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Abstract
The impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s
authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to
restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial de-
bate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee”
employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a ”unitary executive,” in
which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently,
the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have
suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such es-
tablished features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor
of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the
New Deal represented a ”constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in
the distribution of power within the federal government. Still others have argued
that the increased policymaking functions of the modern administrative state jus-
tify permitting Congress to impose greater limits on presidential control over the
execution of the law. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical
record has yet to appear.
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ABSTRACT 
 
The impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s 
authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the 
President’s control over the administration of the law.  The initial debate focused on whether the 
Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the 
Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is 
centralized in the President.  More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical 
practices.  Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have 
become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in 
favor of the unitary executive.  Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New 
Deal represented a “constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in the distribution of 
power within the federal government.  Still others have argued that the increased policymaking 
functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to impose greater limits 
on presidential control over the execution of the law.  To date, however, a complete assessment 
of the historical record has yet to appear. 
This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places 
the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law 
in historical perspective.  It reviews the period between 1945 and 2001, beginning with the 
Administration of Harry Truman, ending with the Administration of Bill Clinton, and paying 
particular attention to the Clinton Impeachment.  The record reveals that these Presidents 
consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the 
issue from being foreclosed by history.  In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent 
illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the separation of powers.  
Supreme Court decisions striking down the legislative veto,1 the line item veto,2 and 
congressional attempts to control federal spending through the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act3 triggered a wave of academic commentary on the proper roles of both Congress and 
the president in exercising control over the execution of federal law.4   
Much of the scholarship has focused on the constitutionality of the so-called 
independent agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission, which theoretically operate outside of direct presidential 
control.5  But the most dramatic flash point for debates about Congress’s ability to limit 
presidential authority over the execution of the law has been the use of independent 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
1 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
2 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
3 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
4 Professor Calabresi has been a leading participant in these debates.  See Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994); 
Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). 
5 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 
19, 31-36; Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter M. Shane, Independent 
Policymaking and Presidential Power:  A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608-23 
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After 
Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779; Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 215; Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. 
L. REV. 277 (1987). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
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counsels.6  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel 
statute in Morrison v. Olson7 notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s dire warnings that special 
prosecutors could be manipulated for political purposes.8  The years that followed 
appeared to bear out Justice Scalia’s predictions,9 eventually peaking during the 
impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.  Further controversy was forestalled 
when the statute authorizing independent counsels was allowed to lapse in 1999. 
The scholarly commentary has evolved into a debate over whether the 
Constitution created a “unitary executive,” in which all executive authority is centralized 
in the president.  Participants in the debate have examined the Constitution’s text10 and 
ratification history11 to determine whether it rejected of the plural executive employed by 
the Articles of the Confederation and many state constitutions in favor of a structure in 
                                                 
6 For early commentary on the constitutionality of independent counsels, see TERRY 
EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (1989); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent 
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson:  A Formalistic 
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Shane, supra note 5, at 598-608; 
Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Legislative Power, 63 
B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983). 
7 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
8 Id. at 712-14, 727-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
9 See Archibald Cox & Philip B. Heymann, After the Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
1999, at A19; Benjamin Ginsberg & Martin Shefter, Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL. 
497 (1995).  For an analysis of the impact of the political abuse of independent counsels for the separation 
of powers, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 
23, 90-95 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments]; Steven G. Calabresi, Some 
Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL. 521 
(1995). 
10 Compare, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 4 (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause, 
bolstered by other constitutional provisions, represents a substantive grant of constitutional power); 
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4 (same); and Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4 (same); with Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-55, 119 (1994) 
(disagreeing with Professor Calabresi’s views); and A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New 
Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994) (same). 
11 Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 603-05 (arguing that the 
preratification history supports the unitary executive); and Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of 
Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 753-89, 808-12 (same); with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-1810 (1996) (drawing the opposite conclusion); Abner S. 
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138-53 (1994) 
(same). 
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which all administrative authority was concentrated in a single person.12  To the extent 
that commentators have focused on the post-ratification history with respect to this issue, 
they have tended to focus primarily on the practices during the presidential 
administrations immediately following the Founding.13   
Increasingly, commentators have looked beyond the Founding era and have begun 
to assess the implications of the broader sweep of history.  The few historical treatments 
that currently exist typically suggest that, regardless of the underlying merits, arguments 
in favor of the unitary executive have been foreclosed by the sweep of more than two 
centuries of constitutional history.14  Others have offered the more limited historical 
claim that nonunitariness has only been an established practice since the Supreme Court’s 
1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.15  Some of those offering such 
arguments have candidly acknowledged the incompleteness of the current literature and 
                                                 
12 It is interesting to note that the conclusion that the Constitution of 1787 established a 
unitary executive has found general acceptance among courts, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
110-33 (1926); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); among historians, see JACK N. 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 250-53, 257-
58 (1996); and even among leading critics of the unitary executive, see Strauss, supra note 5, at 599-601; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432-33 (1987). 
13 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 635-63; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in 
Separation of Powers;  Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Gerhard 
Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 473 (1995); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras:  Constitutional Interpretation in the 
First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 82-111 (1993); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 5-84; 
Prakash, supra note 11, at 789-800.  
14 See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY :  AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
180 n.35 (1994).(“more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution . . . render a strict separation [or 
powers] impossible”); Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1816 (suggesting that a common law constitutionalist 
would regard the past 200 years of practice under the Constitution “dispositive” in foreclosing the unitary 
vision of the executive); Tiefer, supra note 6, at 103 (“From the creation of the government’s structure by 
the First Congress, through the development of the modern agency, and down to the present, the status of 
agencies has not been a unitary or monolithic one.”); see also Miller, supra note 5, at 83-86 (finding past 
presidents’ failure to consistently oppose independent agencies problematic, but ultimately insufficient to 
constitute acquiescence). 
15  295 U.S. 602 (1935).  See Strauss, supra note 5, at _; Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, 
Established by Practice:  The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1111, 1236 (2000). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
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have recognized the need for a more complete assessment of the historical record of 
presidential control over the execution of the law.16   
We have attempted to fill this void by embarking on a four-article series 
examining the history of the president’s ability to execute the law.  In The Unitary 
Executive During the First Half-Century,17 we analyzed the first seven presidencies under 
the Constitution to determine the view of presidential power held by the incumbents 
between 1789 and 1837.  In so doing, we paid particular attention to what is generally 
recognized to be the first great clash between the president and Congress over control of 
the administration of the law:  Andrew Jackson’s removal of his Treasury Secretary 
during his battle with the Bank of the United States.18  Writing in 1997, when the 
institution of independent counsels still enjoyed broad support among both politicians 
and academic commentators,19 we called for and predicted the demise of the independent 
counsel statute.20 
We continued our project in The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-
Century,21 beginning with Martin Van Buren’s presidency in 1837 up through the end of 
the first administration of Grover Cleveland in 1889.  In the process, we offered an 
extended discussion of the second great conflict over the unitary executive:  the 
                                                 
16 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334 (noting that “a full account of the 
growth of presidential power” would allow consideration of “the enormously significant and self-conscious 
changes in the role of the presidency from the period following Jackson through Franklin Roosevelt”). 
17 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997). 
18 Id. at 1538-59. 
19 See Ken Gormley, Monica Lewinsky, Impeachment, and the death of the Independent 
Counsel Law:  What Congress Can Salvage from the Wreckage—A Minimalist View, 60 MD. L. REV. 97, 
101-02 (2001) (noting that as of the end of 1997 the independent counsel statute still enjoyed broad support 
and that the abruptness with which people abandoned it came as a shock). 
20 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1462. 
21 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second 
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 668 (2003). 
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impeachment of Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act.22  The period 
closed with a series of landmark events, including the enactment of the Civil Service Act 
of 1883, the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 (the agency that 
would eventually become the model for all subsequent independent agencies), and the 
repeal of the Tenure of Office Act in 1887.23 
In The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,24 we continued our 
survey of presidents from Benjamin Harrison through Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In the 
process, we offered a detailed analysis of FDR’s failed attempt to implement the 
Brownlow Committee’s proposal to reorganize the executive branch, which is widely 
recognized as a watershed moment in the history of the president’s authority over the 
execution of the law.25  This period plays a critical role in arguments about the unitariness 
of the executive branch.  Many constitutional theorists, led by Bruce Ackerman, regard 
the New Deal era to be a constitutional moment that implicitly ratified major changes in 
the allocation of power within the federal government.26  This period also witnessed the 
rise of the so-called independent agencies, which had been languishing in the aftermath 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States.27  We found that presidents 
throughout this period consistently asserted the president’s role as the ultimate repository 
of executive power.  The anti-unitarian position did not receive any material support until 
                                                 
22 Id. at 746-58. 
23 Id. at 788-89, 795-99. 
24 Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Laurence Nee, The Unitary Executive During 
the Third Half-Century (forthcoming 2004). 
25 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2274-75 (2001); 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334; Miller, supra note 5, at 79, 85. 
26 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991); Bruce 
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801, 845-96 (1995). 
27 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
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1935, when the Supreme Court reversed decades of precedent and upheld the 
constitutionality of congressionally imposed limitations on president’s power to remove 
officers charged with executing the law in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.28  
Although Roosevelt was unable to undo the damage done by the Court’s ruling in 
Humphrey’s Executor, his continued efforts to resist the move toward agency 
independence was more than sufficient to foreclose any claims of presidential 
acquiescence. 
We believe that our prior work has shown that each of the first thirty-two 
presidents—from George Washington up through Franklin D. Roosevelt—believed in a 
unitary executive of the kind defended by many scholars in recent years.  These thirty-
two presidents all asserted a broad presidential power to remove subordinate officials 
exercising executive policy-making power for any reason, including policy 
disagreements.  We also showed that many of these thirty-two presidents also asserted 
other presidential powers of control over law execution including the issuing of binding 
orders to subordinates to take particular actions and the nullifying of particular actions 
taken by subordinates.  Finally, we showed that many of these thirty-two presidents had 
construed the Vesting Clause of Article II to be a grant of power to the president, as 
Professor Calabresi has previously argued in a debate with Professors Lawrence Lessig 
and Cass Sunstein.29 
                                                 
28 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  For our discussion of Humphrey’s Executor, see Yoo et al., supra 
note 24, at _.  
29 Compare Calabresi, supra note 4, at 1378-1400, 1403-05 (arguing that the Article II 
Vesting Clause represents a substantive grant of constitutional power); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, 
at 563-64, 570-81, 612-13 (same); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1165-70, 1175-81, 1186-1206 
(same), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 47-55, 119 (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi’s 
views). 
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We now pick up the survey where we left off in our three prior articles and 
examine the presidencies during the fourth half-century of our constitutional history to 
see the views expressed by presidents from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton regarding the 
scope of the president’s power to execute the law.  As in our previous articles, in 
conducting our historical review of presidential practices, we employ the interpretive 
method known as “departmentalism” or “coordinate construction.”  This approach holds 
that all three branches of the federal government have the power and duty to interpret the 
Constitution and that the meaning of the Constitution is determined through the dynamic 
interaction of all three branches.30  The relevant inquiry is whether a long-standing and 
unbroken practice exists to which both Congress and the presidents have acquiesced.  
Only if that is the case can a practice justifiably be regarded as an established part of the 
structure of our government.31  In this respect, our methodology is the similar to the one 
followed by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,32 which relied on the fact that eleven 
of thirteen presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan had refused to accede to 
the legislative veto in rejecting arguments that the legislative veto had become an 
accepted feature under the separation of powers.33 
Our historical account focuses primarily on the three devices generally viewed as 
necessary to any theory of the unitary executive:  the president’s power to remove 
subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the manner in 
                                                 
30 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1463-72. 
31 For the classic statement of this position, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 
459, 474 (1915).  For other examples, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686 
(1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679-83 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 170-76 (1926); and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
32 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
33 Id. at 942 n.13. 
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which subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the president’s 
power to veto or nullify such officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power.34  
Where appropriate, we also discuss presidential exercises of the foreign affairs power, 
which derives largely from the Article II Vesting Clause, the same constitutional 
foundation as the president’s power to execute the law.35  We do not claim that there is 
consensus among all three branches of government as to the president’s control of the 
removal power and of the powers to direct and nullify.  Rather, we claim only that there 
is no consistent, three-branch custom, tradition, or practice to which presidents have 
acquiesced permitting congressionally imposed derogations of the president’s sole 
authority to execute the law.36  As a result, we reject claims that arguments regarding the 
proper balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches have been 
effectively foreclosed by history.  Instead, we contend that such arguments must be 
resolved on the basis of their legal and normative merits. 
The years between from 1945 to 2001 represents a particularly interesting period 
in the constitutional history of presidential power.  The executive branch that emerges 
during the second half of the twentieth century is a mammoth operation that dwarfs the 
scale of administration during the time of George Washington.  Indeed, the size of the 
modern federal bureaucracy far exceeds even the burgeoning administrative state that had 
emerged by the end of the New Deal. 
                                                 
34 Id. at 1458. 
35 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252-65 (2001); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1639, 1676-68 (2002). 
36 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1458. 
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In addition, the modern presidency wields far more power and plays a far larger 
role in setting and coordinating federal policy than in previous periods.  The scope of 
presidential power is perhaps demonstrated most dramatically by the fact that Harry S. 
Truman’s accession to the presidency in 1945, which commences the period covered by 
this installment of our series of articles, coincides with the beginning of the Atomic Age.  
Ever since 1945, the fact that the president has possessed the power to deploy nuclear 
weapons on a global scale if the circumstances call for it provides simply the most 
dramatic demonstration of the increasing importance of the office.   
Indeed, the presidency now far surpasses any other governmental institution in 
terms of political leadership.  Chief executives typically establish a direct relationship 
with the American people and became the embodiment and the focal point of the national 
will.  Thus, presidents like Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan 
wielded more power and were more central to the life of the nation than were such 
predecessors as Franklin Pierce or Benjamin Harrison.  For better or worse, we have an 
imperial presidency now.37 
As a result, many non-formalist theories of constitutional interpretation contend 
that the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt represents a turning point in the history of the 
separation of powers in which the polity effectively sanctioned a fundamental 
redistribution of power among the three branches.  Interestingly, different scholars draw 
starkly different normative inferences from this fact.  Some scholars, such as Peter 
Strauss, Abner Greene, and Martin Flaherty, have argued that the increased policymaking 
functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to place greater 
                                                 
37 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1989). 
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limits on presidential control over the execution of the law.38  Others, including most 
notably Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, have drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing 
that the increase in discretionary, policymaking authority wielded by administrative 
agencies has strengthened the case in favor of the unitary executive.39   
We take issue with both approaches.  Contrary to the prognosis of Ackerman and 
Flaherty, presidents throughout the post-World War II era consistently asserted their sole 
authority to execute the laws, often with the support of the judiciary.  Indeed, the 
reaffirmations of the unitariness of the executive branch that we discuss are part of a 
seamless position that presidents have consistently advanced since the Founding.  Thus, 
from the standpoint of constitutional law, what we find singular is not the supposed 
fundamental discontinuity that drives the constitutional moment envisioned by 
Ackerman,40 but rather the consistency with which the executive branch has asserted its 
vision of the proper scope of presidential power.  From the standpoint of three-branch 
constitutional interpretation, the conduct of presidents throughout the period running 
from 1945 to 2001 stands as a strong reaffirmation of the unitariness of the executive 
branch that is more than sufficient to vitiate any inference that the executive branch has 
acquiesced to any encroachments upon its prerogatives. 
We begin in Parts I through X below with a discussion of the eleven presidencies 
between 1945 and 2001.  In Part XI, below, we pay particularly close attention to the rise 
and fall of the Ethics in Government Act, which created so-called independent counsels 
to prosecute wrongdoing by senior executive branch officials.  We shall see that the 
                                                 
38 See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1816-21, 1823-24; Greene, supra note 11, at 153-95; 
Strauss, supra note 5. 
39 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 93-106. 
40 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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history of the Ethics in Government Act is strikingly similar to the history of the so-
called Tenure of Office Act and would end in the Act’s demise, just as we predicted in 
1997.41 
I. HARRY S. TRUMAN 
Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Roosevelt as president at a time when the 
whole world was consumed by war.  With no time to prepare for his awesome 
responsibilities, Truman would have to complete the Second World War, manage the 
transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and formulate a new foreign policy to 
contain Soviet communism.  Truman’s biographer, Donald R. McCoy, observes: 
Of elected presidents, only Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
had assumed office under such pressure and with such complications.  
They had been elected to their high estate, however; had had some time to 
prepare to assume it; and were not obligated to carry on the policies of 
their predecessors.  Truman did not have the time, the prestige, the mental 
preparation, or the luxury of concentrating on only one crisis.  He had, in 
fact, two major crises to resolve simultaneously—winning the war and 
securing the peace—and the one complicated the other.  And waiting in 
the wings for him were the challenges of domestic and world 
reconstruction.42 
Fortunately, Truman’s character “enabled him to make much of his on-the-job 
training as president.  He was brisk, decisive, direct, industrious, practical, and tough.”43  
Truman “exercised command vigorously”44 and on August 6, 1945, he dropped the first 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima thus bringing World War II to an end.45  In general, Truman 
                                                 
41 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1462. 
42 DONALD R. MCCOY, THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 34 (1984). 
43 Id. at 15. 
44 Id. at 22. 
45 Id. at 39. 
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gets high marks as “a supremely tough, decisive leader”46 who was completely in control 
from the start of his entire administration. 
Truman immediately announced that he would continue FDR’s policies and that 
he would “prosecute the war on both fronts, east and west, with all the vigor we possess 
to a successful conclusion.”47  Despite his initial determination to continue Roosevelt’s 
policies, he soon realized “there could be no Truman administration unless he had his 
own people in office”48 and had a Cabinet that was “in entire sympathy with what I 
wanted to do”49  Truman therefore acted swiftly to assemble his own White House staff.  
Six months into his presidency Truman was left “with only three of the ten cabinet 
members whom he had inherited.”50   
Truman relied “more heavily on his top subordinates than had Roosevelt,”51 and 
he “had daily meetings with his chief White House aides and at least weekly meetings 
with cabinet members.”52  It would be a mistake to infer from Truman’s more 
deliberative style that he exerted any less control over the execution of the law than did 
Roosevelt.  Truman’s determination to take full responsibility for the entirety of his 
administration is evident in the rules he laid down for his cabinet on May 18, 1945.  
Cabinet members were to help the president 
carry out policies of the government; in many instances the Cabinet could 
be of tremendous help to the President by offering advice whether he liked 
it or not but when [the] president [gave] an order they should carry it out.  
I told them I expected to have a Cabinet I could depend on and take in my 
                                                 
46 Id. at 65. 
47 Id. at 16. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 Id. at 18. 
50 Id. at 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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confidence and if this confidence was not well placed I would get a 
Cabinet in which I could place confidence.53 
And when cabinet members did not execute the law in accordance with Truman’s 
wishes, he did not hesitate to remove them or force them to resign.  For example, 
Secretary of Defense Johnson was told to resign because of his “conflicts with other 
officials, his verbal indiscretions, his chumminess with Republicans, and his slowness in 
conforming to new policies during a war.”54  Even more dramatic was the forced 
resignation of Attorney General J. Howard McGrath.  The sequence of events that led to 
McGrath’s undoing began on February 1, 1952, when he appointed Newbold Morris as a 
special prosecutor to investigate alleged corruption in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and 
the Department of Justice’s Tax Division, only the fifth occasion in history in which a 
special prosecutor had been named.  After Morris attempted to identify senior Justice 
Department officials who might be taking bribes by preparing a lengthy questionnaire 
intended to identify those officials’ whose lifestyles outstripped their salaries, McGrath 
ordered that the questionnaires not to be distributed.  When Morris then sought access to 
McGrath’s official and personal records, McGrath fired Morris, which in turn prompted 
Truman to fire McGrath later that same day.55  The investigation was then completed by 
Judge James P. McGranery, who succeeded McGrath as Attorney General. 
Truman’s willingness to remove McGrath for his attempt to interfere with the 
activities of the special prosecutor illustrates the strength of Truman’s belief in his 
authority over the execution of federal law.  This is not to suggest that Truman thought 
                                                 
53 Id. Quoting Harry S. Truman. 
54 Id. at 236. 
55 Donald C. Smaltz , The Independent Counsel:  A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 
2330-31 (1998).   
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that he had any less right to control the conduct of the special prosecutor than he had over 
the Attorney General.  The manner in which the special prosecutor conducted his 
investigation revealed that he was completely subject to presidential direction.  For 
example, after meeting with Truman, Morris declared that he did not need the subpoena 
power “because if I want something and can't get it, I can go to the President for it.”56  
The fact that Morris was himself removed by McGrath, who was himself then removed, 
further confirms that the Truman Administration did not regard the special prosecutor as 
independent of the executive branch or as anything less than completely accountable to 
the president.  Truman disagreed with McGrath’s actions as a matter of policy; at no 
point, however, did Truman suggest that McGrath lacked the authority to dismiss 
Morris.57   
As befitting a person with a plate on his desk proclaiming “The buck stops 
here,”58 Truman also exerted direct supervisory control over other aspects of his 
administration as well.  Truman listened to and relied upon his White House staff and the 
Bureau of the Budget, but it was always “clear he was the boss, the person on whose desk 
‘the buck stops’.  For all their influence, they were advisors, not executives or policy 
makers.”59  Truman also “created the institution of the presidency”60 by refining the 
structure of the White House staff and making increasing use of the Bureau of the 
Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security Council.  The 
                                                 
56 Quoted in id. at 2331. 
57 See generally KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE:  THE FEDERAL SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 15 (1992).   
58 MCCOY, supra note 42, at 315, 
59 Id. at 147. 
60 Id. at 164. 
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development of efficient means of using the White House staff to police the executive 
branch greatly enhances the unitary executive. 
Military and foreign policy matters continued to occupy a substantial part of 
Truman’s time in his second term.  Truman repeatedly asserted himself over the armed 
forces, and he kept military expenses down.  Truman “never let anyone forget who was 
the commander in chief.”61  In addition, “[t]he Americans had developed and tested the 
hydrogen bomb by November 1952” and had “begun work on atomic-powered 
submarines and aircraft, as well as on guided missiles.”62   
By the summer of 1950, Truman found himself being drawn into a major 
undeclared war in Korea.63  This was a major exercise of executive power, and Truman 
was to proceed on his own authority.  It would also lead to one of the most dramatic 
removals ever in American history when Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of 
his command of U.S. troops in Korea for being insubordinate and for openly intervening 
in the political arena.  Truman believed that MacArthur’s action posed “a danger to the 
fundamental principle of civilian supremacy over the military.”64  This very high 
visibility removal illustrates dramatically why the removal power is so important for the 
president if he is to be in charge of the executive branch.   
Not only was Truman willing to exercise the removal power; he also vigorously 
defended it against congressional attempts to place limits on its exercise, as evinced by 
his continuation of the defense of the removal power in connection with the case of 
                                                 
61 Id. at 140. 
62 Id. at 194-95. 
63 Id. at 226-27. 
64 CHESTER J. PACH, JR., & ELMO RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER 17 (1991). 
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United States v. Lovett,65 begun during the Roosevelt Administration.66  The Lovett case 
arose when Congress attached a rider to an appropriations bill specifying that no federal 
funds could be used to pay Lovett and two other named executive branch employees 
suspected of holding subversive views.  In essence, the issue in Lovett was whether 
Congress could use its spending power to in effect remove executive branch employees 
whom the president wanted to retain.  Although the Court of Claims had decided in favor 
of the Administration’s position, it failed to provide the strong endorsement of the 
removal power that the Administration sought.  Dissatisfied with the Court of Claims’ 
disposal of the case on nonconstitutional grounds, the Attorney General successfully 
petitioned for certiorari in early 1946.67 
The Truman Administration’s brief on the merits primarily attacked the rider as 
an impermissible infringement on the President’s power to remove,68 as did its 
presentation during oral argument.69  The administration’s brief specifically said that 
If the President is to perform his constitutional obligation to execute the 
laws, he must have power to control the subordinate officers through 
whom the executive function is administered.  The principal control which 
the President has over executive officers is his power to remove them, and 
it has been said that he is . . . Chief of the Executive only through his 
power of removing appointees who are recalcitrant and unwilling to 
follow his wishes.  Any exercise of the removal power by the legislative 
                                                 
65 66 F. Supp. 142, 146 (Ct. Cl. 1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
66 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
67 John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett:  Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1975).  The Attorney General’s decision to seek Supreme Court review is 
telling because the outcome he desired had prevailed in the Court of Claims.  Therefore the Attorney 
General petitioned for certiorari not to change the result in the judgment below, but rather to change its 
rationale. 
68 The Administration’s brief devoted some forty-seven pages to its removal argument, 
spending the remaining fifteen pages challenging the rider as a bill of attainder.  Id. at 28-29 (citing Brief 
for the Petitioner, United States v. Lovett (Nos. 809 to 811)). 
69 Id. at 30 & n.86 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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branch necessarily interferes with the executive power and tends to subject 
the executive branch to the control and domination of Congress.70 
The Truman Administration’s brief goes on to claim that in England the “power to 
remove executive officers was vested in the Crown”71 and the brief specifically cites the 
Vesting Clause of Article II as the source of the President’s removal power.72  The brief 
concludes its argument against a congressional power to remove Lovett by showing that 
the consistent practice from 1789 up through the 1940’s was of presidential not 
congressional power to remove.73 
Although the Supreme Court did reach the constitutional questions avoided by the 
Court of Claims, it upheld the Administration’s position on the grounds that the statute 
represented a bill of attainder without reaching the removal issue.74  As a result, none of 
the arguments on the removal power in the administration’s brief found its way into the 
Supreme Court’s opinion.  For the purposes of this Article, however, it is of no 
consequence that the Supreme Court chose not to base its resolution of the case on the 
removal power.  The fact that the Truman Administration strongly opposed congressional 
infringement upon the removal power is sufficient to show that Truman did not acquiesce 
to this deviation from the unitary executive. 
Having failed in its attempt to use its control over appropriations to remove 
certain executive officers, Congress tried to remove Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Reclamation Michael W. Straus and Regional Reclamation Director Richard L. Boke by 
                                                 
70 Brief for the Petitioner at 15, United States v. Lovett (Nos. 809 to 811). 
71 Id. at 19. 
72 Id. at 21. 
73 Id. at 32-48. 
74 328 U.S. at 307.  The House considered refusing to allocate the money to pay Watson, 
Dodd, and Lovett, but in the end voted 99 to 98 to appropriate the necessary funds.  93 CONG. REC. 2973-
75, 2977, 2987-91 (1947); see also Ely, supra note 67, at 10 n.32, 31 n.93. 
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arbitrarily changing the qualifications for their positions.75  Truman complained that this 
provision, designed as it was to “effect the removal of two men now holding such 
positions,” was “contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of those provisions of the 
Constitution which guarantee the separation of legislative and executive functions.”76  
However, because Congress had already adjourned, Truman felt that he “had no choice” 
but to sign the bill.  Truman indicated, however, that “had it been possible to veto this bill 
without bringing the vital work of the Department to a standstill,” he would have done 
so.77  Congress persisted the following year, attaching a provision to a continuing 
resolution prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for paying Straus’s or Boke’s 
salaries.78  Again Truman objected in much the same terms.79  Perhaps chastened by their 
defeat in Lovett, Congress finally backed down the following month when it deleted the 
changes in these offices’ qualifications without having forced Straus or Boke out of their 
posts.80 
That said, there were occasions on which Truman did not consistently support the 
unitariness of the executive branch.  Truman’s position was somewhat equivocal 
regarding the President’s power to direct and overrule subordinate executive officials’ 
exercises of discretion, as evidenced by the attitude of his administration during the 
consideration of the Reorganization Act of 1945.  Although Truman’s initial proposal 
would have included all of the independent agencies within the President’s reorganization 
                                                 
75 Interior Department Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 80-841, 62 Stat. 1112, 1126 (1948). 
76 Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on the Interior Department Appropriation 
Act (June 30, 1948), in 1948 PUB. PAPERS 390, 390. 
77 Id. 
78 Temporary Appropriations Act of 1949, ch. 101, 63 Stat. 67. 
79 Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Temporary 
Appropriations Bill (May 12, 1949), in 1949 PUB. PAPERS 250. 
80 Act of Oct. 12, 1949, ch. 680, § _, 63 Stat. 765, _; see also Note, 1949 PUB. PAPERS 250. 
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authority,81 Congress refused to comply and instead followed the pattern established in 
the Reorganization Act of 193982 by specifically exempting certain specified agencies 
from the Act altogether and by strictly limiting the degree to which certain other agencies 
could be reorganized.83  Truman also implicitly condoned another deviation from the 
unitariness of the executive branch when recommended that Congress incorporate the 
legislative veto provision of the 1939 reorganization statute into the 1945 version.84  
Congress of course took Truman at his word and included a two-house legislative veto 
into the 1945 Act.85  Truman also tolerated the enactment of other legislative vetoes 
throughout his first term.86 
Truman began to offer greater resistance to such intrusions after he won reelection 
in his own right.  Building on the recommendations of the First Hoover Commission,87 
                                                 
81 Letter from President Truman to the Congress of the United States (May 24, 1945), 
reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1945).     
82 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
83 Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 70-263, § 5, 59 Stat. 613, 615-16; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess 6, 10-11 (1945); S. REP. NO. 638, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1945). 
84 Truman noted that under that arrangement, Anecessary control is reserved to the Congress 
since it may, by simple majority vote of the two Houses, nullify any action of the President which does not 
meet with its approval.”  Letter from President Truman to the Congress of the United States (May 24, 
1945), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1945). 
85 § 6(a), 59 Stat. at 616.  The Senate even dallied with shifting to a one-house legislative 
veto, S. REP. NO. 638, supra note 84, at 3, but in the end it backed down and retained the two-house veto.  
Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 
66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 581 n.46 (1953) (citing 91 CONG. REC. 10269-74, 10714 (1945)). 
86 For a discussion of other legislative vetoes accepted during Truman’s first term, see 
Ginnane, supra note 85, at 583-86, 603-04.  See generally H. Lee Watson, Comment, Congress Steps Out:  
A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1019-21 (1975); Louis Fisher, The 
Legislative Veto:  Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1993, at 273, 283 [hereinafter 
Fisher, Legislative Veto]; Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. 
L. REV. 57, 80 (1990) [hereinafter Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts]. 
87 The Commission called for a “clear line of control from the President to these department 
and agency heads and from him to their subordinates.”  COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:  A REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 1 (1949) [hereinafter FIRST HOOVER COMM’N REP. ON EXEC. BRANCH].  The Commission 
elaborated: 
 
Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority—the power to direct.  
The exercise of authority is impossible without a clear line of command from the top to 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
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Truman recommended in 1949 that Congress make the President’s authority to 
reorganize the government permanent and extend it to cover all governmental agencies, 
including the independent regulatory commissions.  In Truman’s eyes, “the new 
reorganization act should be comprehensive in scope; no agency or function of the 
executive branch should be exempted from its operation.”88  Truman’s growing support 
for the unitariness of the executive branch, however, was still incomplete:  his 
recommendation continued to condone the legislative veto procedure contained in the 
Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945 “whereby a reorganization plan submitted to the 
Congress by the President becomes effective in 60 days unless rejected by both Houses of 
Congress.”89  
                                                                                                                                                 
the bottom, and a return line of responsibility and accountability from the bottom to the 
top. 
 
Id.  Far from posing a threat to free and responsible government, “strength and unity in an executive make 
clear who is responsible for faults in administration and thus enable the legislature better to enforce 
accountability to the people.”  Id. at 2 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).  However, 
such lines of authority and accountability “has been weakened, or actually broken in many places and in 
many ways.”  As the Commission found: 
 
That line of responsibility still exists in constitutional theory, but it has been worn away 
by administrative practices, by political pressures, and by detailed statutory provisions.  
Statutory powers often have been vested in subordinate officers in such a way as to deny 
authority to the President or a department head. 
 
Id. at 4; see also Letter from Herbert Hoover to Kenneth McKellar (Jan. 13 1949), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 
232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949) (“[W]e must reorganize the executive branch to give it the simplicity 
of structure, the unity of purpose, and the clear line of executive authority that was originally intended 
under the Constitution.”).  Therefore, the Commission recommended that all agencies be placed within 
executive departments and that all independent authorities granted to subordinate executive officials by 
statute or appropriations rider be eliminated.  FIRST HOOVER COMM’N REP. ON EXEC. BRANCH, supra, at 
32, 34.  The Commission also recommended that Congress not exempt any agencies from the President’s 
reorganization authority, including in particular the independent regulatory commissions.  Furthermore 
Congress should not place any limitations based on an agency’s “independent exercise of quasi-legislative 
or quasi-judicial functions.”  Such phrases are too “vague and of uncertain meaning” and would only 
inhibit the President’s proper control over the executive branch.  Id. at x,-i. 
88 Message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress (Jan. 17, 1949), reprinted in S. 
REP. NO. 232, supra note 87, at 4, 5. 
89 Id. at 5.  In support of this proposal, the Attorney General’s Office issued a memorandum 
repudiating Attorney General Mitchell’s formalist critique of the legislative veto.  The memorandum 
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Congress accepted the gist of Truman’s proposal and removed all of the 
exemptions except for those governing the Comptroller General and the General 
Accounting Office.  Congress did exact a price for surrendering its ability to protect 
specific agencies that were of special interest to its members:  it added the requirement 
that all proposed changes to certain agencies be contained in a single reorganization plan 
unmingled with reorganizations affecting other agencies and broadened the two-house 
legislative veto into a one-house legislative veto.90  
Truman immediately used this authority to assert greater Presidential control over 
the independent agencies.  Again building off of the recommendations of the First 
Hoover Commission,91 Truman submitted a reorganization plan on June 20, 1949, 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasoned that legislative vetoes did not represent “an improper legislative encroachment upon the Executive 
in the performance of functions delegated to him by the Congress. . . .  [T]he authority given to the 
President to reorganize the Government is legally and adequately vested in the President when the 
Congress takes the initial step of passing a reorganization act.”  Thus Congress simply reserved “the right 
to disapprove action taken by the President under the statutory grant of authority.”  Letter and 
Memorandum from Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General, to John L. McClellan, Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Expenditures (Mar. 17, 1949), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 232, supra note 87, at 18, 20. 
In fact, the memorandum did not regard the legislative veto as being any more sinister than a 
provision requiring that the executive branch report its intended actions to Congress and then wait for a 
specified period of time:  
 
It cannot be questioned that the President in carrying out his Executive functions may 
consult with whom he pleases. . . .  There would appear to be no reason why the 
Executive may not be given express statutory authority to communicate to the Congress 
his intention to perform a given Executive function unless the Congress by some stated 
means indicates its disapproval. 
 
Id. at 20.   
90 Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, § 6(a), 63 Stat. 203, 205.  See generally Ginnane, 
supra note 85, at, 581-82; Watson, supra note 86, at 1014 n.143. 
91 Although the Commission stopped short of the Brownlow Committee’s challenge to the 
independent agencies’ constitutionality, it still leveled several criticisms at their structure.  First, it 
complained that the independent agencies’ exercise of executive authority was cumbersome and badly 
coordinated with the rest of the executive branch.  Therefore, the Commission recommended that “all 
administrative responsibility be vested in the chairman of the commission,” THE COMMISSION ON 
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REGULATORY COMMISSIONS:  A 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 5 (1949), and that a number of executive functions be transferred to Cabinet 
Departments, id. at 12-13.  Finally, the Commission’s task force recommended that the President be given 
the authority to designate and remove at will which of the particular commissioners would serve as 
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making sweeping changes to bring the United States Maritime Commission under more 
direct control of the executive branch.92  The following year, Truman submitted a similar 
series of plans proposing that the executive and administrative functions of all of the 
independent agencies be centralized in the Chairman and that the Chairman be made 
appointable and removable at will by the President.93  Congress’s response demonstrated 
the legislative veto’s effectiveness in interfering with the proper functioning of the 
executive branch:  Even though Congress had dropped the specific exemptions for the 
independent agencies from the Reorganization Act of 1949, it was still able to frustrate 
Truman’s efforts to assert greater control over the ICC, FCC, and NLRB by exercising its 
legislative veto over the plans to reorganize those agencies.94 
Perhaps in response to the mischief caused by these legislative vetoes, Truman 
began objecting to the legislative veto as an improper interference with the independence 
of the executive branch.  Truman’s first such protest arose when Congress revived the 
provision that had drawn the wrath of both Presidents Wilson and Hoover several 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chairman.  TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS [APPENDIX N] PREPARED FOR THE 
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT viii, 13-14, 31-33 
(1949).  For similar views, see ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 683-
84(1941). 
92 Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1949, 3 C.F.R. 1001 (1948-1953 compilation).  Another plan 
abolished the United States Maritime Commission and transferred its functions in part to the Secretary of 
Commerce and in part to the newly constituted, semi-independent Federal Maritime Board within the 
Commerce Department.  Reorg. Plan No. 21 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1012 (1948-1953 compilation); see also 
Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL. L. REV. 866, 903 n.180 (1969). 
93 Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 511, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (ICC); 
Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1005 (1948-1953 compilation) (FTC); Reorg. Plan No. 9 of 1950, 3 
C.F.R. 1005 (1948-1953 compilation) (FPC); Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1948-1953 
compilation) (SEC); Reorg. Plan No. 11 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (FCC); 
Reorg. Plan No. 12 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 516, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (NLRB); Reorg. Plan No. 13 
of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1948-1953 compilation) (Civil Aeronautics Board).   
94 _; see also Angel M. Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory 
Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 486 (1994) (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 134-37 (1955)). 
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decades earlier95 requiring that government publications be subject to the prior approval 
of the Joint Committee on Printing.96  Truman signed this legislation, but objected to it as 
an “invasion of the rights of the Executive branch by a legislative committee.”97  
Although Truman acknowledged Congress’s right to establish printing policies and to 
place limits on the printing activities of the executive branch, “restrictions imposed by the 
Congress should be left to the executive agencies to administer.”98  Although Truman did 
propose substitute legislation to eliminate this problem, Congress took no action on it.99 
Truman offered even stronger resistance to subsequent congressional efforts to 
control executive discretion.  In 1951, when Congress attempted to enact a provision 
similar to one that Roosevelt had previously tolerated100 requiring that all significant 
military real estate projects be approved in advance by the Armed Services Committees, 
Truman drew the line.  Concerned by Congress’s increasing tendency to attempt to 
influence the execution and administration of the laws, Truman vetoed the legislation.  
As Truman reasoned, “Under our system of government it is contemplated that the 
Congress will enact the laws and will leave their administration and execution to the 
executive branch.”101  The House voted 312 to 68 to override the veto.102  The Senate, 
however, took no action, and the veto stood.  Four months later, however, Congress was 
                                                 
95 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
96 Act of July 5, 1949, ch. 296, 63 Stat. 405, 406. 
97 Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on Government Printing and Binding (July 
5, 1949), in 1949 PUB. PAPERS 346, 347. 
98 Id. 
99 Watson, supra note 86, at 1019 (citing JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 218 (1964)). 
100 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
101 Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill Relating to Land Acquisition and Disposal Actions by the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Federal Civil Defense Administration (May 15, 1951), in 1951 PUB. PAPERS 
280, 282. 
102 97 CONG. REC. 5445 (1951). 
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able to frustrate Truman’s efforts to oppose the legislative veto by attaching an almost 
identical provision to the Military Construction Act of 1951.103  Because of the urgent 
need for the legislation, the President had no choice but to sign it.104 
Truman continued his opposition to legislative vetoes the following year when he 
pocket vetoed a bill which would have required the Postmaster General to “come into 
agreement” with the Public Works Committees before consummating lease-purchase 
contracts for the construction of post offices.  Truman objected because the bill 
“contain[ed] a provision which would infringe upon the functions of the executive branch 
to such an extent that I feel I cannot give my approval.”105  According to Truman, it was 
improper to “giv[e] committees veto power over executive functions authorized by the 
Congress to be carried out by executive agencies.”106  Thus, by the end of his term, 
Truman’s metamorphosis into a steadfast opponent of the legislative veto was complete. 
Truman’s vigor as president was further illustrated by the frequency of his vetoes.  
McCoy describes the veto as “a significant weapon in Truman’s arsenal” and says “he 
was among the presidents who used this weapon most often.”107  He “employed the veto 
twenty-one times in 1945 and thirty-three times in 1946,” and “Congress did not override 
any of these vetoes.”108  In the tradition of that great Democratic president, Andrew 
Jackson, Truman liked to portray himself as “the tribune of the people” and as “the 
                                                 
103 Ch. 434, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365. 
104 See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 282-83; Ginnane, supra note 85, at 603-04; 
Watson, supra note 86, at 1019-20 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 222). 
105 Harry S. Truman, Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Authorizing the Postmaster 
General to Lease Quarter for Post Office Purposes (July 19, 1952), in 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 488, 488. 
106 Id.; see also Watson, supra note 86, at 1020; Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, 
supra note 86, at 80; Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 283. 
107 Id. 
108 MCCOY, supra note 42, at 62. 
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people’s president.”109  Truman cast himself as the people’s champion against the special 
interest groups that held such sway with Congress.  In the 1948 campaign, he saw the 
contest as being between “Truman—the world class champion of peace, prosperity, 
democracy, and the people—fighting against special interests at home and 
authoritarianism abroad.”110  As Truman said explicitly on September 18, 1948 at a 
campaign stop:  “The issue is the people against the special interests.”111 
Another major exercise of the executive power occurred when Truman invoked 
the authority vested in him “by the Constitution and the laws of the United States” and 
issued a pair executive orders directing all cabinet secretaries to institute programs to 
ensure nondiscrimination in federal employment112 and in the military.113  That these 
orders were based on the president’s inherent authority appears to have been no accident, 
as evidenced by the fact that Truman invoked specific statutory authority when issuing a 
similar executive order mandating nondiscrimination in government contracting.114  
McCoy reports that “by the time Truman left office, the work of this committee would 
lead to substantial racial integration in the military and to fairer procedures for promotion 
                                                 
109 Id. at 104, 106. 
110 Id. at 159. 
111 Id. at 161. 
112 Exec. Order 9980, 3 C.F.R. _(1943-48 compilation). 
113 Exec. Order 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-48 compilation).  In this second order, Truman 
also invoked his authority as Commander in Chief.  Id. 
114 Exec. Order 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-53 compilation); see also Note, Executive Order 
11,246 and Reverse Discrimination Challenges:  Presidential Authority to Require Affirmative Action, 54 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 376, 382-83, 387 (1979) (concluding that Truman’s order was issued under his the 
“presidential war powers” and  “national defense powers” rather than under any statutory authority); United 
States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that Truman issued 
these orders pursuant to his “war powers”); Contractors Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 442. F.2d 159, 169 (3d 
Cir. 1971) (concluding that Truman issued these orders pursuant to his “national defense powers,” while 
referencing several statutory bases).  But see Andrée Kahn Blumstein, Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way:  
The Case for Delimiting Presidential Power Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 33 VAND. L. REV. 921, 
924 (1980) (suggesting that Truman based the executive orders on statutory grounds). 
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and training.”115  Black Americans saw these executive orders as “unprecedented since 
the time of Lincoln.”116  “By the end of the Truman administration, the air force, the 
army, and the navy were largely integrated racially and opportunities for equal treatment 
had been very much enhanced.”117  One of the Truman administration’s final actions as it 
left office was to file in December of 1952 an amicus brief in Brown v. Board of 
Education.118 
One of the most famous controversies of the Truman Administration came over 
the President’s decision to seize the steel mills with led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
famous Steel Seizure decision—a decision which limits executive power but in a way that 
is wholly consistent with the theory of the unitary executive.  The steel crisis “had been 
brewing since late 1951”119 when it became clear the United Steelworkers wanted a large 
wage increase.  On April 8, 1952, Truman directed his Commerce Secretary Charles 
Sawyer “to take over and continue the operation of the steel mills, because a ‘work 
stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense.’”120  
Resolutions calling for “Truman’s impeachment were introduced in the House, and 
attempts were made in the Senate to restrict the use of federal funds for operating the 
steel mills.  Most significant, court suits were initiated to resolve the situation legally.”121  
                                                 
115 MCCOY, supra note 42, at 109. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 170. 
118 Id. at 307. 
119 Id. at 290. 
120 Id. at 291. 
121 Id. at 292. 
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The district court issued an order enjoining the seizure on April 29th, and the government 
took the case directly up to the Supreme Court for its resolution.122 
In its brief in the Steel Seizure case, the Truman administration vigorously pressed 
the view that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a generalized grant of power to the 
President.  The administration’s brief explicitly said: 
Section 1 of Article II provides that “the executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”  In our view, this clause 
constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the government is 
capable.  Remembering that we do not have a parliamentary form of 
Government but rather a tripartite system which contemplates a vigorous 
executive, it seems plain that Clause 1 of Article II cannot be read as a 
mere restricted definition which would leave the Chief Executive without 
ready power to deal with emergencies.123 
The brief also pointed to the Take Care Clause as construed in Cunningham v. 
Neagle124 and in In re Debs125 as justifying President Truman’s seizure of the steel 
mills.126  The brief went on to note numerous actions by Presidents where property was 
taken in wartime beginning with the War of 1812 and continuing “during the 
administrations of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.”127  And, it also 
cited Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young128 and United States v. Midwest Oil Co.129 for the 
                                                 
122 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952). 
123 Brief for Petitioner at 96-97, Youngstown (Nos. 744 and 745) (citations omitted; citing 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913); 
CHARLES THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, chs. 4-5 ( 1922); THE FEDERALIST, NOS. 
70 AND 71; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Sept. 15, 1790), in 4 THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 313, 338 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913)). 
124 135 U.S. 1 (1890).  For our review of the Neagle case, see Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
125 158 U.S. 564 (1895).  For our review of the Debs case, see Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
126 Brief for Petitioner at 98, Youngstown (Nos. 744 and 745). 
127 Id. at 103-05. 
128 309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940). 
129 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
  
 
30
proposition that constitutional power “when the text is doubtful, may be established by 
usage.”130  
The Steel Seizure case involved a far more sweeping claim of executive power 
than we assert when we say the Vesting and Take Care Clauses give the president power 
over removals and law execution.  Thus, for our purposes the fact the Truman 
Administration also claimed those clauses enabled it to seize the steel mills means only 
that Truman is another in a long line of presidents to read the Article II Vesting Clause as 
a grant of power to the president.  The Supreme Court, of course, rebuffed the Truman 
Administration in the Steel Seizure case and, most damagingly of all, Justice Robert 
Jackson explicitly said in his famous concurrence that the Article II Vesting Clause is a 
mere designation of the title of the President and is not an affirmative grant of the 
executive power.131  Other justices did not follow Jackson on this point, with Justice Felix 
Frankfurter in his concurrence accepting the notion that long-established custom or usage 
could be a “gloss on the executive power” filling in its meaning.132  Obviously, this series 
of articles is premised on the notion that presidential construction of the Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses as authorizing a presidential power over removal and law execution is 
supported by a tradition of executive branch construction over the last 215 years. 
We agree with the Court’s ruling in Youngstown that the president’s executive 
power did not authorize a seizure of the steel plants on the facts presented in that case.  
We think this does not change the fact, however, that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a 
sweeping grant of power to the president as the Truman administration argued it was.  
                                                 
130 Brief for Petitioner at 121, Youngstown (Nos. 744 and 745). 
131 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
132 Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Nonetheless, as McCoy observes, “Seldom had the Supreme Court so soundly rebuffed a 
president.”133  Truman “had gambled badly, and he had lost badly.”134  Truman “did not, 
however, defy the Supreme Court, for the government immediately relinquished control 
of the steel mills.”135 
Truman’s foreign policy was led Secretary of State George C. Marshall who had 
been army chief of staff during World War II.136  Truman and Marshall announced a 
program known as the Truman Doctrine under which the United States committed itself 
to intervene with aid to assist peoples such as those in Greece and Turkey who were 
resisting communist subversion.  We saw in our earlier articles that major statements of 
foreign policy such as Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation or the Monroe Doctrine 
were treated as exercises of “the executive Power.”  The Truman Doctrine was another 
such exercise of power, and it was widely recognized” as representing “a major 
reorientation of United States foreign policy.”137  As 1936 Republican presidential 
nominee Alf Landon said, “We are in European power politics up to our necks, and in it 
to stay.”138  The Truman Doctrine was followed up by the Marshall Plan to aid the war 
ravaged countries of Western Europe so that they would not fall to communism.139  The 
plan was fully backed by Truman but its identification with the “soldier-secretary of 
state” made it easier to sell in a bipartisan manner on Capital Hill.140  The Truman 
Doctrine and Marshall Plan marked “the end of the Pax Britannica, and the establishment 
                                                 
133 MCCOY, supra note 42, at 293. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 115. 
137 Id. at 123. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 125 
140 Id. at 127. 
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instead of the Pax Americana over what was coming to be known as the ‘Free 
World.’”141 
Thus, by the end of his tenure in the White House, Truman had adopted a position 
largely consistent with the unitary executive, strongly defending the President’s removal 
power, using his reorganization powers to assert his control over the independent 
agencies, and objecting to the legislative veto as an unconstitutional infringement on the 
President’s power to execute the laws.  Truman stopped short of condemning the 
independent agencies as unconstitutional and did permit the enactment of a few 
additional legislative vetoes without registering any objection.142  Yet Truman’s level of 
opposition to congressional infringements on the unitary executive on constitutional 
grounds was probably sufficient to preclude the inference that Truman acquiesced in 
them for the purposes of coordinate construction. 
II. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
In sharp contrast to his immediate predecessors, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not 
aspire to be an activist President.  As a career soldier, he considered it his duty to remain 
above politics, and he consistently strove to remain behind the scenes when guiding 
national policy.  As his biographers, Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, observe, 
“At a time of widespread discontent with the ‘imperial presidency,’ restraint in the 
exercise of presidential power looked far more attractive than it had a decade earlier.”143   
                                                 
141 Id. at 129. 
142 See, e.g., Act of July 15, 1952, ch. 758, § 1413, 66 Stat 637, 661.  See generally Ginnane, 
supra note 85, at 604; Watson, supra note 86, at 1020. 
143 CHESTER J. PACH, JR., & ELMO RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER xii (1991). 
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The general consensus of historians, however, is that Eisenhower “only appeared 
to be a passive chief executive.  He actually used his power vigorously and deftly, but 
often behind the scenes, to achieve his goals.”144  One of the reasons why people believed 
Eisenhower was not in control of his administration was because he would sometimes 
deliberately duck questions at press conferences by pretending to garble his syntax.  Pach 
and Richardson note, “Critics seized upon such responses as evidence that the president 
did not know what was going on in his own administration.  Usually, he did, but his 
spontaneous oral statements seemed to suggest otherwise.”145  Eisenhower’s penchant for 
behind the scenes management of his administration has led political scientist Fred I. 
Greenstein to label “this method of governing ‘hidden-hand leadership.’  Eisenhower 
made the critical policy decisions, but he carefully muffled his responsibility.”146  Pach 
and Richardson note that a cost of hidden-hand leadership is that “it created the 
appearance that Eisenhower was not in charge of his own administration” even when he 
was in fact highly skilled politically.147   
Another reason Eisenhower was not perceived as being actively in charge of his 
administration was his penchant for delegation.  Eisenhower’s leadership style was very 
much the product of his prior career as a general.  Pach and Richardson report: 
As supreme Allied commander and army chief of staff, Eisenhower 
became highly experienced in managing large organizations, reconciling 
divergent factions, choosing subordinates who could act responsibly, and 
making decisions on the most vital issues.  From his military career, 
Eisenhower derived a set of beliefs—the importance of teamwork, the 
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need for clear lines of authority, an abhorrence of partisanship—that 
shaped his presidency.148 
Eisenhower ran his Administration in much the same manner.   
Rather than grapple with matters that puzzled or bored him, he acted as 
any general would—he delegated the task to a subordinate.  John Foster 
Dulles thus handled foreign affairs; George M. Humphrey shaped 
economic policy; Sherman Adams took responsibility for a host of 
domestic matters. . . . The president presided over his administration, but 
he did not run it.149 
Eisenhower also relied heavily upon his Attorney General designate, Herbert Brownell, 
Jr., and on his longtime friend and associate, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, in picking the other 
members of his cabinet.150  He was also the first president to “accord[] cabinet status to 
the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Joseph M. Dodge”151—an office created under 
the Harding administration and moved to the White House by FDR.152 
Eisenhower’s willingness to delegate responsibility should not be confused with a 
lack of willingness to assert control over the conduct of his administration: 
Contemporaries often misunderstood Eisenhower’s style of leadership; 
they mistook, for example, his delegation of authority for his abdication of 
it.  Despite these misapprehensions, Eisenhower was in control of his 
presidency from its inception.  Indeed during the months between his 
election and inauguration, he carefully organized an administration that 
reflected his style of leadership and his assessment of the needs of the 
nation.153 
Eisenhower took several steps to enhance and assert his authority to direct and 
review the actions of his subordinates.  When Congress included a provision in the 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit his 
                                                 
148 Id. at 29. 
149 Id. at xi. 
150 Id. at 34. 
151 Id. at 37. 
152 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _ (detailing the creation of the Bureau of the Budget 
under Harding and FDR). 
153 Id. at 29. 
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reorganization plans directly to Congress without presidential oversight,154 Eisenhower 
ignored the absence of such a provision and flatly instructed the Secretary to submit any 
such plans to him before transmitting them to Congress.155  Eisenhower also 
unsuccessfully backed the Second Hoover Commission’s recommendation that all federal 
legal services be consolidated in the Department of Justice.156  Even without such 
centralization, Eisenhower did not hesitate to intervene in the legal affairs of the federal 
government, at one point even personally drafting part of the brief in Brown v. Board of 
Education.157 
Indeed, Brown set the stage for one of the most courageous examples of 
presidential determination to enforce the law in our nation’s history.  After the Court 
handed down its landmark opinion in Brown, Eisenhower made it clear that his duty as 
president and citizen was compliance with the Supreme Court’s order:  “The Supreme 
Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country; 
and I will obey.”158  Pach and Richardson note, “Indeed only a day after the decision, 
                                                 
154 Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, § 3, 72 Stat. 514, 515. 
155 Watson, supra note 86, at 1014 n.143 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 210). 
156 The Second Hoover Commission believed that such consolidation of legal services was 
required to promote efficiency and policy coordination.  UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION 
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND 
PROCEDURES 6 (1955).  Other aspects of the Commission’s report, such as their recommendation that 
lawyers be covered by a separate civil service system in order to insulate them from politicians and career 
civil servants, were less favorable to the unitary executive.  Id. at 7-9.  Even with such protections, 
Congress rejected the proposal because of its concerns that the centralization of legal services would limit 
their ability to oversee agencies.  Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence:  Solicitor General Control 
over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 265 (1994); James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty 
in Government Litigation:  Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY. L. 
REV. 1569, 1582 (1996) (citing JAMES M. STRINE, THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL:  LEGAL 
PROFESSIONALS IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM 71 (1992). 
157 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  For Eisenhower’s role in drafting the brief, see Devins, supra note 
156, at 284 (citing Norman Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 1946-1960:  An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV., 817, 817-19 (1987). 
158 Quoted in CHESTER J. PACH & ELMO RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER 142 (rev. ed. 1991). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12
  
 
36
Eisenhower asked the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to set an 
example of peaceful desegregation.”159 
In September of 1957, Little Rock, Arkansas, erupted in violent opposition to 
court-ordered school integration.  Eisenhower denounced the “mob of extremists” and 
pledged to use “whatever force may be necessary . . . to carry out the orders of the 
Federal Court.”160  Hours later, Eisenhower ordered “Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the army 
chief of staff, to dispatch 1,000 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little 
Rock” and federalized the Arkansas National Guard.161  Eisenhower felt a critical sense 
of duty “to protect the Constitution and uphold federal law.  Despite his own reservations 
about the Brown decision, he could not turn his back on a mob that tried to substitute its 
will for that of a federal judge.  ‘If the day comes when we can obey orders of our Courts 
only when we personally approve of them,’ he reminded Swede Hazlett, ‘the end of the 
American system, as we know it, will not be far off.’”162   
It was for this reason, that Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first president since 
Ulysses S. Grant to send troops to the South to the civil rights of African Americans.163  
The sending of U.S. troops to Little Rock “served notice that riotous obstruction of 
federal court orders might provoke the armed intervention of the national government, a 
possibility that had been unthinkable for eighty years.”164  Eisenhower further opposed 
racial discrimination by renewing and extending the executive orders first initiated during 
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the FDR and Truman Administrations165 prohibiting discrimination in federal contracting 
and employment.  Unlike his predecessors, Eisenhower explicitly based his orders on 
statutory rather than constitutional grounds.166 
The Eisenhower Administration also preserved the unitariness of the executive 
branch through his policies with respect to the civil service system.  As of the 1950s, the 
civil service laws did not impose any substantive limits on the president’s removal 
power.167  The governing statute provided that officials could be removed from the civil 
service “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service.”168  Although 
on its face this language would appear to give federal officials covered by the civil 
service laws substantive protections against dismissal, both the executive branch and the 
courts had repeatedly construed this language as not placing any limits on the executive 
branch’s unlimited discretion in determining what constitutes adequate cause for 
removal.169  Congress had enacted the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 giving veterans 
certain procedural protections, providing them with written notice of removals, the right 
to submit a reply, and the right to appeal adverse disciplinary actions to the Civil Service 
Commission.170  The 1944 legislation did not alter the substantive standards governing 
removal, and courts continued to construe it as not placing any restrictions on the 
                                                 
165 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text; Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
166 Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-53 compilation) (invoking the president’s 
authority under the Act of May 3, 1945, ch. 106, § 214, 59 Stat. 106, 134); Exec. Order No. 10,577, pmbl. 
& § 4.2, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218, 220-21 (1949-53 compilation) (invoking the president’s authority under the 5 
U.S.C. § 631; the Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; and 3 U.S.C. § 301); see also Contractors 
Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 1971); Note, supra note 114, at 388. 
167 See Maheshwar Nath Charturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Employees 
Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 287, 309 (1968); Richard A. Merrill, Procedures for 
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REV. 196, 199 (1973). 
168 Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555. 
169 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
170 Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, ch. 359, § 14, 58 Stat. 387, 390. 
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exercise of the president’s removal authority.171  For example, in Bailey v. Richardson,172 
the D.C. Circuit reviewed what it regarded as an unbroken 160-year history of judicial 
noninterference in removals and concluded, “No function is more completely internal to a 
branch of government than the selection and retention or dismissal of its employees.”173  
The Civil Service Commission was thus limited to conducting informal investigations to 
ensure compliance with procedural requirements,174 even decisions with respect to 
procedural compliance were not made binding on agencies until 1948.175   
The Supreme Court would acknowledge one narrow restriction on the president’s 
removal power by protecting federal employees against dismissal for exercising 
constitutionally protected activity.176  Such a limitation was concededly quite narrow177 
and was also consistent with the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1883 preventing 
supervisors from requiring federal employees to pay political assessments or engage in 
political activity in order to keep their jobs.178  Most importantly, the Court would 
subsequently make clear that the doctrine prohibiting removals for the exercise of 
                                                 
171 See Levy v. Woods, 171 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 470, 
471 (D.D.C. 1947); Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, 223 (1946).  See generally Yoo et al., supra 
note 24, at _. 
172 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
173 Id. at 58. 
174 See Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse 
Action Appeals, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 331 (1970). 
175 Act of June 22, 1948, ch. 604, § _, 62 Stat. 575, _.  See Merrill, supra note 167, at 213. 
176 The seminal case is Wieman v. Updegraff, 343 U.S. 183 (1952).  See also Pickering v. 
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Bailey v. Richardson, 
182 F.2d 46, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J., dissenting), aff’d mem. by an equally divided Court, 341 
U.S. 918 (1951). 
177 See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service 
Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 972-74 (1976).  For example, it does not bar the limits on federal 
employees’ political activities by the Hatch Act.  See Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
(1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946). 
178 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
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constitutionally protected activity did not apply to removals related to job performance.179  
This would be demonstrated most eloquently by the Court’s decision in Cafeteria and 
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,180 in which the Court “summarily denied” the 
existence of limits on the removal power in cases involving “the Federal Government’s 
dispatch of its own affairs.”181  The Court indicated that the executive branch had the 
unfettered discretion to deny a security clearance to an employee of a government 
contractor whose garrulousness posed a security risk.182   
At times, the Civil Service Commission did seek a greater role in reviewing the 
substance of agency removal decisions.183  This recommendation was effectively quashed 
by the harsh criticism of it leveled by the Second Hoover Commission.  As the 
Commission noted: 
A judicial proceeding . . . leads to the worst kind of supervisor-employee 
relations because it requires the building of a written record and the 
accumulation of formal evidence sufficient to stand up as a support for the 
supervisor’s action.  It relieves the employee of any necessity for 
demonstrating his competence and usefulness to his department, and in 
effect, guarantees him a job unless his supervisor can prove in a formal 
proceeding that he is incompetent.  This leads to working situations which 
are intolerable.  If the supervisor acts on his best judgment, he normally 
disciplines or separates an employee as soon as the misconduct occurs or 
the incompetence is evident.  Bu, if he does o, he may be unable to 
substantiate his action judicially because he has not waited to accumulate 
documentary evidence.184 
The Eisenhower Administration also strongly asserted the unitariness of the 
executive branch by exerting control over the independent agencies.  Drawing again upon 
                                                 
179 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 n.5; Slochower, 350 U.S. at 559. 
180 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
181 Id. at 896. 
182 Id. at 899. 
183 See 48 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 41 (1931); Guttman, supra note 174, at 332. 
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the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission185 and a report by Professor 
Emmette Redford requested by the president towards the end of his administration, which 
emphasized the need for greater presidential control over the independent agencies in 
order to insure proper leadership and guidance in policy development,186 Eisenhower 
employed a wide variety of means to influence the independent agencies, by conducting 
policy studies on specific areas of agency jurisdiction; jawboning individual 
commissioners; issuing policy statements and suggestions; and notifying the 
commissions about his budgetary and legislative priorities.187  Eisenhower even tried to 
turn the commission chairmen into executive officers by giving them second hats as 
special assistants to the President.  However, this “practice was soon eliminated because 
of the jealousy of other agency members and opposition in Congress.”188  Although the 
Eisenhower Administration did not completely ignore the agencies supposed 
independence,189 there can be little question that it asserted sufficient control over them to 
                                                 
185 The Second Hoover Commission called for greater coordination of government 
operations and recommended the transfer of all of the adjudicative functions of the independent regulatory 
commissions to a newly created Administrative Court.  _; see also Moreno, supra note 94, at 487 (citing 
HERBERT EMMERICH, FEDERAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 101-28 (1971)). 
186 EMMETTE S. REDFORD, THE PRESIDENT AND THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Nov. 17, 
1960) (unpublished report).  Redford later published a modified version of this study, in which he 
concluded, “The President should have responsibility for leadership and guidance of the commissions in the 
development of policies to implement the objectives embodied in law.”  Emmette S. Redford, The 
President and the Regulatory Commissions, 44 TEX. L. REV. 288, 307-08 (1965).  Only when authority of 
over the commissions was returned to the President could the President fulfill the “constitutional and 
statutory responsibilities which separately and cumulatively require his attention to many policy aspects of 
regulation” as well as “the expectancy of people that the President will supply unity and leadership in the 
execution of the laws.”  Id. at _.  Therefore, Redford recommended that the President be given the authority 
to issue policy guidance to the commissions, to designate and remove the chairmen of all of the 
commissions at pleasure, and to have greater latitude to dismiss commissioners.  Id. at _. 
187 See Redford, supra note 186, at 303-04 
188 Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 
1395, 1410 (1975). 
189 One of Eisenhower’s Solicitors General observed that he knew of no case in which the 
Administration “ha[d] precluded an independent agency from presenting its position,” even when that 
position conflicted with that of the Administration.  Devins, supra note 156, at 289 (quoting Robert L. 
Stern, The Solicitor General’s Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A. J. 154, 157 (1960)). 
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foreclose any suggestion that Eisenhower acceded to this form of interference with the 
unitariness of the executive branch. 
The issue of presidential control over the independent agencies came to a head 
when Eisenhower removed Myron Wiener and Georgia Lusk after they refused to resign 
from the War Claims Commission, a body created to provide compensation to persons 
injured by the enemy during World War II.  Eisenhower based his actions solely on the 
importance of presidential superintendence over the execution of federal law, noting that 
he “regard[ed] it as in the national interest to complete the administration of the War 
Claims Act of 1948, as amended, with personnel of my own selection.”190   
Wiener brought suit in the Court of Claims challenging his removal, and the case 
eventually reached the Supreme Court.191  In its brief, the Eisenhower Administration 
defended its actions primarily on unitariness grounds.192  The brief began its summary of 
argument section by stating: 
 A constitutional usage which goes back to the very first year in 
which the Constitution became effective establishes that the President has 
the unlimited power to remove all the “officers of the United States” 
appointed by him, subject only to constitutional or statutory restrictions 
with respect to non-executive officers. 
 The President’s removal power rests essentially on three 
considerations:  first, the canon of construction well known to the 
Founding Fathers that the power to appoint carries with it the power to 
remove; second, the President’s constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed—a duty which cannot be performed if the 
President is unable to control the officers who carry out the laws; and 
                                                 
190 Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Myron Wiener (Dec. 10, 1953), quoted in Wiener 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 350 (1958). 
191 Wiener brought an action in the Court of Claims to recover the salary he would have been 
paid had he not been removed.  The Court of Claims dismissed this action on the grounds that Congress 
had not intended to impose any restrictions on the removal of War Claims Commissioners.  Wiener v. 
United States, 142 F. Supp. 910 (Ct. Cl. 1956), rev’d, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (citing Shurtleff v. United 
States, 189 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1903)). 
192 Brief for the United States at 21-68, Wiener v. United States (No. 52).   
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third, the postulate of executive unity—i.e., that the President is the head 
of the entire executive branch.193 
The brief went on to argue two clearly correct propositions, both of which were 
destined to be rejected by the Supreme Court.  First, the brief argued that Wiener was a 
core executive employee and that he was thus outside the ambit of Humphrey’s Executor 
v. United States,194 which sanctioned congressionally imposed limitations on the 
president’s removal power of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers.  Second, the 
brief argued that even if Wiener were seen as being a quasi-judicial employee, the case 
was still outside the ambit of Humphrey’s Executor because Congress had been utterly 
silent about removal in the statute setting up the War Claims Commission.  In Shurtleff v. 
United States,195 the Supreme Court had previously imposed a clear statement rule, 
holding that it would not construe any statute as limiting the president’s removal power 
unless Congress employed “very clear and explicit language” indicating that such was its 
intent.196  Statutory language merely stating that an officer may be removed for 
“inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office” was not sufficient.197  As the Court of 
Claims had noted,198 the statute at issue in Wiener was completely silent as to removal, 
providing only that the Commission wind up its affairs no later than three years after the 
last claim was filed.199  Under Shurtleff, the government argued, the relevant statute 
                                                 
193 Id. at 15-16. 
194 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
195 189 U.S. 311 (1903).  For our review of the Shurtleff case, see Yoo et al., supra note 24, 
at _. 
196 189 U.S. at 315. 
197 Id. at 315-18. 
198 Wiener, 142 F. Supp. at 914. 
199 War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1240, 1241.  The filing deadline was 
eventually postponed until March 31, 1952.  Act of Apr. 5, 1951, ch. 27, 65 Stat. 28; Act of May 27, 1949, 
ch. 145, 63 Stat. 112.   
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should not be construed as limiting the president’s unfettered authority to remove 
Wiener. 
In a remarkably brief and thinly reasoned opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the 
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Eisenhower lacked the power to remove 
Wiener even though, as the Court twice noted, the statute did not purport to place any 
limits on the removal power.200  Instead, the Court inferred Congress’s desire to impose 
such limits from the fact that War Claims Commissioners were quasi-judicial officers.201  
In so holding, the Court took the remarkable step of implicitly reversing the presumption 
acknowledged in Shurtleff against construing statutes as limiting the removal power, at 
least when quasi-judicial officers were involved.  To do so without any significant 
analysis of the considerations that led the Shurtleff Court to erect the presumption in the 
first place was quite unfortunate. 
From the standpoint of politics, Wiener can be regarded as the converse of 
Humphrey’s Executor.  While Humphrey’s Executor represented an attempt by a largely 
conservative Supreme Court to snub a president who was considerably more 
progressive,202 Wiener represented a decision by a mostly New Deal Supreme Court that 
rebuked a president seeking to take the administration of federal law in a different 
direction.  For purposes of this article, it matters little that the Eisenhower 
Administration’s arguments in Wiener ultimately proved unsuccessful.203  What matters 
                                                 
200 Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350, 352. 
201 Id. at 353-54. 
202 Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
203 A parallel claim filed by Commissioner Lusk was settled without litigation.  Lusk v. 
United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 291, 294-95 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).  Eisenhower eventually 
abolished the War Claims Commission in 1954.  Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1954, § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 442, 443 
(1954-58 compilation).  See generally Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit:  
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is that the Eisenhower Administration’s defense of the removal power effectively 
undercuts any inference of acquiescence by Eisenhower to a non-unitary executive under 
the principles of coordinate construction regardless of whether the other branches 
eventually accepted Eisenhower’s position. 
Just as Eisenhower was content to assume more of a background, supervisory role 
in the conduct of executive affairs, Eisenhower was similarly measured in his direct 
dealings with Congress, insisting that FDR and Truman “had upset the constitutional 
equilibrium between the White House and Capitol Hill and promis[ing] to exercise 
restraint in order to restore the balance.”204  His desire to rebalance the relationship 
between the presidency and Congress should not be taken as reluctance to defend against 
attempts to infringe upon the unitariness of the executive branch.  As we shall see, 
Eisenhower resolutely defended presidential prerogatives  
Most notably Eisenhower exceeded the efforts of the Truman Administration in 
opposing the legislative veto as an improper infringement on the president’s prerogative 
to execute the law.205  Eisenhower’s first such objection appeared in his May 25, 1954, 
veto of a bill that would have required the Secretary of the Army to “come into 
agreement” with both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees before 
transferring the Camp Blanding Military Reservation to the State of Florida.  Eisenhower 
vetoed the bill because “plac[ing] the power to make such agreement jointly in the 
Secretary of the Army and the members of the Committees on Armed Services,” the bill 
“violate[d] the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 750 (1987). 
204 Id. at 50. 
205 Watson, supra note 86, at 1021. 
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articles I and II of the Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and 
the executive power in the executive branch.”206  Eisenhower supported this conclusion 
with a forceful exposition against placing executive functions outside of the executive 
branch: 
The making of such a contract or agreement on behalf of the United States 
is a purely executive or administrative function, like the negotiation and 
execution of government contracts generally.  Thus, while congress may 
enact legislation governing the making of Government contracts, it may 
not delegate to its members or committees the power to make such 
contracts, either directly or by giving o them a power to approve or 
disapprove a contract which an executive officer proposes to make.207 
Echoing Hamilton’s pronouncements in The Federalist No. 70, Eisenhower concluded 
that “such a procedure destroys the clear lines of responsibility for results which the 
Constitution provides.”208   
                                                 
206 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Veto Message (May 25, 1954), reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 
7135 (1954).     
207 Id. 
208 Id.; see also Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 283; Watson, supra note 86, at 
1021.  Other members of the Eisenhower Administration had already voiced their opposition to the 
legislative veto during the debates on a proposal similar to the one pocket vetoed by Truman, see supra 
notes 105-106 and accompanying text, that would have required the Administrator of General Services or 
the Postmaster General to come into agreement with the Committees on Public Works before acquiring 
property for the construction of post offices.  H.R. 6342, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).  The Justice 
Department issued a memorandum objecting that such a provision would violate Article II of the 
Constitution, which “vests the Executive power in the President and directs that ‘he shall take are that the 
laws be faithfully execute.”  Memorandum from J. Lee Rankin to Senator Knowland (Apr. 8, 1954), 
reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 4879 (1954).  Although Congress could overturn a particular executive action 
through formal legislation, “Congress may not through its committees administer or share in the 
administration of a statute.”  Id.  Allowing Congress to interfere in this matter would represent “a departure 
from our constitutional practice which, if systemically pursued, could result in a radical change in the 
distribution of the powers of the Federal Government.”  Id.  After the Senate declined to delete this 
provision by a vote of 60 to 8, 100 CONG. REC. 10017 (1954), the Justice Department transmitted an even 
more detailed memorandum to the Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works.  In response to 
these objections and Eisenhower’s veto of the Camp Blanding legislation, the Conference Committee 
struck the committee veto provision and replaced with a requirement directed at Congress prohibiting the 
appropriation of any funds without prior approval had been given by the Public Works Committee.  Act of 
July 22, 1954, ch. 560, § 411, 68 Stat. 518, 519; see also Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 
1954, ch. 676, § 2, 68 Stat. 666, 666 (applying similar provision to “works of improvement”).  Since this 
restriction was directed at Congress and not the executive, Attorney General Brownell advised Eisenhower 
to sign the bill.  See generally 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 300, 305 (1957); Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, 
at 284; Watson, supra note 86, at 1023 (HARRIS, supra note 99, at 231). 
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Eisenhower continued his opposition to the legislative veto the following year in a 
signing statement accompanying the Defense Appropriations Act of 1956.209  In an 
attempt to thwart Eisenhower’s attempt to privatize many of the Department of Defense’s 
functions, Congressmen whose districts contained military facilities likely to be adversely 
affected attached a rider requiring that the Administration justify to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees that the “discontinuance is economically sound and the work 
is capable of performance by a contractor without danger to the national security” before 
transferring of work to a contractor and by subjecting all such transfers to a committee 
veto.210  Eisenhower signed the bill even though he believed that the justification and 
committee veto provisions were unconstitutional.  In language reminiscent of his 
objections to the Camp Blanding bill, Eisenhower acknowledged that “Congress has the 
power and the right to grant or to deny an appropriation.”211  However, “once an 
appropriation is made the appropriation must, under the Constitution be administered by 
the executive branch of the Government alone, and the Congress has no right to confer 
upon its committees the power to veto Executive action or to prevent Executive action 
from becoming effective.”212  In so observing, Eisenhower embraced a strongly formalist 
vision of the separation of powers:  “The Constitution of the United States divides the 
                                                 
209 Defense Appropriations Act of 1956, ch. 157, 69 Stat. 301. 
210 § 638, 69 Stat. at 321. 
211 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress upon Signing the Department of 
Defense Appropriation Act (July 13, 1955), in 1955 PUB. PAPERS 688, 689 [hereinafter Eisenhower, 
Defense Authorization Signing Statement].  In issuing this signing statement, Eisenhower relied upon an 
opinion offered by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., concluding that the legislative veto provision 
violated Article II of the Constitution by “usurp[ing] power confided to the executive branch” and by 
intruding into the authority “to engage in the administration and execution of the law” which “by 
constitutional warrant, has been the responsibility and right of the executive branch since the founding of 
our constitutional form of government.”  41 Op. Att’y Gen. 230, 231 (1955).  Brownell also anticipated the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha by noting that the provision raised problems under Article I as well.  
Id.  See generally Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 283-84. 
212 Eisenhower, Defense Authorization Signing Statement, supra note 211, at 689. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  
 
47
functions of the Government into three departments—the legislative, the executive, and 
the judicial—and establishes the principle that they shall be kept separate.  Neither may 
exercise functions belonging to the others.”213  Accordingly, Eisenhower felt “bound to 
insist that Executive functions be maintained unimpaired by legislative encroachment” 
and refused “[t]o acquiesce in a provision that seeks to encroach upon the proper 
authority of the Executive.”214  Therefore, Eisenhower insisted that “to the extent that this 
section seeks to give to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of 
Representatives authority to veto or prevent Executive action, such section will be 
regarded as invalid by the executive branch of the Government . . . unless otherwise 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.”215  
Eisenhower’s announced refusal to enforce the provision touched off a 
confrontation between the President and the Comptroller General.  Recognizing his role 
as “the agent of the Congress,” the Comptroller General informed Congress that he would 
enforce the law and disallow any covered expenditure which did not gain committee 
approval.216  Facing personal liability for issuing checks without the Comptroller 
General’s approval, the Defense Department personnel ignored the President’s wishes 
and complied with the committee veto provision.  Further conflict was averted when the 
provision was dropped the following year.217 
                                                 
213 Id. at 688-89. 
214 Id. at 689. 
215 Id. 
216 Porter Hardy, Jr., No. B-124985, 1955 WL 1368 ,1955 WL 2073 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 17, 
1955). 
217 The withdrawal of this provision did not signal any acquiescence to the President’s 
position by Congress.  Congress intended to shift the committee veto from the Appropriations Committees 
to the Armed Services Committees.  However, the bill transferring the committee veto died in the Senate.  
See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1022-23 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 229-30). 
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Three days after signing the Defense Appropriations Act, Eisenhower vetoed yet 
another bill because it contained two legislative veto provisions.218  As before, 
Eisenhower indicated that such committee vetoes “would destroy the clear lines of 
responsibility which the Constitution provides.”219  In response to the veto, Congress 
changed the veto into a “report and wait” provision, which afforded executive action the 
force of law, but delayed its effective date for a fixed amount of time so that Congress 
could decide whether to enact formal legislation revoking the action.220  Because “report 
and wait” provisions do not purport to give Congress the authority to effect a change in 
the law without having to comply with the constitutionally required process for enacting 
legislation, this amendment eliminated Eisenhower’s constitutional concerns.  Congress 
later returned to the legislative veto by enacting a provision requiring that all contracts 
authorized by the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956 be approved by a 
                                                 
218 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Veto of Bill Authorizing Certain Construction at Military 
Installations (July 16, 1956), in 1956 PUB. PAPERS 596 (vetoing H.R. 9893, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956)).  
Section 301 of the bill made the authorizations for the Talos missile program contingent upon an agreement 
between the Secretary of Defense and the Armed Services Committees of each House.  Section 419 
imposed a similar requirement on contracts for the construction and acquisition of housing for military 
families.  Id. at 596-97. 
219 Id. at 597.  Eisenhower further noted: 
 
While the Congress may enact legislation governing the making of Government 
contracts, it may not constitutionally delegate to its Members or committees the power to 
make such contracts, either directly or by giving them the authority to approve or 
disapprove a contract which an executive officer proposes to make. 
Two years ago I returned, without m approval, a bill . . . containing similar 
provisions.  At that time I stated that such provisions violate the fundamental 
constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in articles I and II of the 
Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and the executive power 
in the executive branch. 
Once again, I must object to such a serious departure from the separation of 
powers as provided by the Constitution.  Any such departure from constitutional 
procedures must be avoided. 
 
Id.  Again anticipating Chadha, Eisenhower also challenged it as a violation of the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of Article I, section 7, of the Constitution.  Id. 
220 Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 939, § 419, 70 Stat. 991, 1018-19; see also Watson, supra note 
86, at 1021 n.190. 
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congressional committee.221  Eisenhower again registered his constitutional objections.  
To the extent that committee vetoes could be regarded as an executive act, it constituted 
an “an unconstitutional infringement of the separation of powers prescribed in Articles I 
and II of the Constitution.”222  As Eisenhower further explained: 
I do not believe that the Congress can validly delegate to one of its 
committees the power to prevent executive actions taken pursuant to law.  
To do so in this case would be to divide the responsibility for 
administering the program between the Secretary of the Interior.  Such a 
procedure would be a clear violation of the separation of powers within 
the Government and would destroy the lines of responsibility which the 
Constitution provides.223 
The Committee veto also violated Article II by itself.  As Eisenhower noted: 
[T]he negotiation and execution of a contract is a purely executive 
function.  Although the Congress may prescribe the standards and 
conditions under which executive officials may enter into contracts, it may 
not lodge in its committees or members the power to make such contracts, 
either by giving them the power to approve or disapprove a contract which 
an executive officer proposes to make.224 
Eisenhower nonetheless “approved this bill only because the Congress is not in session to 
receive and act upon a veto message and because I have been assured that the committees 
which handled the bill in the Congress will take action to correct its deficiencies early in 
the next session.”225  In the meantime, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior 
to initiate the programs covered by the Act in the expectation that Congress would 
                                                 
221 Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, ch. 7, § 4(c), 70 Stat. 1044, 1045. 
222 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing the Small Reclamation 
Projects Act of 1956 (Aug. 6, 1956), in 1956 PUB. PAPERS 648, 649. 
223 Id. at 649-50.  Alternatively, to the extent to which the committee veto exercised a 
legislative function, “the section is open to the objection that it involves an unlawful delegation by the 
Congress to its committees of a legislative function which the constitution contemplates the Congress itself, 
as an entity, should exercise.”  Id. at 649.  See generally JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:  
UNSEPARATING THE POWERS 11-12 (1977). 
224 Id. at 650. 
225 Id. at 649. 
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remove or revise the objectionable section.226  As Eisenhower predicted, Congress 
replaced the committee veto with a “no appropriation” provision the next session.227  
Although Eisenhower did accede without objection to a few legislative vetoes,228 
Eisenhower subsequently objected to a provision providing a two-house legislative veto 
over TVA power projects,229 successfully called for the repeal of the provision enacted 
during the Truman Administration giving a legislative veto to a single member of 
Congress,230 and questioned the constitutionality of a provision subjecting the Attorney 
General’s decisions to parole certain refugees into the United States to a legislative 
veto231 that would eventually give rise to the decision in INS v. Chadha232  
But Eisenhower’s most sustained opposition to the legislative veto was his 
attempt to overturn the committee veto in the Military Construction Act of 1951 (to 
                                                 
226 Id. at 650. 
227 Act of June 5, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-47, § _, 71 Stat. 48, 49; see also Watson, supra note 
86, at 1024. 
228 Notably, Congress included a one-house veto in the Reorganization Act of 1957, Pub. L. 
No. 85-286, 71 Stat. 611, and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, § 3, 72 Stat. 
514, 514-58.  In 1960, at the request of the General Services Administration, Congress also restored a 
committee veto provision to the Public Buildings Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, § 7, 73 Stat. 479, 480; 
see also Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-626, 74 Stat. 425, 431; Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-
722, 74 Stat. 821, 826.  See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1014. n.143, 1025 & nn.214-15. 
229 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Singing a Bill Amending the  
Tennessee Valley Authority Act (Aug. 6, 1959), in 1959 PUB. PAPERS 566 (objecting to Act of Aug. 14, 
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-157, 73 Stat. 338); see also Joseph Cooper & Ann Cooper, The Legislative Veto and 
the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467, 471 n.11 (1962). 
230 See Watson, supra note 86, at 1020 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 1020). 
231 Eisenhower noted: 
 
The Attorney General has advised me that there is a serious question as to whether this 
provision is constitutional.  Nevertheless, in view of the short period for which this power 
is given and the improbability that the issue will arise, it is believed that it would be 
better to defer a determination of the effect of such possible action until it is taken. 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Providing for the Admission of 
Refugees (July 14, 1960), 1960 PUB. PAPERS 579, 579.  As the Chadha decision attests, Eisenhower was 
wrong in his estimates both of the act’s limited duration and of the likelihood of conflict arising under it. 
232 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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which Truman had acceded233) subjecting all major military real estate transactions to the 
approval of the Armed Services Committees.234  Bolstered by the recommendations of 
the second Hoover Commission235 and the criticism of other Administration officials,236 
Eisenhower’s 1961 Budget Message directed the Secretary of Defense to “disregard the 
section unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise.”237  Finally 
Congress relented and converted the committee veto into a constitutionally permissible 
“report and wait” requirement.238   
Eisenhower took a number of other steps to defend the president’s sole authority 
to execute the law.  Eisenhower quietly opposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
proposed by Senator John Bricker designed to curb presidential power over foreign 
affairs by barring the use of executive agreements and prohibiting the negotiation of any 
treaty that abridged constitutional rights or affected “any other matters essentially within 
                                                 
233 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
234 Military Construction Act of 1951, ch. 434, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365. 
235 “The commission . . . questions the appropriateness of congressional committee 
participation in the executive function of operation on the ground that it is an invasion of the executive by 
the legislative branch.”  COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GOVERNMENT, REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 35-36 (1955); see also COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
92-94, 99 (1955). 
236 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 300 (1957); Letter from _ to Senator McClellan (Apr. 27, 1956), _. 
237 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1961, H.R. DOC. NO. 255, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at M18 (1960). 
238 Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-500, § 2662, 74 Stat. 166, 186-87; H.R. REP. NO. 
1307, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-45 (1960).  It was no coincidence that the vast majority of the legislative 
veto provisions that Eisenhower blocked were aimed at the acquisition and disposition of military facilities.  
See Watson, supra note 86, at 1023-25.  As Professor Calabresi has noted, the incentives that members of 
Congress face leave them little choice but to try to protect the interests of their local constituencies even 
when those actions would be ill advised as a matter of national policy.  See Calabresi, Some Normative 
Arguments, supra note 9, at 34-35, 58-70.  Thus it is unsurprising that Congress has most strenuously 
attempted to inject itself into the execution of the laws in those situations where the consequences for local 
constituencies were the greatest.  As Professor Joseph Harris noted, AThe requirement of advance approval 
by congressional subcommittees enables members of Congress to resist the closing of military installations 
in their districts, and it cannot be doubted that the effect is to force the retention that in the interest of 
economy should be closed.”  HARRIS, supra note 99, at 223. 
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the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.”239  Eisenhower steadfastly opposed the 
amendment on the grounds that it would “cripple the Executive power to the point that 
we [would] become helpless in world affairs.”240  On the issue of executive privilege 
Eisenhower dealt Senator Joe McCarthy a “stunning blow by invoking executive 
privilege to prevent congressional interrogation of members of the executive branch.”241  
Pach and Richardson call this “the boldest assertion of executive privilege in the history 
of the republic.”242 
Like Harry Truman and James Monroe before him, Eisenhower also became 
known for a major foreign policy position—the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine.  Under 
this Doctrine Eisenhower sought foreign aid money and was willing to deploy troops in 
the general area of the Middle East to deter the forces of “International Communism.”243  
“This program, which soon became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, would ‘give 
courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain 
of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.”244  The president, over the 
reservations of democratic senators, pushed a resolution through Congress indicating that 
the U.S. was willing at the president’s behest to use its armed forces to protect any 
Middle Eastern nation in repelling Communist aggression.245 
Thus, by the end of his Administration, Eisenhower had defended the removal 
power, had asserted his control over the executive branch and the independent agencies, 
                                                 
239 97 CONG. REC. 8258, 8265 (1951). 
240 Id. at 60. 
241 Id. at 70. 
242 Id. 
243 PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 158, at 161. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
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had resisted congressional attempts to interfere with the execution of the laws through the 
legislative veto, and had taken other actions to assert the unitariness of the executive 
branch.  Although he did waver at times in his opposition, these minor variations cannot 
be said to have been sufficient to constitute acquiescence to a non-unitary vision of the 
executive branch. 
III. JOHN F. KENNEDY 
John F. Kennedy became the youngest elected president ever in American history.  
Kennedy viewed his presidency as being “in the Democratic tradition of Woodrow 
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.”246  Like those individuals, “[h]e sought 
to be a strong, active president.”247  His splendid inaugural address immediately 
demonstrated his talent for using the bully pulpit of the presidency.  His call for national 
service—“Ask not what you country can do for you, ask what you can do for your 
country”248—helped to inspire a generation of Americans to commit themselves to 
anticommunism abroad and the protection of civil rights at home.  It also marked a return 
to vision of the presidency as a leader and shaper of public opinion.  James Giglio, 
Kennedy’s biographer, reports: 
John Kennedy was one of the most image-conscious presidents of his 
century.  The imagery sharpened during the presidential years.  As 
president he could better shape favorable symbols, realizing that personal 
style could counter political frustration, mask ineptness, and create 
popularity in a media oriented society.  Much of the imagery centered on 
family life.249   
                                                 
246 JAMES N. GIGLIO, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 29 (1991). 
247 Id. 
248 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in 1961 PUB. PAPERS 1, 3. 
249 GIGLIO, supra note 246, at 255. 
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Like Teddy Roosevelt, whose family and athletic prowess added greatly to his political 
appeal, Kennedy created an image of athletic youthfulness that contrasted sadly with the 
almost constant physical pain caused by his back problems throughout his presidency. 
From the outset of his administration, Kennedy was determined to exercise full 
control over the executive branch, illustrated most dramatically illustrated by his decision 
to appoint his brother, Robert, to be Attorney General.  Although the decision drew 
significant criticism, the President “knew that in Robert Kennedy he had his most trusted 
associate on board.”250  It would be hard for a president to do more to retain control over 
the law execution function than by appointing his closest sibling and former campaign 
manager to run his Justice Department. 
In structuring his cabinet and White House staff, Kennedy was critical of the 
extent to which Eisenhower had relied upon cabinet government.  He saw this as “a 
ponderous bureaucratic system, resulting in group or corporate decisions.”251  Giglio 
notes, “Kennedy specifically objected to the extent to which Eisenhower had shared 
power with the cabinet (which met weekly); the chief of staff, Sherman Adams; and the 
National Security Council (NSC), created in 1947 to advise the president on foreign and 
domestic policy.”252  Giglio reports, “As president, Kennedy proved less willing to 
delegate power outside the Oval Office.  His staff, far smaller than Eisenhower’s or 
Johnson’s, consisted for the most part of loyalists from the Senate or his campaign staff, 
                                                 
250 Id. at 21 
251 Id. at 30. 
252 Id. 
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many of them still in their thirties.  They remained completely devoted to Kennedy and 
knew exactly what he wanted.”253 
Kennedy was reluctant to meet regularly with the cabinet, “preferr[ing] to 
communicate in less direct ways.”254  He received weekly written summaries from 
cabinet department heads about their most significant activities, and he followed these up 
with requests for additional information and by communicating with cabinet members 
through his White House staff.255  Kennedy met frequently with certain favored cabinet 
members, particularly his brother, Robert, who was his “lightning rod for untested ideas 
and [his closest] personal adviser.”256  The most prominent removal during the Kennedy 
Administration was Chester Bowles, the undersecretary of state, where “[i]deology and 
personal displeasure” both played a role.257  Bowles was summarily handed a press 
release indicating that George Ball would replace him.258 
Kennedy’s dynamism made it all but inevitable that he would exert his authority 
over the execution of the federal laws to its fullest.  For example, Kennedy asserted his 
authority to control the administration of federal law by following the practice adopted by 
FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower of issuing executive orders requiring all federal officers 
and government contractors not to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or 
national origin, now enforced by the newly created President’s Committee on Equal 
Opportunity.259  These orders exceeded the scope of previous orders by requiring that all 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 34. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at _. 
257 Id. at 92. 
258 Id. at 93. 
259 Exec. Order No. 10,925, §§ 101-204, 3 C.F.R. 448, 448-49 (1959-63 compilation); Exec. 
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government contractors undertake “affirmative action to ensure that . . . employees are 
treated during their employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national 
origin.”260  In issuing these orders, Kennedy returned to the practice followed by FDR 
and Truman and based the orders on “the authority vested in [the president] by the 
Constitution and the statutes.”261  The Comptroller General acknowledged, “In this 
instance the Executive order is not based on any Congressional directive.  The authority 
to issue the order must, therefore, stem from the general executive power under Article II 
of the Constitution.”262  The Attorney General concurred, arguing that Congress’s failure 
to object to this longstanding practice represented legislative acquiescence to the 
president’s authority to issue nondiscrimination orders.263  Kennedy also opposed racial 
discrimination by taking a leading role in helping two blacks register at the University of 
Alabama over the opposition of Alabama’s segregationist governor, George Wallace.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-63 compilation). 
260 Exec. Order No. 10,925, '§ _, 3 C.F.R. at _; Exec. Order No. 11,114, § _, 3 C.F.R. at _. 
261 Exec. Order No. 10,925, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at pmbl; Exec. Order No. 11,114, pmbl., 3 
C.F.R. at _. 
262 40 Comp. Gen. 592, 593 (1961); see also Note, supra note 114, at 391 (suggesting that 
the nondiscrimination orders might fall within the president’s implied authority to act in the absence of a 
contrary statute (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
263 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 97, 106-07 (1961) (citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 
459, 472-75 (1915)); William H. Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Government 
Contract Work, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 245-46 & n.17 (1963) (same).  But see Farkas v. Tex. Instruments, 
Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (concluding that “Executive Order No. 10925 was issued 
pursuant to statutory authority”); Farmer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964) (noting that the 
defendant did not “maintain that the executive orders . . . were issued without statutory authority”); 
Blumstein, supra note 114, at 927-29 (arguing against a constitutional foundation for the orders); James L. 
Moeller, Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246:  Presidential Power to Regulate Employment 
Discrimination, 43 MO. L. REV. 451, 481-82 (1978) (same); Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The 
Philadelphia Plan:  A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726-32 (1972) 
(same). 
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“Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard, signaling Wallace that he intended to 
enforce the court order militarily if necessary.”264 
The Kennedy Administration also issued an executive order making procedural 
changes to the civil service laws.  As noted earlier, the applicable statutes did not provide 
federal employees with any substantive protections against dismissal.265  Although some 
lower court decisions offered some halting moves towards limits on the removal 
power,266 such protections would not emerge in Supreme Court cases until the 1970s.267  
Indeed, decisions from this era continued to reaffirm that a supervisor’s lack of 
confidence in a subordinate was sufficient grounds for removal.268  Veterans, who 
comprised roughly half of the federal workforce,269 did enjoy a greater degree of 
procedural protection than nonveterans.270  This Kennedy eliminated this discrepancy by 
issuing an executive order extending the procedural protections similar to those provided 
by the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 to nonveterans as well by requiring that each 
agency establish a system for hearings and appeals.271  Although this change did not 
                                                 
264 Id. at 179-80. 
265 See supra notes 167-184 and accompanying text. 
266 See Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Murphy v. Kelly, 259 F. Supp. 914, 
917 (D. Mass.) (inquiring whether removal was arbitrary or capricious), aff’d mem., 388 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 
1966); Greenway v. United States, 163 ct. Cl. 72, 81 (1963) (ruling that removed employee is entitled to 
“honest consideration based on the merits”); Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 127-28 (Ct. Cl. 
1948) (indicating that a removed employee has the right to the “honest judgment” of the removing officer 
and that the decision must not be “arbitrary or capricious” or rendered in “bad faith”).  But see Vigil; 
Coledanchise v. Macy, 265 F. Supp. 154, 162 (D.S.C. 1967) ( 
267 See Frug, supra note 177, at 970-89; see also Charturvedi, supra note 167, at 330 (noting 
that as of 1968 substantive limits on the removal power had “yet to gain reversal recognition” and that 
many courts continue to follow the doctrine Hennen and Eberlein). 
268 See Leonard v. Douglas, 321 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
269 PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 436 (Greenwood 
Press 1976) (1958). 
270 See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text. 
271 Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 527 (1959-63 compilation).  The executive order largely 
adopted the recommendations of a presidential task force.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT 
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place any substantive limits on the president’s authority to remove,272 it did attest to 
Kennedy’s issuance belief in his authority to exercise control over the entirety of the 
federal bureaucracy.   
Kennedy also made clear that he believed his authority to control the executive 
branch extended to the independent agencies when he included them in his executive 
order imposing ethical standards on conflict of interest and ex parte communications.273  
That Kennedy believed that he possessed the authority to direct the independent agencies 
should have come as no surprise.  After he was elected but before he had been sworn in, 
Kennedy asked Professor James Landis prepare a report specifically on the independent 
agencies.  Landis concluded, among other things, that the lack of effective inter-agency 
coordination was inhibiting federal policy development and required that the President 
possess greater influence over all agencies, including the independent agencies.274  
Calling the distinction between independent and executive agencies “meaningless,”275 
                                                                                                                                                 
COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 24 (1951). 
272 Kathleen V. Buffon, Comment, Removal for Cause from the Civil Service;  The Problem 
of Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 212 (1979) (noting that the Civil Service 
Commission did not exercise its authority under the executive order in a way that placed substantive 
restrictions on the removal power). 
273 Exec. Order No. 10939, 3 C.F.R. _ (1959-63 compilation); see also Redford, supra note 
186, at 316. 
274 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON 
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 24-31 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by James Landis). 
275 Id. at 4; see also id. at 30 (noting that there was “not too great a difference between the 
allegedly ‘independent’ agencies and those technically a part of some Executive Department”).  Landis also 
concluded that “[t]he relationship of the agencies to the Congress generally speaking is that of any statutory 
branch of the Executive to the Congress, with certain exceptions.”  Id. at 33.  The so-called exceptions to 
which Landis pointed were not that exceptional.  First, Landis stated that Congress should oversee the 
independent agencies, except that they should not attempt to influence their decisions in particular 
adjudicatory matters.  Id. at 33-34.  This caveat, however, applied with equal force to executive agencies.  
Second, Landis opined that the independent regulatory agencies were responsible 
 
to the Congress rather than solely to the Executive.  The policies that they are supposed 
to pursue are those that have been delineated by the Congress not by the Executive.  
Departure from these policies or the failure to make them effective or their subordination 
of legislative goals to the directions of the Executive is thus a matter of necessary 
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Landis recognized that the President’s “constitutional duty to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed” was “applicable to the execution of laws entrusted to regulatory 
agencies, whether technically ‘independent’ or not.”276  Therefore, Landis recommended 
that the informal controls that the President possessed over the independent agencies277 
should be strengthened.278  That Landis would come to such a conclusion is nothing short 
of remarkable.  One of the primary architects of the New Deal, Landis had believed that 
the simple tripartite form of government, wherein power is “divided neatly between 
                                                                                                                                                 
legislative concern. 
 
Id. at 34.  However, all agencies, whether executive or independent, are obligated to follow the policies 
established by Congress and exceed their authority whenever their actions contravene legislative goals. 
276 In particular, “[t]he patent failure of the Federal Power Commission to execute the laws 
relating to natural gas production” was “rightly a matter of constitutional concern to him,” as was “[t]he 
congestion of the dockets of the agencies, the delays incident to the disposition of cases, [and] the failure to 
evolve policies pursuant to basic statutory requirements.”  Id. at 32-33.  As Landis later noted, “Presidential 
concern, with the work of the agencies, is important . . . from the standpoint of the President’s duty to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed.”  Id. at 82. 
277 The President could influence the independent regulatory commissions’ execution of the 
law through appointments and removals (although statutes often provided that commissioners could only be 
removed “for cause”); Bureau of the Budget clearance of commission budget proposals legislative 
proposals; and the President’s power to appoint the chairman of all the commissions except the ICC and 
perhaps the FPC.  Id. at 30-31.  The President could also influence commissions through less formal means, 
either by engaging outside consultants to conduct surveys of their affairs or by consulting with 
commissioners directly.  Id. at 31-32. 
278 Specifically, Landis recommended that the President be permitted to use his 
reorganization powers to give the chairmen of the commissions authority over all administrative matters 
and to make them removable at will.  Id. at 65-66, 85; see also id. at 37-38 (ICC), 44 (CAB), 48 (SEC & 
FTC), 58 (FPC).  The administrative matters would include the preparation and review of budget estimates, 
the distribution of appropriated funds, the appointment of personnel, and control over the commission’s 
internal organization.  Id. at 37-38, 85.  Thus Landis returned to the vision that Truman had pursued in 
1950, only to see it shot down by the legislative veto. 
Also, recognizing that policy development required “a close and intimate relationship to the 
President,” id. at 77, 80, Landis recommended the President create separate offices within the Executive 
Office of the President to coordinate and develop transportation, communications, and energy policy as 
well as an Office for the Oversight of Regulatory Agencies charged with preparing reorganization plans 
specifically for the Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and Federal Communications Commission, id. at 85-87.  See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 
587; Redford, supra note 186, at 312-14; Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and 
Agency Decisionmakers;  The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary 
Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 697 (1989). 
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legislative, executive and judicial,” was inadequate to deal with modern problems and 
must give way to the exigencies of modern governance.279 
Armed with these reports, Kennedy strongly asserted his control over the 
independent agencies.  The chairmen of all of the commissions except the Federal 
Reserve Board submitted their resignations, and Kennedy replaced all of them except the 
chairman of the Federal Maritime Board.280  Kennedy also sent a message to Congress on 
“Regulatory Agencies” calling for greater presidential oversight of the commissions.281  
Kennedy backed up his rhetoric by impressing upon his nominees the importance of 
national policy coordination and expressed his hope that they would follow the declared 
policies of his Administration, by conducting, numerous policy studies and conferences 
to guide commission decisionmaking, and by requiring that the commissions send him 
monthly reports.282  Moreover, Solicitor General Archibald Cox refused to let the FTC 
present its own views to the Supreme Court.283  Clearly, Kennedy did not acquiesce to the 
supposed “independence” of the independent agencies. 
Kennedy, however, did show more tolerance of the legislative veto than did 
Truman or Eisenhower,284  even going so far as to propose that an agricultural quota and 
                                                 
279 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1938). 
280 The omission of the Federal Maritime Board turned out to be insignificant since he 
replaced the entire membership of the Federal Maritime Board with his own appointees when he 
reorganized it into the Federal Maritime Commission.  The plan also provided that “[e]ach Commissioner 
shall be removable by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  Reorg. 
Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 102(a), 3 C.F.R. 876, _ (1959-63 compilation). 
281 John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on the Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 13, 
1961), in PUB. PAPERS 267. 
282 See Redford, supra note 186, at 314-18. 
283 Brief for the United States at 10, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 
(1961) (No. 47), quoted in Devins, supra note 156, at 270-71. 
284 Kennedy failed to object to a provision subjecting reorganization plans to a one-house 
veto.  Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 47, 75 Stat 638 (1961).  President 
Kennedy did tolerate “no appropriation” provisions, see, e.g., Act of Aug. 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-578, 76 
Stat. 335, 338; Act of Sept. 27, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-703, § 103, 76 Stat. 605, 608, as well as a provision 
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income support program be subject to a committee veto.285  As his presidency progressed, 
Kennedy began to show increasing opposition to the legislative veto.  Acting on the 
advice of the Attorney General, Kennedy challenged the constitutionality of a provision 
in the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963 subjecting changes 
in economic assistance funds administered by the Agency for International Development 
(AID) to a committee veto.286  Kennedy charged that “this provision is unconstitutional 
either as a delegation to Congressional committees of powers which reside only in the 
Congress as a whole or as an attempt to confer executive powers on the Committee in 
violation of the principle of separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of the 
Constitution.”287  In signing the bill despite these objections, Kennedy relied upon similar 
practices undertaken by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower.288  Accordingly, 
Kennedy directed the Administrator of the Agency for International Development “to 
treat this provision as a request for information.”289  Kennedy’s subsequent opposition to 
                                                                                                                                                 
requiring for “consultation” before executive action, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-796, 76 Stat. 904.  
Kennedy also did not register any objection to a provision requiring that the President appoint members of 
Congress as delegates to certain trade negotiations.  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 
§ 243, 76 Stat. 872, 878.  See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1010 n.115, 1026. 
285 John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Agriculture (Mar. 16, 1961), in 
1961 PUB. PAPERS 192, 196.  Even more remarkably, Kennedy endorsed private control of executive action 
by proposing that the agricultural controls not to into effect until approved by a two-thirds majority of 
authorized farmers.  Id. at 195.  Congress did not enact the proposal.  Watson, supra note 86, at 988 n.12, 
1026 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 205). 
286 Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 87-872, 76 
Stat. 1163, 1164. 
287 John F. Kennedy, Memorandum on Informing Congressional Committees of Changes 
Involving Foreign Economic Assistance Funds (Jan. 8, 1963), in 1963 PUB. PAPERS 6. 
288 Id. 
289 Id.  Curiously, the Administrator did not carry out the President’s request because “the 
Comptroller General gave an opinion that it was in the act, unconstitutional or not, and we had to abide by 
it as long as it was in the act.”  Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations For 1964:  
Hearings on H.R. 9499 Before the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1963).  
See generally Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 944 (1994); Watson, supra note 86, at 1026. 
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the legislative veto critically weakens the precedential weight of his earlier concessions 
for the purposes of coordinate construction.   
Kennedy’s foreign policy record was dominated by crises over Cuba and over the 
freedom of West Berlin.  Kennedy’s role in the famous Cuban Missile Crisis is too well 
known to require much discussion here.  Suffice it to say it was the most famous 
reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine in modern times,290 successfully banishing the former 
Soviet Union from its efforts to deploy nuclear missiles targeted in Cuba.  In Berlin, 
Kennedy was to make one of his most famous statements from the bully pulpit of the 
presidency, when he challenged those who denied there was a difference between the free 
and Communist worlds to come to Berlin and to look at the Wall that the Soviets had 
built there.291  He added that in the free world of his day the proudest boast a man could 
make was “Ich bin ein Berliner.”292 
Kennedy’s foreign policy was tainted by his support for attempts to assassinate or 
overthrow foreign leaders including, of course, Fidel Castro of Cuba, and President Diem 
of South Vietnam.  While perhaps foolish and misguided as a matter of policy, neither 
episode signaled any lack of willingness on Kennedy’s part to assert his authority over 
the execution of the law.  Aside from those events, Kennedy’s presidency was 
“remarkably free of notable scandal and incompetence.  Not since the New Deal was the 
national government uniformly served so well.”293  Although evidence would later 
surfaced regarding the personal indiscretions of the president and his brother with respect 
                                                 
290 GIGLIO, supra note 246, at 216. 
291 Id. at 219. 
292 Id. at _. 
293 Id. at 287. 
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to their private sex lives, such matters have more to do with Kennedy’s place in history294 
and have essentially no larger implications for the separation of powers. 
Despite its brevity, the Kennedy Administration emerges as a steady defender of 
presidential prerogatives.  His dominance over his cabinet, his executive orders on civil 
rights, his claims of supervisory authority over the independent agencies, his aggressive 
use of foreign policy to oppose communism, and his eventual determination to oppose the 
legislative veto nonetheless place him squarely in the unitary executive camp.  In fact, the 
president and his brother waged a war on organized crime that was so effective that some 
have speculated that it lead to the president’s assassination in Dallas on November 22, 
1963.  It is thus clear that there was no significant acquiescence in any diminution of the 
unitary executive on John Kennedy’s watch. 
IV. LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
Anyone familiar with Lyndon Johnson’s legendary personality would have little 
doubt that he would emerge as a strong chief executive.  That said, Johnson ascended to 
the presidency under extraordinarily difficult conditions, having to succeed a charismatic 
leader who, after having captured the imagination of the country, had died under tragic 
circumstances.  Having sworn to continue Kennedy’s vision, Johnson inherited a fully 
staffed executive branch to which he could not make significant changes without seeming 
to abandon Kennedy’s legacy.295  Johnson was respectfully slow to make significant 
                                                 
294 Interestingly, a recent survey of political scientists, legal academics, and historians 
overwhelmingly designated Kennedy the most overrated president in U.S. history.  See James Lindgren & 
Steven G. Calabresi, Rating the Presidents of the United States, 1789-2000:  A Survey of Scholars in 
Political Science, History, and Law, 18 CONST. COMM. 583, 594 (2001). 
295 VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 25-27 (1983). 
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changes to the administration.  It would be a mistake to construe his reticence to change 
personnel as any hesitancy to exert full control over the workings of the executive 
branch.  When Adlai Stevenson complained that he really wanted to be Secretary of State 
rather than an errand boy, Walter Lippman quipped, “If you are Lyndon Johnson’s 
secretary of state, you’ll be an errand boy.”296  Clearly, Johnson was confident that he and 
he alone would determine the direction of his administration. 
Johnson also strongly resisted attempts by Congress to limit his authority to 
administer the laws.  For example, Congress submitted legislation in 1966 that purported 
to restrict the President’s authority to propose a financial plan for agricultural research for 
fiscal year 1968.297  Johnson indicated that he would ignore the provision as an improper 
infringement upon executive power.  Johnson indicated: 
The provision thus clearly intrudes upon the Executive function of 
preparing the annual budget.  In developing the budget for fiscal 1968, I 
will give careful consideration to the view of Congress expressed in this 
act—but I will propose an agricultural research program designed and 
finance to make the best possible use of the resources available to us.298  
Two months later, after the Secretary of Commerce exercised his authority under 
the Export Control Act of 1961299 to impose export controls on leather and cattle hides, 
Congress attached a rider to the Commerce Department’s appropriations bill prohibiting 
the Department from using of any appropriated funds to enforce the export controls.300  
Johnson complained that “in this rider . . . Congress attempts to control the manner in 
                                                 
296 Id. at 25. 
297 Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-556, 
80 Stat. 689, 690 (1966). 
298 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of 
Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill (Sept. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 980, 981 
(Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-556, 80 Stat. 689). 
299 _. 
300 _, Pub. L. No. 89-797, § 304, 80 Stat. 1479, 1497 
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which the Export Control Act is to be administered.”301  These objections 
notwithstanding, Johnson signed the bill; foreign demand for hides had fallen to the point 
where the Secretary was planning on dropping the controls anyway.  However, since 
conditions might again require the imposition of export controls on leather, Johnson 
directed the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Budget to submit legislation 
removing this restriction.302  
The following year, Johnson objected that three provisions of the Military 
Construction Authorization Act of 1968303 were “inconsistent with the sound 
management of America’s military establishment and raise questions concerning the 
constitutional separation of powers.”304  First, the Act prohibited Johnson from closing 
the Naval Academy’s dairy farm.305  Second, the Act froze the present geographic 
boundaries and headquarters of the eleven Naval Districts.306  Third, the Act prohibited 
the Department of the Army from closing a particular installation in Hawaii.307  
Johnson’s signing statement dripped with sarcasm when he quipped, “Thus the Congress, 
which has given the Navy Department authority over the world’s most powerful fleet, has 
withdrawn the Department’s authority over 380 cows.”308  In the end, however, the dairy 
remained open.309  
                                                 
301 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Expressing Disapproval of Appropriation 
Act Provision Relating to Export Control of Hides, Skins, and Leather (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 
1351, 1351. 
302 Id. 
303 Pub. L. No. 90-110, 87 Stat. 279. 
304 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction 
Authorization Act, 1968 (Oct. 21, 1967), in 1967 PUB. PAPERS 935, 935 [hereinafter Johnson, Military 
Construction Authorization Act Signing Statement]. 
305 § _ 81 Stat. at _. 
306 § _ 81 Stat. at _. 
307 § _ 81 Stat. at _. 
308 Johnson, Military Construction Authorization Act Signing Statement, supra note 304, at 
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Johnson also issued more general directives to the executive officers, for example 
ordering them to continue the antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs begun 
during the Kennedy Administration.310  Like Kennedy, Johnson did not rely upon his 
defense or procurement powers as the basis for his actions, nor did he rely upon the 
newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Instead, Johnson followed Kennedy’s example 
and simply invoked “the authority vested in [him] as President of the United States by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States.”311  Courts and commentators have 
                                                                                                                                                 
935. 
309 May, supra note 289, at 943-44. 
310 This order expanded the Kennedy Administration’s program in two significant ways.  
First it applied the antidiscrimination prohibitions to all of a contractor’s activities during the performance 
of the contract, not just those activities connected with the contract.  Second, it expanded the program to 
include sex discrimination as well.  Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 compilation).  See 
generally Moeller, supra note 263, at 456-61. 
311 Id.  As noted earlier, the jurisdictional basis of the nondiscrimination executive orders has 
traditionally been construed as resting on the executive power vested in the President by Article II.  See 
supra notes 112-114, 261-262 and accompanying text.  Some courts nonetheless persisted in viewing 
Executive Order 11,246 as being based on the procurement statute.  United States v. New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 
(1978); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-671 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass’n v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Legal Aid Soc’y v. 
Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 
39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio 1969).  See generally 
Blumstein, supra note 114, at 930-32; James A. Hardgrove, Note, The Philadelphia Plan, 45 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 678, 685 (1970); Moeller, supra note 263, at 477-78; Note, supra note 114, at 383. 
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 raised a whole new round of questions about the 
propriety of these executive orders.  Opponents of the executive order argued that in passing Title VII of 
the Act, Congress had explicitly prohibited the use quotas and that that policy preempted the President’s 
authority and that the House’s failure to pass an amendment explicitly authorizing the executive 
antidiscrimination program suggested that it was unauthorized.  The order’s supporters pointed out that the 
failure of the Senate to pass an amendment that would have explicitly provided that Title VII constituted 
the exclusive remedy for discrimination supported the imposition of additional antidiscrimination 
protection.  See, e.g., James E. Jones, Jr., The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 341, 
388-94; Earl M. Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades:  An Analysis of the 
Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84, 102-09 (1970); Blumstein, supra note 114, at 939-49; 
Hardgrove, supra, at 687-95; Moeller, supra note 263, at 482-87; Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 733-38; 
Karen Ann Sindelar, Note, Employment Discrimination—Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.:  
Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 11246?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 695 (1979); _, [Note], The Philadelphia 
Plan:  Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 224-
29 (1970); _ Note, Executive Order 11246:  Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 596-600 (1969).  Regardless of how this controversy is resolved, the fact remains that 
Johnson’s actions clearly indicate that he believed he had the authority to direct the manner in which the 
subordinate executive officers executed of the laws. 
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struggled to determine whether Johnson issued the order pursuant to statutory authority or 
under his implied powers as president.312   
Johnson also pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in allowing the 
president to control the execution of the law when he began using the oversight 
responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence the development of important 
agency regulations.313  Thus Johnson plainly had little doubt about his authority to control 
the execution of the laws. 
Johnson exerted his influence over the independent agencies as well.  When he 
met with the heads of the commissions shortly after taking office, his remarks indicated a 
broad view of presidential responsibility and left little doubt that presidential intervention 
would be forthcoming if and when the commissions failed to discharge their 
responsibilities in a manner consistent with the President’s policies.314  Consistent with 
this vision, Johnson directed the heads of three commissions involved in the regulation of 
transportation to begin intra-agency consultations on their problems.  A Bureau of the 
                                                 
312 Compare Contractors Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding 
that even if not statutorily authorized, Executive Order No. 11246 falls within the president’s implied 
authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute); with United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 
553 F.2d 459 466-68 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that that the order was authorized by statute); see also 
Note, supra note 114, at 388-91 (arguing that the order could be upheld either as being authorized by 
statute or as falling within the president’s implied authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute).  But 
see Cramer v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Va. 1976 (holding the order 
foreclosed by statute); Blumstein, supra note 114, at 927-32, 939-49 (arguing that the order is not justified 
either by the Constitution or by statute); Moeller, supra note 263, at 479-87 (same); Schuwerk, supra note 
263 (same). 
313 Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power:  Office of Management & Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 
1, 9 (1984). 
314 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at a Meeting with the Heads of Independent Regulatory 
Agencies in Cabinet Room (Dec. 3, 1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 18. 
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Budget circular also established guidelines on the responsibilities of the FPC and other 
executive agencies in the acquisition of water data.315  
Furthermore, Johnson ardently opposed the legislative veto as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the unitary executive.  Rather than vetoing legislation, Johnson tended to 
use signing statements to construe the legislation in a manner that preserved its 
constitutionality.  For example, within the first few weeks of his Administration, Johnson 
criticized a provision of the Public Works Appropriation Act that prohibited the Panama 
Canal Company from disposing of any real property without obtaining prior approval of 
congressional committees.316  Condemning the committee veto as either “an 
unconstitutional delegation to Congressional committees of powers which reside only in 
the Congress as a whole, or an attempt to confer executive powers on the committees in 
violation of the principle of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution,” Johnson 
directed the Secretary of the Army to treat the provision as a request for information 
rather than a formal committee veto.317  Similar signing statements followed.318  
                                                 
315 Circular No. A-67 (Bur. of Budget Aug. 28, 1964).  See generally Redford, supra note 
186, at 318-19. 
316 Public Works Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 88-257, 77 Stat. 844, 847 (1963). 
317 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works 
Appropriations Act (Dec. 31, 1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 104, 104 & note. 
318 In signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-638, 78 Stat. 1035, Johnson objected to two legislative veto provisions.  One provision “seeks to give 
either the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry a veto power over certain proposed dispositions of 
foreign currencies accruing from sales under Public Law 480.  The other seeks to prevent the President 
from making certain loans at interest rates below a specified level unless he has concurrence of an advisory 
committee composed in part of Members of Congress and in apart of his own executive appointees.”  Since 
“[b]oth such provisions represented a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers,” Johnson directed executive officials to keep Congress informed and consult with them on all 
aspects of the law.”  Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the 
Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act (Oct. 8, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1249, 1250.  
Later that same month, Johnson signed legislation that required that the rules and regulations 
prescribed by the Director of Central Intelligence for the establishment and maintenance of the retirement 
system not take effect until approved by the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Armed 
Services Committees.  Act of Oct. 13, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-643, 78 Stat. 1043.  Johnson noted that “[s]uch 
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So strong was Johnson’s opposition to legislative vetoes that he refused to accept 
provisions first enacted during the Eisenhower Administration prohibiting Congress from 
appropriating funds for particular uses unless a particular committee had given its prior 
approval on the grounds that they were the functional equivalents of legislative vetoes.319  
When confronted with such a provision in the Water Resources Research Act of 1964,320 
Johnson directed the Secretary of the Interior not to request any funds under the act.  
Although Johnson acknowledged that such provisions were technically constitutional, he 
still objected to them in principle and refused to implement the act until Congress 
eventually amended the legislation to remove the committee approval provision.321  
Johnson later went so far as to veto legislation containing such a provision, concluding 
that such committee approval “seriously violates the spirit of the division of powers 
between the legislative and executive branches” and “infringes upon the responsibilities 
of the executive branch.”322  As Johnson reasoned, “The executive branch is given, by the 
Constitution, the responsibility to implement all laws—a specific and exclusive 
responsibility which cannot be shared with a committee of Congress.”  Johnson 
accordingly withheld his approval from the bill until the offending provision was 
                                                                                                                                                 
a provision attempts to confer executive powers on the members of the legislative branch, in violation of 
the constitutional principle of separation of powers.”  Accordingly, Johnson instructed the Director to “treat 
the provision as a request for consultation with the named committee members.”  Lyndon B. Johnson, 
Statement by the President Upon Approving Bill Authorizing a Retirement System for Certain Employees 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 14, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1336.  See generally Watson, 
supra note 86, at 1026-27. 
319 Since Congress is of course free to establish its own rules of procedure and these 
provisions only served to limit the discretion of Congress before it enacted legislation and did not limit the 
discretion of the executive branch after legislation had been enacted, Eisenhower had accepted such 
provisions as constitutional. 
320 Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 200, 78 Stat. 329, 331. 
321 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Water Resources 
Research Act (July 17, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 861, 862.  The provision was deleted by Act of Apr. 
19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-404, 80 Stat. 129.  See generally May, supra note 289, at 939-40; Watson, supra 
note 86, at 1027. 
322 Lyndon B. Johnson, _ (June 5, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS _, _ 
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removed.323  Johnson entered similar objections throughout the balance of his 
Administration.324 
Finally, Johnson even objected to the one type of provision that every previous 
President had agreed was constitutional:  the “report and wait” provision.  Although 
Johnson indicated that he would accept “reasonable 30-day period of notification” to 
congressional committees, the proposed Military Construction Act required that the 
Administration wait 120 days.  Although again not technically unconstitutional, Johnson 
nonetheless vetoed the bill, condemning it as “repugnant to the Constitution” and “a 
fundamental encroachment on one of the great principles of the American Constitutional 
system—the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches.”325  
Johnson continued, “By the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. 
. . . The President cannot sign into law a bill which substantially inhibits him from 
                                                 
323 Id. at _. 
324 Four months later, Johnson objected to a committee approval provision in the Omnibus 
Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat 1073, _; concluding that acceding to such a provision 
“would make the President a partner in the abdication of a fundamental principle of our Government—the 
separation of powers prescribed by the United States Constitution” that “would dilute and diminish the 
authority and powers of the Presidency.”  Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the 
Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act (Oct. 26, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1082, 1082.  Unlike the previous 
provision, the provision contained in this legislation was optional rather than obligatory.  Because nothing 
in the Act prevented Johnson from signing it and then directing his Administration not to exercise of the 
authority provided by the Act until the provision was removed, Johnson concluded that the better course 
would be to sign the bill so that the remaining legislative provisions could be enacted.  Id. at 1083.  See 
generally May, supra note 289, at 939; Watson, supra note 86, at 1027-28. 
The following year, Johnson criticized a provision that prohibited Congress from appropriating 
funds for rural renewal loans unless that loan had been approved by the Agriculture Committees.  Act of 
Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-796, 80 Stat. 1478 (1966) (amending Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, Pub. 
L. No. 87-703, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 605, 608).  Johnson called such provisions “repugnant to the Constitution.  
They represent an improper encroachment by the Congress and its committees upon Executive 
responsibilities, and dilute and diminish the authority and powers of the Presidency.”  Therefore, Johnson 
directed the appropriate Departments to submit corrective legislation and ordered his Administration not to 
approve any loans which would require committee approval.  Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the 
President Upon Signing Bill Amending the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. 
PAPERS 1354, 1354. 
325 Lyndon B. Johnson, Veto of the Military Authorization Bill (Aug. 21, 1965), in 1965 
PUB. PAPERS 907, 907. 
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performing his duty.”326  As a result, Johnson concluded that “[t]he limitations upon . . . 
the executive branch of the government here sought to be imposed are a clear violation of 
separation of powers. . . . The Congress enacts the laws.  Their execution must be left to 
the President.”327  It is “the President [who] is responsible . . . for the faithful execution of 
the laws enacted by Congress.”328  Johnson supported his conclusion by quoting James 
Madison’s statement during the Decision of 1789 and by noting that “Attorneys General 
in unbroken succession since at least the time of President Wilson” had opposed the use 
of such legislative vetoes.329  Johnson eventually signed corresponding legislation 
containing a more modest, thirty-day waiting period.330  However, Johnson again 
objected when Congress attempted to extend the waiting period to thirty days of 
continuous congressional session.331  Johnson expressed his doubts as to whether such a 
waiting period was reasonable and warned that his “responsibilities as President and 
Commander in Chief will require [him] to seek prompt revision of the restriction if future 
circumstances prove it to be inimical to the national interest.”332 
Thus Johnson strongly opposed the legislative veto more vehemently than any 
other previous President.  When this opposition is combined with Johnson’s consistent 
objections to congressional efforts to encroach upon his authority as well as the resolute 
manner in which he asserted his control over all parts of the executive branch, the 
                                                 
326 Id.  
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 908. 
329 Id. 
330 Military Construction Authorization Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-188, 79 Stat. 793, 818-
19; Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization 
Act (Sept. 16, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1003.  See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1028. 
331 Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No, 89-568, § _, 80 Stat. 739, _ (1966). 
332 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction 
Authorization Bill (Sept. 12, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1008, 1008. 
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conclusion that Johnson did not in any way acquiesce to a non-unitary vision of the 
executive branch becomes inescapable. 
V. RICHARD M. NIXON 
Notwithstanding the troubles that would eventually engulf his Administration, 
Richard M. Nixon proved to be a stalwart defender of the President’s authority to execute 
the laws.333  For example, Nixon protected the President’s removal power when he 
successfully resisted Congress’s attempt to remove two executive officials by abolishing 
their positions and reestablishing them subject to Senate confirmation.334  Nixon 
complained that “[t]his legislation would require the forced removal by an 
unconstitutional procedure of two officers now serving in the executive branch.”335  The 
President’s “power and authority to remove, or retain, executive officers” was “deeply 
rooted in our system of government.”336  Although Nixon did “not dispute Congressional 
authority to abolish an office or to specify appropriate standards by which the officers 
may serve,” Nixon vetoed the bill because “the power of the Congress to terminate an 
office cannot be used as a back-door method of circumventing the President’s power to 
remove.”337  Nixon eventually prevailed in his defense of the removal power when, after 
                                                 
333 See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation:  Separation of Powers in 
the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 401 (1989) (“The Nixon years were characterized by 
aggressive assertions of presidential power vis-à-vis Congress . . ..”). 
334 The officials involved were Office of Management and Budget Director Roy Ash and 
Deputy Director Frederick Malek.  Congress’s efforts were similar to the efforts during the Truman 
Administration to remove to officials in the Bureau of Reclamation by changing the qualifications for their 
offices.  See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
335 Richard M. Nixon, Veto of a Bill Requiring Senate Confirmation of the Director and 
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (May 18, 1973), in 1973 PUB. PAPERS 539, 539.   
336 Id. 
337 Id.  Nixon closed by quoting James Madison’s ringing endorsement of the separation of 
powers from the Decision of 1789.  Id. at 540 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581(1789)). 
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failing to override Nixon’s veto,338 Congress amended the legislation the next year to 
require Senate confirmation only of future OMB Directors and Deputy Directors.339 
Nixon extended the policy initiated by Kennedy of extending the civil service 
protection enjoyed by veterans to all federal employees.  A pair of executive orders 
giving nonveterans the right appeal adverse employment actions to the Civil Service 
Commission340 and revoking the agency review process established by Kennedy in favor 
of exclusive review by the Civil Service Commission341 in effect extended the procedural 
protections Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 to all federal employees, veterans and 
nonveterans alike.  This action is fully consistent with the unitary executive.  As we have 
noted, the procedural protections were not construed as placing any limits on the 
president’s unfettered power to remove.342  In addition, the fact that the president had the 
power to remove Civil Service Commissioners at will343 rendered any authority wielded 
by Commission unproblematic from the standpoint of the unitary executive. 
That said, we acknowledge that the Nixon Administration did bear witness to the 
emergence of the first effective limits to the removal power.  Interestingly, the impetus 
behind these limits came not from Congress, but rather from the courts.  The Supreme 
Court began to recognize that the civil service laws gave federal employees a sufficient 
property interest in their jobs to give them the benefit of procedural due process 
                                                 
338 Although the Senate voted _ to _ to override the veto, _ CONG. REC. _ (May 22, 1973), 
the House failed to follow suit, voting _ to _ to sustain the veto, id. at _ (May 23, 1973). 
339 Act of _, Pub. L. No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11 (1974).  See generally LOUIS FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 78 (3d ed. rev., 1991) [hereinafter 
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS]; LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 51-55 (1975). 
340 Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 22, 3 C.F.R. 254, 266 (1974 compilation). 
341 Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3A C.F.R. 151 (1974). 
342 See supra notes 167-175, 265-272 and accompanying text. 
343 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 21, at 788; Frug, supra note 177, at 955. 
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protections.344  And even then, such noted commentators as Gerald Frug criticized the 
Court’s decisions as starkly ahistorical and inconsistent with the longstanding, judicially-
recognized tradition of unfettered presidential removal.345  In any event, contrary to 
popular belief, the idea that the civil service laws limit the president’s power to remove is 
of fairly recent vintage.  Given the Court’s acknowledgement in INS v. Chadha346 that the 
fact that presidents since the Wilson Administration had consistently opposed a particular 
practice was sufficient to keep a question open as a constitutional matter, it is hard to see 
how this development could turn the civil service laws into an established derogation of 
the unitariness of the executive branch. 
Nixon also asserted his authority to direct federal officials’ execution of the laws 
in a wide variety of ways.  For instance, Nixon continued the program initiated by 
Johnson’s executive order requiring that government contractors institute affirmative 
action plans.347  After a series of opinions issued by the Comptroller General had 
suggested that the order was unenforceable because it did not spell out the minimum 
requirements of a satisfactory affirmative action program,348 Secretary of Labor George 
Shultz issued a revised version known as the Philadelphia Plan that providing more 
specific guidance on what was required.349  After the Comptroller General ruled that the 
additional guidance provided by the Philadelphia Plan imposed quotas in violation of 
                                                 
344 See Arnett v. Kennedy; 416 U.S. 134 (1974).  Arnett followed from the Court’s decisions 
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), regarding 
the dismissal of state employees. 
345 Frug, supra note 177, at 977-89.  As Professor Frug notes, both Roth and Sinderman 
involved teachers who alleged that they were removed for their exercise of their constitutional rights to free 
speech.  As a result, they could have been resolved under Wieman and Pickering without having to resort to 
judicial innovation.  Id. at 977-78. 
346 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983). 
347 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
348 _. 
349 _. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,350 Attorney General John Mitchell issued an 
opinion clarifying that the Plan involved mere goals, not quotas,351 and Shultz accepted 
that construction.352  Finally, after a complicated series of legislative maneuvers, 
Congress ended future questions about the Philadelphia Plan’s legitimacy in 1972 by 
unequivocally approving the President’s authority to mandate affirmative action 
programs.353  But until that point, Nixon, like Kennedy and Johnson before him, had 
derived the authority to require such programs directly from his authority to control the 
execution of federal law. 
Nixon also asserted his control over the executive branch by expanding the 
program of White House oversight of regulatory policy begun during the Johnson 
Administration.354  Nixon’s program was initially restricted to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which Nixon created by executive order in 1970,355 and began 
on May 21, 1971, when OMB Director George Shultz sent a memorandum to EPA 
Administrator William Ruckelshaus requiring OMB clearance for all EPA decisions that 
                                                 
350 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969). 
351 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 405 (1969); John W. Mitchell, Legal Memorandum:  Authority Under 
Executive Order 11246 (June 24, 1969), reprinted in The Philadelphia Plan—Congressional Oversight of 
Administrative Agencies (The Department of Labor):  Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan and S. 931 Before 
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).  
The conflict between the Comptroller General and the Attorney General raised an interesting question 
“whether the Executive branch of the Government has the right to act upon its own interpretations of the 
laws enacted by Congress, and to expend and obligate funds approved by Congress in a manner which the 
[Comptroller General’s] Office, as the designated agent of the Congress has found to be contrary to law.”  
SENATE HEARINGS, [supra note 85, at 139 (Staats statement)], quoted in Note, supra note 311, at 229; 
Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 748.  Clearly, under the unitary executive theory, subordinate executive 
officials are responsible only to the President for their execution of the laws, not to the Comptroller General 
of Congress. 
352 Jones, supra note 311, at 358-61, 364-73; Thomas D. Morgan, Achieving National Goals 
Through Federal Contracts:  Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 
301, 311-12; Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 745-46. 
353 See Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 757.  For a discussion of the maneuvering that led up to 
the 1972 vote, see id at 747-57. 
354 See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
355 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994), and 84 Stat 2086 (1970). 
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were expected to have a significant impact on the policies of other agencies, impose 
significant costs on non-federal sectors, or created additional demands on the federal 
budget.356  Nixon later expanded this initiative into a larger program into termed “Quality 
of Life” review,357 which required agencies to submit covered regulations thirty days 
before draft publication, along with an analysis of the rule’s objectives, alternatives, and 
expected costs and benefits.  OMB then solicited comments from other agencies, which 
were then forwarded to the agency proposing the rule.  A similar process, focusing on 
public comments and new issues raised during the rulemaking, was required twenty days 
before the publication of final rules.  Although the program was nominally extended to 
all federal policy proposals involving consumer protection, public health and safety, and 
occupational health and safety, in practice EPA remained the only agency routinely 
required to submit its proposals to OMB.358  In addition, OMB theoretically only 
facilitated inter-agency comments and mediated inter-agency conflicts; the issuing 
agency ostensibly retained control over the final decision.  In practice, OMB was able to 
use Quality of Life review to effect significant changes in EPA policy.359  Nixon further 
                                                 
356 Memorandum from George Shultz to William Ruckelshaus (May 21, 1971), quoted in 2 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 91 
(1977). 
357 Memorandum from George P. Shultz, Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines 
Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety 
(Oct. 5, 1971), cited in Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance:  Executive Office Oversight of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1991, at 127, 128 n.4.  For general 
descriptions of Quality of Life Review, see Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory 
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 221 (1993); Moreno, supra note 94, at 488-89; James T. O’Reilly 
& Phyllis E. Brown, In Search of Excellence:  A Prescription for the Future of OMB Oversight of Rules, 39 
ADMIN. L. REV. 421, 424-25 (1987); Percival, supra, at 133-38; Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The 
President’s Council on Competitiveness:  Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory 
Review, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 759, 769-70 (1993). 
358 But see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE 
L.J. 451, 466 (1978) (describing OMB intervention in NHTSA rulemaking). 
359 Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:  The Not-So-
Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 988-89 (2001). 
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strengthened his control over regulatory policy on July 31, 1972, when OMB Circular A-
19 required that agencies submit all proposed testimony, reports, and legislation for OMB 
approval prior to their transmission to Congress.360  The extent to which Nixon 
centralized administrative control in OMB is underscored by the fact that leading EPA 
administrators were unable to obtain written assurances that they retained independent 
decisional authority.361  It is true that these administrators sometimes threatened to resign 
over their inability to obtain assurances that they would have the final say over EPA 
regulations.362  Such threats are properly regarded as being consistent with the unitary 
executive, rather than evidence of agency independence as some of suggested,363 since 
resignation or removal is the natural outcome under our theory when an executive official 
finds himself or herself out of step with administration policy. 
Nixon also undertook efforts to dominate the independent agencies.  Nixon’s 
efforts were based on the conclusion of the Advisory Council on Executive Organization 
(commonly known as the “Ash Council” after its Chairman, OMB Director Roy Ash) that 
the commissions were “an anomaly in government structure.”364  Originally intended to 
shield the regulatory process from partisanship of the executive branch, independence 
had rendered “not sufficiently accountable to either Congress or the executive branch.”365  
                                                 
360 See Percival, supra note 357, at 137. 
361 Id. at 989 n.154 (citing JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA:  AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 119 (1976)). 
362 See Percival, supra note 359, at 988-89 (citing Implementation of the Clean Air At 
Amendment of 1970—Part I:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Sen. 
Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 325 (1927) (statement of EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus); 
and QUARLES, supra note 361, at 119). 
363 See id. 
364 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK:  REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 13 (1971) [hereinafter ASH 
COUNCIL REPORT].  See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 487-88. 
365 ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 364, at 14.  The report elaborated: 
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Therefore, the Council concluded, “[i]f regulation is to be more responsive to the public 
interest and coordinated with national programs, it must first be brought within the ambit 
of elective government, with accountability to those officials to whom the public and the 
regulated industries alike look for fair and constructive application of national policy.”366  
To accomplish these goals, the Ash Council recommended that most independent 
agencies be abolished and that their functions be transferred to newly created executive 
agencies headed by single administrators serving the President’s pleasure.367  The 
adjudicative-type review previously performed by the commissions would be conducted 
by the Administrative Court of the United States.368  Only in that way could the President 
fulfill his constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”369 and his 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Congress has conceived of these commissions as independent of executive branch 
control, but in fact the commissions are almost as independent of Congress itself.  Apart 
from appropriations approval, periodic program review, and the intermittent interest of 
one or several of its members, Congress does not exercise the degree of oversight with 
respect to regulatory commissions that it does for executive departments and other 
agencies of the executive branch.  Congress has sought to preserve the independence of 
the regulatory commissions, even as their activities increasingly affect the 
implementation of national policy.  The executive branch, responsible for carrying out 
national policy, has been reluctant to support reforms needed to integrate regulatory 
activities with executive programs because the President does not have sufficient 
responsibility for commission direction. 
 
Id. at 14-15. 
366 Id. at 16.  The Ash Council later noted: 
 
Accountability is an essential element of democratic government.  The Congress 
and the President are accountable to the people for the performance of government.  In 
turn, agencies of government headed by appointed officials should be response and 
responsible to the Congress, to the Executive, and through them, ultimately to the public. 
. . . 
Without clear accountability for performance to either Congress or the 
President, it is not surprising that the agencies receive inadequate attention. 
 
Id. at 40-41; see also id. at 15 (“Independence, and the resulting absence of regulatory accountability, has 
transferred to a generally shielded arena those questions which should be settled in a more open forum.”). 
367 Id. at 4-5, 20. 
368 Id. at 6, 22. 
369 The Ash Council noted, “The President is responsible under article I[I] of the 
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role as the person to whom the American public “looks to . . . for leadership in pursuing 
national policy goals, including those affected by the regulatory process.”370 
Bolstered by these proposals, Nixon proposed a massive reorganization in which 
all executive functions would have been consolidated into four new superagencies, 
although this proposal was eventually engulfed by the Watergate scandal.371  Congress 
defended its ability to control the independent agencies by considering a proposal to 
make the commissions even more independent of presidential control by permitting them 
to transmit their budget requests directly to Congress.  Although this proposal eventually 
failed, Congress did subsequently enact legislation authorizing a few agencies to submit 
their budgets directly to Congress372 and granting independent litigating authority to the 
FTC.373 
Congress even considered a proposal to turn the Department of Justice into an 
independent agency.374  The Administration challenged the constitutionality this proposal 
through the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Robert G. Dixon, Jr.  As Dixon 
noted, the Article II Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause compelled two 
conclusions:  “First, the enforcement of the laws is an inherently executive function, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitution to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  That duty extends to the activities of the 
regulatory agencies to assure that the laws enacted by Congress are carried out effectively and fairly.”  Id. 
at 16.  The Ash Council also contended that the fact that previous Presidents had offered similar regulatory 
reform proposals demonstrated that “these Presidents presumably felt that such recommendations were part 
of their responsibility to oversee faithful execution of the laws.”  Id.  Furthermore, the inclusion the 
independent regulatory commissions in the President’s reorganization power demonstrated that Congress 
also “recognized the President’s role in the regulatory scheme.”  Id. 
370 Id. at 16. 
371 Percival, supra note 357, at 133 & n.28. 
372 See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 191-92. 
373 Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 
591-92 (1973).  Nixon approved of this provision in return for the authorization of the Trans-Alaska Oil 
Pipeline.  See Devins, supra note 156, at 270-71. 
374 Under this proposal, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Solicitor 
General would serve six-year terms and would be removable by the President only for “neglect of duty or 
malfeasance of office.”  S. 2803, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
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second, the executive branch has the exclusive constitutional authority to enforce 
laws.”375  Dixon also argued that making the Department of Justice independent was ill 
advised as a matter of democratic political theory.  As Hamilton recognized in The 
Federalist No. 70, and the Landis Report and the Ash Council had recently reaffirmed, a 
plural executive would tend “to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility.”376  Finally, 
Dixon argued that “an ‘independent’ Department of Justice would be a constitutional 
anomaly fundamentally inconsistent with the whole theory of a tripartite government 
envision by the Founding Fathers and specified in the first three articles of the 
Constitution.”377  Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach agreed, arguing that the 
president “is responsible for the administration of the law and should be, and can be, held 
accountable for that stewardship.”378  Even Archibald Cox opposed the notion that the 
Attorney General should be made independent of presidential control:  “I believe in 
focusing individual responsibility.  There is no substitute for that responsibility.  No 
president should be relived of it—or of the consequences of default.”379  Indeed, any 
attempt to insulate the Attorney General from presidential direction would have the effect 
of erecting the “presumption that our Attorneys General cannot be trusted.  The 
presumption should be the other way, and they should be held responsible when they 
were proved incompetent or unfaithful.”380 
                                                 
375 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2803 and S. 2978, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 84 (1974) (testimony of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 152-53. 
379 Id. at 209. 
380 Id. at 211. 
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Furthermore, Nixon also opposed congressional attempts to interfere with the 
President’s execution of the laws through the legislative veto.  Although he did not 
continue Johnson’s opposition to “report and wait provisions” as well as committee 
approval requirements directed at Congress,381 Nixon offered numerous objections to 
provisions more properly regarded as legislative vetoes.  For example, Nixon objected 
that a provision of the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972 that subjected 
approval of three building projects to a committee veto.382  Such committee vetoes 
“infring[ed] on the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and executive 
powers.”383  After Congress persisted in its efforts to include a committee veto,384 Nixon 
announced that he would disregard it.385  
The following months Nixon objected that a committee veto contained in the 
Public Buildings Amendments of 1972,386 by “conditioning of the authority of the 
executive branch upon an action by committees of the Congress,” was an unconstitutional 
“infring[ement] upon the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and 
                                                 
381 Early in his Administration, President Nixon announced that “this Administration will 
interpose no objection to the procedures involved in the accomplishment of watershed projects under” the 
Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act and released the funds impounded by President Johnson.  _.  See 
generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1028, 1029; Louis Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 374 (1970).  Nixon subsequently approved a similar provision in the Public Buildings 
Amendments of 1972, noting that “[t]he Congress regards this ‘no appropriation may be made’ provision as 
internal Congressional rulemaking which does not affect the executive branch.  This Administration has 
acquiesced in that construction.”  Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings 
Amendments of 1972 (June 17, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 686, 687 (approving of Public Buildings 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-313, § 7(a), 86 Stat. 216, 221); see also Richard M. Nixon, Second 
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1972 (May 28, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 627, 627 (“The Congress 
regards this ‘no appropriation may be made’ provision, I understand, as internal Congressional rule-making 
not affecting the executive branch, and this Administration has acquiesced in that construction.”).  Nixon 
thereafter signed numerous such provisions into law without comment.  See generally Fisher, Legislative 
Veto, supra note 86, at 284; Watson, supra note 86, at 1029. 
382 Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-306, 86 Stat. 163, 175. 
383 Nixon, Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1972, supra note 381, at 627. 
384 Act of June 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313, § _, 86 Stat. 216, 220. 
385 Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972 
(June 17, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 686, 687; see also Watson, supra note 86, at 1025 n.215. 
386 §§ 5(f), 7, 86 Stat. at 220, 221. 
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executive powers.”  Consequently, President Nixon directed the General Services 
Administration to disregard those provisions and submit remedial legislation.387  Nixon 
similarly vetoed the War Powers Resolution in part because of the legislative veto 
provision it contained.388  Although Nixon did subsequently sign several legislative veto 
provisions into law without comment,389 his previous objections were doubtlessly 
sufficient to preserve his constitutional challenge for the purposes of coordinate 
construction. 
And perhaps most dramatically, Nixon asserted his right to control the execution 
of the laws throughout the Watergate scandal.  The issue first arose during the hearings 
concerning Elliott Richardson’s confirmation as Attorney General.  Richardson agreed in 
principle that a special prosecutor should be appointed, but insisted on the importance 
“that the Attorney General retain[] ultimate responsibility” for the special prosecutor’s 
work.390  Alternatively, the special prosecutor could be responsible only to the chief 
executive, since “executive power is vested in the President [by the Constitution] and 
since it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that the conduct of investigations and 
                                                 
387 Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, supra note 
385, at 687-88. 
388 Richard M. Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution (Oct. 24, 1973), in 1973 PUB. 
PAPERS 893, 893, 895 (objecting that the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 
violated the Constitution).  Congress overrode Nixon’s veto.  119 CONG. REC. H9641-61, S20093-116 
(daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).  See generally Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Congressional Veto and Separation of 
Powers:  The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 & n.21 (1978); Watson, supra note 86, at 
1016 n.160. 
389 E.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat 103, 107 (1972); Act of Oct. 
21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-520, § 3, sec. 18(d)(4), 86 Stat. 1019, 1021; Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627.  Nixon even proposed a legislative veto provision, but eventually 
vetoed the underlying legislation on other grounds.  See Watson, supra note 86, at 1016 n.160.  See 
generally id. at 1009, 1016 n.160, 1026 n.215, 1029. 
390 Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to Be Attorney General:  Hearings Before the Sen. 
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973). 
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prosecutions as defined by the law are executive branch functions.”391  Richardson 
insisted, “I know of no way constitutionally whereby any individual who has been vested 
with prosecutorial responsibility can be removed from responsibility to a superior within 
the executive branch.”392 
Nixon’s belief in his sole authority to control the execution of the law was 
demonstrated most dramatically by the “Saturday Night Massacre,” in which he directed 
Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to 
remove Archibald Cox as Watergate special prosecutor notwithstanding the Justice 
Department order granting Cox the “greatest degree of independence that is consistent 
with the Attorney General’s statutory authority” and providing that Cox would not be 
removed “except for extraordinary improprieties on his part.”393  After Richardson 
resigned and Ruckelshaus was removed over their refusal to fire Cox, the task fell to 
Solicitor General Robert Bork.  Although regrettable, the Saturday Night Massacre 
remains a vivid, if controversial, assertion of Nixon’s belief in his authority to control the 
execution of the law 
The Nixon Administration continued to press its belief in the impropriety of 
insulating executive functions from presidential control when opposing the welter of bills 
seeking to authorize the appointment of temporary special prosecutors under the control 
of the courts.  In Senate hearings on the legislation, Acting Attorney General Bork 
testified, “The executive alone has the duty and the power to enforce the laws by 
                                                 
391 Id. at 132-33. 
392 Id. at 139.  See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 31-34. 
393 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973). 
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prosecutions brought before the courts.”394  Giving such authority to another branch “is 
simply not our system of government.”395  Bork offered a similar observation in his 
testimony before a House subcommittee, arguing that “[t]o suppose that Congress can 
take that duty form the Executive and lodge in either in itself or in the courts is to 
suppose that Congress may by mere legislation alter the fundamental distribution of 
powers dictate by the Constitution.”396 
Over time, many leading figures have begun to question the conventional wisdom 
that the Saturday Night Massacre demonstrated the need for a prosecutorial institution 
operating independently of presidential control.397  The political uproar following Cox’s 
dismissal forced Nixon to appoint another special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who 
completed the Watergate investigation and drove Nixon out of office.  The episode 
demonstrates how political constraints can ensure the effectiveness of investigations of 
high-level government misconduct without resort to constitutionally problematic 
institutional arrangements.  From this perspective, it is Jaworski’s successful completion 
of the Watergate prosecution rather than Cox’s removal that represents the central lesson 
with respect to the separation of powers.  Regardless of where one comes down in this 
debate, the fact remains that Cox’s removal and the administration’s opposition to 
congressional attempts to authorize special prosecutors operating independently of 
                                                 
394 Provision for Special Prosecutor:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 451 (1976). 
395 Id. 
396 Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legislation:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 253 (1973).  See 
generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 40-41. 
397 Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 704, at 29 (testimony of former Attorney General 
Griffin B. Bell), 57 (testimony of former Independent Counsel Joseph E. diGenova), 148 (testimony of 
Clinton counsel Robert S. Bennett), 245 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno), 425 (testimony of 
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr). 
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presidential control represent prominent examples of Nixon’s steadfast insistence on the 
unitariness of the executive branch. 
VI. GERALD R. FORD 
When Gerald R. Ford came to the White House, he had every reason to expect 
that he would be hard pressed to defend the prerogatives of the executive branch.  
Watergate had effectively destroyed public confidence in the Presidency.  Moreover, 
having never run for national office, Ford lacked the mandate and the broad base of 
political support needed for vigorous presidential action.  More than any other post-
World War II President, Ford could have been expected to acquiesce to congressionally-
imposed invasions on the unitariness of the executive branch.  Ford’s biographer, John 
Robert Greene, notes: 
The 865 days of the Ford presidency tell a story of an administration 
struggling to create itself, to escape the long shadow of the Nixon 
administration by offering its own agenda to the American people.  The 
pardon, as we shall see, is the seminal event in the planning of both these 
objectives as Ford sought to evict the ghost of Nixon past from his White 
House and to begin anew, with a Ford administration.398 
When Ford assumed office, “Political sagacity dictated that [he] fire the Nixon 
people as quickly as possible and when he installed his own advisers that he steer clear of 
a Haldeman-like chief of staff.”399  Ford immediately indicated that White House Chief 
of Staff Alexander Haig could stay on for a short while, but that he would soon be 
replaced by young turk Donald Rumsfeld.400  Rumsfeld’s strong personality guaranteed 
that there would be at least some centralized control of White House operations.  During 
                                                 
398 JOHN ROBERT GREENE, THE PRESIDENCY OF GERALD R. FORD xii (1995). 
399 Id. at 24. 
400 Id. at 25. 
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the one month honeymoon period between Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s pardon of him, 
“The idea of a strong cabinet” gained favor “[a]s most of the country had come to view 
the Nixon White House as a fortress where access was forbidden and advice ignored.”401  
Ford made some moves toward a stronger cabinet, but he did not totally buck the modern 
trend toward strong White House staffs.  “The pattern that actually emerged in Ford’s 
administration fell in between these extremes of policy development.  Ford’s style with 
his cabinet was neither as heavy-handed as Nixon’s nor did it offer a collegial return to 
cabinet government.”402 
The first two major issues of the Ford presidency emerged one month into his 
administration when he pardoned both former President Richard M. Nixon and many of 
those individuals who had evaded the draft during the Vietnam War.  These two pardons 
“destroyed [Ford’s] honeymoon with the American people.”403  The pardon of the draft 
evaders was a major decision about the execution of the laws based on Ford’s belief that 
it was necessary to bring to an end the “‘long national nightmare’ of the sixties.”404  This 
pardon helped to “cement Ford’s image as a conciliator,”405 and it was in accord with 
previous exercises of the pardon power to bring the American people together after a 
major war.  The question of whether to pardon Nixon had “hung over the administration 
like the sword of Damocles,” since it had been a major item of discussion at Ford’s first 
cabinet meeting.406  Ford felt the pardon was appropriate both because of Nixon’s 
precarious health—a trial might have killed him—and because he wanted to, in the 
                                                 
401 Id. at 28. 
402 Id. at 29. 
403 Id. at 35. 
404 Id. at 39. 
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406 Id. at 45. 
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language of the Preamble of the Constitution, “ensure domestic tranquility.”407  
Obviously, the two pardons together were a major law enforcement decision made by 
Ford personally about what degree of law enforcement would best serve the interests of 
the nation.  The fact that Ford made these two law enforcement decisions himself as the 
nation’s chief law enforcement officer is telling support for the theory of the unitary 
executive. 
After the Nixon pardon, congressional power vis-à-vis the executive branch began 
to grow enormously, continuing a trend that began in the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations.  The public perception of the time was that there had grown up what 
was called in Arthur Schlesinger’s words, an imperial presidency,408 and that the time had 
come to restore some power to Congress.  The “stinging” and “bipartisan” opposition on 
Capitol Hill to the Nixon pardon began a long process of power flowing away from the 
White House.409  “A new day had dawned, and Ford had to work in that new day—
clearly the locus of power in the federal government had shifted back from the White 
House to Capitol Hill.”410 
After two of Richard Nixon’s Attorneys General were convicted of crimes, it was 
essential that Ford pick a person of impeccable character to serve in that role.  Ford did 
precisely that by turning to Edward Levi, then the president of the University of Chicago.  
“Levi made it clear to Ford early in the nominating process that he would not take the job 
unless Justice was made apolitical.”411  Ford and Levi together faced many crises, 
                                                 
407 Id. at 52. 
408 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 37. 
409 GREENE, supra note 398, at 54-55. 
410 Id. at 58. 
411 Id. at 88-89. 
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including the threat of violence attending school desegregation in Boston.  “Ford was 
ready to intercede if violence broke out.  He had ordered the Department of Defense to 
put fifteen hundred troops of the Eighty-second Airborne on an increased state of 
readiness, which would allow them to be in Boston in nine hours.”412  This shows how 
seriously Ford took his obligation faithfully to execute the laws. 
Early in Ford’s presidency, major scandals broke linking the Central Intelligence 
Agency to attempted assassinations in Cuba and in Vietnam.  Ford responded to this 
crisis on January 4, 1975, by creating a presidential Commission on CIA activities 
headed up by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.  Ultimately, Congress could not resist 
forming its own Committee under Senator Frank Church to investigate the CIA, and that 
Committee went quite a bit further than the Rockefeller Committee in arguably crippling 
the CIA.  Within the political constraints he was operating under, which were severe, 
Ford did his best to maintain the CIA’s effectiveness.  He also strongly resisted handing 
over documents to the Church Committee seeking “to give the appearance of cooperation 
without actually providing the committee with any substantive documentation.”413  Thus 
did Ford defend executive prerogatives in the extremely trying months after the 
Watergate scandal and the Nixon pardon. 
In April of 1975, Ford’s situation became even direr as it became clear that the 
governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia were going to fall to the communists 
unless Congress appropriated money to help those countries defend themselves.  
Scandalously, Congress cut off all funding whatsoever for the anticommunist efforts in 
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Southeast Asia and even failed to appropriate money to evacuate those Cambodians and 
South Vietnamese citizens whose lives would be in danger because of their past help for 
the U.S. war effort in Indochina.  Ultimately, Ford had to personally give the order for the 
evacuation by helicopter from Saigon of as many people as the military could manage to 
help get out.414 
In May 1975, Ford presided as Commander in Chief over the rescue of American 
passengers and crew on the Mayaguez, a ship that was captured by the Cambodians.  
“Ford’s behavior was calm and rational throughout the crisis and his demeanor spread to 
his team.”415  Ford felt he had a duty as president to rescue the captured Americans and 
he fulfilled that duty.416  Ford took military action without consulting Congress under the 
War Powers Act,417 and when members of Congress complained about his failure to 
consult them he said, “It is my constitutional responsibility to command the forces and to 
protect Americans.”418  Ford lived up to that responsibility and rescued the Mayaguez 
crew and passengers. 
On November 2 and 3, 1975, Ford made some major personnel changes in his 
administration which showed he was not afraid to remove people when he thought it 
necessary to do so.  First, Ford asked for the resignations of Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby.  He also removed the ailing Rogers Morton 
as Commerce Secretary, and he stripped Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of his second 
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job as White House National Security Advisor.419  Colby was replaced at the CIA by 
George Bush; Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger at the Pentagon; while the young Dick 
Cheney replaced Rumsfeld as White House Chief of Staff.420  All in all, it was a good 
series of personnel moves, since the incoming figures—Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney—all 
proved exceptionally capable.  The next day, it was announced that Vice President 
Nelson Rockefeller would be dropped from the ticket when Ford ran for reelection in 
1976.  This was a move to reach out to conservatives then gathering around the White 
House candidacy of Ronald Reagan, since conservatives detested Rockefeller and were 
certain to be disappointed by Ford’s firing of Schlesinger.421  With these bold and 
decisive personnel moves, Ford showed that he and he alone was firmly in control of the 
executive branch. 
There was one other prominent removal during the Ford years:  the firing of 
Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz in the middle of Ford’s reelection campaign.  Butz 
foolishly told off-color jokes to Rolling Stone Magazine correspondent John Dean that 
were subsequently published in the national press to the great embarrassment of the 
administration.  “On Monday morning Butz met with Ford; around noon with tears in his 
eyes, he went before the press and resigned.  Ford’s assessment of Dean was entirely 
predictable: ‘a low-down, no-good, son of a bitch.  A sniveling bastard.’”422 
Ford took other steps that demonstrated his willingness to take control of his 
administration.  For example, Ford did not hesitate to direct the actions of subordinate 
executive officials, at one point directing the Department of Health, Education, and 
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Welfare to suspend a rule so that it could be reexamined.423  Ford also continued the 
Quality of Life program begun established by President Nixon, adding the requirement 
that major rules include an “inflation impact statement” comparing the costs and 
inflationary effects with the benefits of the rules.424  These statements would then be 
reviewed by the newly formed Council on Wage and Price Stability, although such 
review would only proceed after the proposed rule had been published in the Federal 
Register and the Council had no power to mandate changes in the rules.425  
Ford also rebuffed congressional attempts to impinge upon the president’s 
authority to execute the law.  Members of the Ford Administration testified against the 
establishment of independent prosecutors.  Attorney General Edward H. Levi testified 
that the special prosecutor appointed by the judiciary was “constitutionally dubious.”426  
Assistant Attorney General Michael M. Uhlmann challenged the constitutionality of the 
proposal as well on the grounds that control of prosecution lay at “the very core of 
                                                 
423 See Bruff, supra note 358, at 465 n.67; Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 
12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483, 494 (1988). 
424 Exec. Order No., 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-75 compilation); OMB Circular A-107 
(Jan. 28, 1975); see also Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1976 compilation) (extending Exec. Order 
No. 11,821). 
425 See generally O’Reilly & Brown, supra note 357, at 426-27; Percival, supra note 357, at 
138-41; see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 533, 547 (1989); Cross, supra note 423, at 494; Moreno, supra note 94, at 489; DeWitt, supra note 
357, at 770-71.  Some scholars have concluded that this program improved the economic analysis and 
influenced the decisions of some agencies.  See COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL REGULATION:  ROADS TO REFORM 85 (1979); Percival, supra note 
357, at 140; Charles W. Vernon III, Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program:  An Assessment of the 
First Two Years, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 1138, 1160-61 (1977).  Others have disagreed, arguing that the 
inflation impact statements amounted to little more than “post-hoc justifications for decisions already 
reached.”  O’Reilly & Brown, supra note 357, at 427; see also Bruff, supra, at 547; Moreno, supra note 94, 
at 489. 
426 Provision for Special Prosecutor:  Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1976); accord id. at 33-34 (arguing that the institution of special prosecutors 
operating outside of presidential control was of “questionable constitutionality”). 
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‘executive functions.’”427  Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler, Jr., similarly criticized 
the proposal as “constitutionally inappropriate” because “[u]nlike any other officer of the 
Executive branch [the special prosecutor’s] removal would be beyond the discretion of 
the President.”428   
Ford instead offered a proposal in which special prosecutors would be appointed 
by the president to three-year terms, confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and subject to the supervision and removal by the Attorney General.429  The Senate 
approved Ford’s proposal by a vote of ninety-one to five, but House declined to do so on 
the grounds that the creation of a permanent position would lead to the instigation of too 
many special prosecutor investigations.  Members of the House instead favored a 
temporary special prosecutor appointed by a special panel of judges.430  In retrospect, it is 
now clear that the House had it precisely backwards.  It is the absence of executive 
control rather than the permanence of the office that represents the greater danger.  
However, the fact that Congress declined to enact this legislation does not weaken the 
constitutional import of the president’s insistence that executive functions remain subject 
to presidential control. 
Furthermore, after a slow start,431 Ford began to challenge the legislative veto as 
an impermissible invasion of the unitary executive.  At first, Ford was only willing to 
                                                 
427 Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975:  Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).  See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL 
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 146 (1992). 
428 Statement of Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Concerning S. 495 Before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee (May 26, 1976), quoted in EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 53. 
429 H.R. DOC. NO. 550, 94th Cong. 2 (1976). 
430 See EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 54-56; Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the 
Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 621-23 (1998). 
431 During the early stages of the Ford Administration, President Ford signed numerous bills 
containing legislative vetoes without any objection.  Dixon, supra note 388, at 428; Watson, supra note 86, 
at 1016 n.160, 1029. 
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question the device, issuing a signing statement challenging the legislative veto as 
improperly “inject[ing] the Congress into the process of administering education laws” 
and “attempting to stretch the constitutional role of the Congress.”  Although Ford 
acknowledged that “[t]he Congress can and should hold the executive branch to account 
for its performance, but for the Congress to attempt to administer Federal programs is 
questionable on practical as well as constitutional grounds.”  Accordingly, President Ford 
“asked the Attorney General for advice on these provisions.”432  Two months later, 
Ford’s opposition to these provisions stiffened when he vetoed a bill because it contained 
a two-house legislative veto.433  
Ford objected twice more in 1975, calling the legislative veto “an unconstitutional 
exercise of Congressional power.”434  In the latter of these two instances, Ford instructed 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare “to treat this provision . . . simply as a 
request for information about the proposed standards in advance of their 
                                                 
432 Gerald R. Ford, Statement on the Education Amendments of 1974 (Aug. 21, 1974), in 
1974 PUB. PAPERS 35, 37. 
433 Gerald R. Ford, Veto of Atomic Energy Act Amendments (Oct. 12, 1974), in 1974 PUB. 
PAPERS 294 (objecting that the legislative veto violated Article I, section 7, of the Constitution).  As 
Professor Dixon has noted, this was “one of the more unusual versions of a legislative veto.”  Dixon, supra 
note 388, at 430 n.24.  Under the vetoed provisions, the Act would not become effective until after the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy submitted its evaluation of a particular study and the Congress adopted a 
concurrent resolution.  “In effect, Congress was reversing the normal legislative process and asking for 
presidential approval of substantive legislation before Congress was ready to commit itself to support the 
legislation.”  Dixon, supra note 388, at 430 n.24.  President suggested that the bill was “merely the 
expression of an intent to legislate” rather than actual legislation.  Ford, Veto of Atomic Energy Act 
Amendments, supra, at 294. 
434 Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing a Bill Amending Child Support Provisions of the 
Social Security Act (Aug. 11, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 1148, 1149; Gerald R. Ford, Statement on 
Signing the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975 (May 26, 1975), in 1975 PUB. PAPERS 724, 724.  Ford 
nonetheless signed the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-25, § 8, sec. 404(c)(3), 89 Stat. 
90, 91, “because the Nation needs the important passenger rail service it will provide.”  Ford, Statement on 
Signing the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1975, supra, at 724. 
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promulgation.”435  Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia tirelessly testified before 
Congress in opposition to the legislative veto.436  
But it was not until 1976 that Ford offered his boldest criticisms of the legislative 
veto.437  Ford entered no fewer than six vetoes438 and five signing statements439 criticizing 
the legislative veto.  Ford based many of his objections on the unitariness of the executive 
branch.440  As Ford at one point noted: 
                                                 
435 Ford, Statement on Signing a Bill Amending Child Support Provisions of the Social 
Security Act, supra note 434, at 1149. 
436 Dixon, supra note 388, at 428 n.22 (citing Congressional Review of Administration 
Rulemaking:  Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative 
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1975); 
Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements—1975:  Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167, 173-
74, 183-87 (1975); Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory Agencies:  Hearings on S. 
2258, S. 2716, S. 2812, S. 2878, S. 2903, S. 2925, S. 3318, and S. 3428 Before the Sen. Comm. on 
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81, 124 (1976); Congressional Review of International 
Agreements:  Hearings on H.R. 4438 Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs 
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1976)); Symposium, Oversight 
and Review of Agency Decisionmaking Part II, Morning Session, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 684-95, 700-01 
(1976) (remarks of Antonin Scalia)). 
437 See Dixon, supra note 388, at 429-30 n.24 (noting Ford’s growing opposition to 
legislative vetoes).  Ford’s attack on the legislative veto occurred at a time when the House had passed a 
proposal to subject all agency rules to a legislative veto.  122 CONG. REC. 31668 (1976); see also FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 142. 
438 Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Hatch Act Amendments Bill (Apr. 12, 1976), in 1976-77 
PUB. PAPERS 1114; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Foreign Assistance Bill (May 7, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. 
PAPERS 1481, 1482; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Bill (July 7, 1976), in 
1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1984; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Extension Bill (Aug. 14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2144; Gerald R. Ford, Memorandum of 
Disapproval of the International Navigational Rules Act of 1976 (Oct. 10, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 
2481; Gerald R. Ford, Memorandum of Disapproval of the Agricultural Resources Conservation Bill (Oct. 
20, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2583.  See generally BOLTON, supra note 223, at 10 n.24; Dixon, supra 
note 388, at 429-30 n.24. 
439 Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 
1976 (Feb. 10, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 241, 242; Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 (May 11, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1529, 1530; Gerald 
R. Ford, Statement on Signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
(July 1, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1936, 1937; Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the National 
Emergencies Act (Sept. 14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2249; Gerald Ford, Statement on Signing the 
Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 (Oct. 15, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 
2538, 2539.  See generally Dixon, supra note 388, at 429 nn.23-24. 
440 Ford also challenged the legislative veto as a violation of Article I, section 7.  See, e.g., 
Ford, Statement on Signing the National Emergencies Act , supra note 439, at 2249. 
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The exercise of an otherwise valid Executive power cannot be limited by a 
discretionary act of a committee of Congress nor can a committee give the 
Executive a power which it otherwise would not have.  The legislative 
branch cannot inject itself into the Executive functions, and opposition to 
attempts of the kind embodied in this bill has been expressed for more 
than 50 years.441 
Ford later similarly objected that legislative veto provisions purported to involve 
the Congress in the performance of day-to-day executive functions in derogation of the 
principle of separation of powers, resulting in the erosion of the fundamental 
constitutional distinction between the role of the Congress in enacting legislation and the 
role of the executive in carrying it out.442  Ford repeatedly announced his support for 
challenging the constitutionality of the practice in court.443   
                                                 
441 Ford, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1976, supra 
note 434, at 242. 
442 Ford, Statement on Signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976, supra note 439, at 1937; see also Ford, Statement on Signing the National 
Emergencies Act , supra note 439, at 2249 (“Such provisions are contrary to the general constitutional 
principle of separation of powers whereby Congress enacts laws but the President and the agencies of 
government execute them.”); see also BOLTON, supra note 223, at 12. 
443 Ford, Statement on Signing the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 
supra note 439, at 1530 (“direct[ing] the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of [the 
legislative veto] at the earliest possible opportunity”); Ford, Statement on Signing the International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, supra note 439, at 1937 (reserving his right to challenge 
the constitutionality of a legislative veto provision); Ford, Statement on Signing the National Emergencies 
Act, supra note 439, at 2249 (noting that the Attorney General was challenging the constitutionality of the 
legislative veto in the Federal Election Campaign Act).  
Despite its stated intentions, the Ford Administration’s brief in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976), chose to portray the Federal Election Commission as a legislative agency and to argue that as a 
legislative agency, it could not constitutionally exercise any executive functions.  Brief of the Attorney 
General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 110-20, Buckley (No. 75-436).  This 
position necessarily forced the Ford Administration to forego any challenges to the legislative veto, since 
any vetoes over the Commission’s actions could not be cast as an attempt by Congress to control an 
executive officer or as a method by which Congress could change the law without presidential 
participation.  Id. at 111-12.  In accordance with the Administration’s position, the Supreme Court did not 
reach the issues surrounding the legislative veto.  424 U.S. at 140 n. 176 (per curiam).  But see id. at 284-
85, 285-86 (White, J., dissenting) (defending the constitutionality of the legislative veto).  The Ford 
Administration did intervene as a plaintiff in a suit brought by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
challenging the constitutionality of the legislative veto.  This case, however, was dismissed as unripe.  
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Carl v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 
(1977); see also May, supra note 289, at 943. 
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Thus, even though Ford did at times tolerate the enactment of legislative 
vetoes,444 there can be little doubt that Ford raised sufficient objections and exerted 
sufficient control over his subordinates to overcome any suggestion that he acquiesced to 
congressional interference in the execution of the laws.  Despite all the handicaps that 
Gerald Ford faced as an unelected president and as a result of the Nixon pardon, Ford still 
emerged as a steady defender of the President’s authority to execute the laws.   
VII. JIMMY CARTER 
The Administration of Jimmy Carter without doubt represents the nadir of 
presidential power in the post-World War II era.  Apparently unable to articulate a clear 
vision for the country and beset by the oil and Iranian hostage crises, Carter ultimately 
proved ill-suited to assume the strong leadership role taken by many of his 
predecessors.445  His political weaknesses, however, did not translate into a willingness to 
allow control over the execution of the law to be transferred from the White House to 
Capitol Hill.  On the contrary, in spite of its other problems, the Carter Administration 
appears to have solidly defended the unitariness of the executive branch.  
To some degree, the Carter Administration’s ability to resist encroachments on his 
authority to execute the laws was limited by the shadow of Watergate, as demonstrated 
by the fate of its constitutional objections to a troika of ethics reform proposals enacted 
over a two-week span in 1978.  The first was the Inspector General Act of 1978,446 which 
                                                 
444 See BOLTON, supra note 223, at 10 n.24; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra 
note 339, at 142-43; May, supra note 289, at 942 & n.354. 
445 In fact, Carter has subsequently indicated that he actively sought to reduce the imperial 
status of the Presidency.  JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 2 (1982). 
446 Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 3(b), 92 Stat. 1101, 1103. 
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vested the existing audit and investigative authority in each of the executive departments 
in an independent Office of Inspector General.  Each Inspector General was required to 
report the results of such audits or investigations to the head of the department and to 
make general reports to Congress on a semi-annual basis.447  The statute also required 
that the president communicates the reasons for removing any Inspector General to both 
houses of Congress.448 
John Harmon, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Carter’s Office of 
Legal Counsel, denounced this legislation as “making the Inspectors General subject to 
divided and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.”449  For example, the provision 
requiring that the Inspectors General report directly to Congress impermissibly interfered 
with the President’s authority to control the execution of the laws.  As the opinion 
pointed out: 
Article II vests the executive power of the United States in the President.  
This includes general administrative control over those executing the laws.  
The President’s power of control extends to the entire executive branch, 
and includes the right to coordinate and supervise all replies and 
comments from the executive branch to Congress.450  
                                                 
447 § 5(a), (b), 92 Stat. at _, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 400 (_). 
448 § 3(b), 92 Stat. at _, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 399 (Supp. V 1981). 
449 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 17 (1977). 
450 Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926); Congress Constr. Corp. v. 
United States, 314 F.2d 527, 530-32 (Ct. Cl. 1963)).  The opinion also noted: 
 
[T]he Justice Department has repeatedly taken the position that continuous oversight of 
the functioning of executive agencies, such as that contemplated by the requirement that 
the Inspector General keep Congress fully and currently informed, is not a proper 
legislative function.  In our opinion, such continuing supervision amounts to an 
assumption of the Executive’s role of administering or executing the laws. 
 
Id.  By providing for unlimited access to executive branch materials, the bill also risked infringing upon 
executive privilege.  Id. at 18. 
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Moreover, the requirement that the President provide Congress with reasons for 
any removal of an Inspector General constituted “an improper restriction on the 
President’s exclusive power to remove Presidentially appointed executive officers.”451  
Although the opinion acknowledged the exception created by Humphrey’s Executor and 
Wiener for quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officers, “the power to remove a subordinate 
appointed officer within one of the executive departments is a power reserved to the 
President acting in his discretion.”452  Furthermore, the Inspector General Act violated the 
unitariness of the executive branch by authorizing the Comptroller General to prescribe 
the audit standards that would apply to the executive branch.453   
The second piece of legislation was the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,454 
which grew out of a bill submitted by Carter proposing that the Civil Service 
Commission be replaced by two newly created agencies.  The Commission’s 
administrative responsibilities would be transferred to the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), while its appellate functions would be vested in the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB) and its investigatory functions being lodged in an Office of 
Special Counsel within the MSPB.455    While this legislation was pending before 
Congress, Carter issued a reorganization plan456 and an executive order457 largely 
implementing his legislative proposals. 
                                                 
451 Id. at 18. 
452 Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78. 
453 See Charles J. Williams III, Comment, The New Separation of Powers Jurisprudence and 
the Controller General:  Does He “Execute the Law” Under the Federal Employees’ Retirement Act?, 9 
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 35, 41 (1986) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 584, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977)). 
454 Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
455 _ CONG. REC. _ (1978). 
456 Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1978 compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 
1577 (1994), and 92 Stat. 3783 (1978). 
457 Exec. Order No. 12107, 3 C.F.R. 264 (1978 compilation), reprinted in . 5 U.S.C. § 1101 
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When Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act, it retained the same 
standard for dismissal that existed in previous statutes, allowing removals “only for such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.”458  It added a list of prohibited 
personnel practices, including among other things discrimination, political coercion, 
nepotism, and retaliation against whistleblowers.459  In an apparent desire to limit the 
range of adverse action that would be reversed on appeal,460 the Civil Service Reform Act 
also scaled back some of the procedural protections promulgated by the Civil Service 
Commission in the aftermath of Arnett v. Kennedy.461  It also provided for broader 
judicial review of adverse personnel decisions by giving the courts jurisdiction to 
overturn MSPB decisions that were arbitrary or capricious, obtained without the 
applicable procedural protections, or unsupported by substantial evidence.462  The statute 
did contain provisions exempting all officials who were appointed by the president; who 
were confirmed by the Senate; who served in the foreign service or for the Central 
Intelligence Agency; or who was determined by the president, a department head, or 
OPM to occupy positions “of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy 
advocating character.”463  By exempting all policymaking personnel, this provision in 
effect limited the scope of the Civil Service Reform Act to purely ministerial officials.  
                                                                                                                                                 
app. at _. 
458 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a).  As was the case with the predecessor statutes, the legislative history 
provides no help in interpreting this provision.  See Stephen G. Vaskov, Judicial Review of Dismissals of 
Civil Service Employees for Off-Duty Misconduct:  The Approach of the Federal Circuit, 34 AM. U. L. 
REV. 439, 458 (1985). 
459 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)-(3), (6)-(7). 
460 See S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 55 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723 2777; Brewer 
v. United States Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 1093, 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
461 416 U.S. 134 (1974).  For an review of these expanded protections, see Buffon, supra 
note 272, at 212-23. 
462 Id. § 7703(c). 
463 Id. § 7511(b). 
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As such, it did not represent a significant derogation from the unitariness of the executive 
branch. 
There were other provisions, however, that were more problematic.  Unlike the 
Civil Service Act of 1883, which made Civil Service Commissioners removable by the 
president at will, and in contrast to the president’s initial proposal, which was silent on 
the point and presumably would have allowed for unfettered removal of MSPB members, 
the version of the Civil Service Reform Act actually adopted provided that MSPB 
members “may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”464  In addition, the statute extended the same removal protections 
to the Office of Special Counsel charged with investigating wrongful terminations.465  
Harmon challenged the removal provisions, pointing out that “the functions of the 
Special Counsel would be predominantly executive in character. . . .  [S]ince, he will be 
performing largely executive functions, [OLC] believe[s] that Congress may impose no 
restrictions on the President’s power to remove him.”466   
Most importantly, Harmon suggested that the provision of the Ethics in 
Government Act467 that vested the power to remove special prosecutors in a special panel 
of the D.C. Circuit raised “serious constitutional questions.”468  In addition, there seemed 
                                                 
464 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). 
465 5 U.S.C. § 1204. 
466 Letter from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Sen. 
Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 6 (June 14, 1978), quoted 
in Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function:  The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 340 (1993). 
467 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). 
468 Special Prosecutor Legislation:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of 
the House Comm. on  the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977).  Congress responded in part to this 
concern by amending the legislation to place the removal power in the Attorney General, but prohibiting 
such removals except for extraordinary impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or “any other 
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such special prosecutor’s duties.”  § 596, 92 Stat. 
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to be serious questions about the need for such a statute.  When allegations of presidential 
misconduct surfaced regarding a money laundering scheme involving the Carter peanut 
warehouse, Attorney General Griffin Bell had appointed his own special prosecutors, 
subject to his supervision and removal, who successfully completed his investigation in 
an exemplary manner that enjoyed widespread public confidence.469  Indeed, Carter’s 
Attorneys General would emerge as leading critics of the Ethics in Government Act.470  
Despite these misgivings about each of these statutes, in the aftermath of Watergate 
Carter had little choice but to overlook these constitutional problems and accept this 
legislation.471  Harmon’s discussion of the provision is a study in lawyerly 
circumspection, noting that the Justice Department had no objections to the removal 
provisions.472  Harmon noted that under Myers, Congress may not ordinarily impose 
limits on the president’s power to remove, and it was not altogether clear whether the 
qualification imposed by Humphrey’s Executor applied to special prosecutors.  In light of 
the extraordinary need to restore public confidence in the government, the Justice 
Department was wiling to permit the experiment of a limitation on the president’s power 
to remove.473 
                                                                                                                                                 
1869; see also EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 145 n.6; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, 
at 77; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 146. 
469 See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3541. 
470 See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 704. at 28 (testimony of former Attorney 
General Griffin B. Bell); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Post-Watergate Legislation in Retrospect, 34 SW. L.J. 
1043, 1051-56 (1981).  
471 See Jimmy Carter, Ethics in Government Act of 1978:  Remarks on Singing S. 555 into 
Law (Oct. 26, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1854; Jimmy Carter, Ethics in Government:  Message to the 
Congress (May 3, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 786, 788.   
472 Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to Be Attorney General:  Hearings Before the Sen. 
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973).     
473 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977; Blind Trusts and Other Conflicts of Interest 
Matters:  Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1977).  
See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 57-58.   
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However, when the areas involved did not relate so directly to ethical abuses by 
the executive branch, Carter’s was better able to defend the President’s authority to 
execute the laws.  In 1978, Carter vetoed a bill that would have required three Cabinet 
officers to report to Congress whenever the President’s budget requests for certain 
activities were less than the amounts authorized by Congress and to explain why the 
higher amounts were not requested.  Calling it an “unacceptable intrusion” on his 
obligations and ability to make budget recommendations, Carter refused to comply.474  
Moreover, the following year Carter refused to comply with a rider barring him from 
closing ten specified United States Consulates,475 announcing in a signing statement that 
he would treat the rider as a “recommendation and not a requirement.”476  
Carter did not hesitate to intervene directly in legal matters of personal concern, 
dictating the Administration’s position in Bakke477 and overruling Bell’s objection to the 
use of public funds to pay the salaries of persons working in church schools.478  The 
Carter Administration also centralized its control over federal litigation, emphasizing the 
“Attorney General’s plenary power over governmental litigation.”479  Towards this end, 
Carter created the Federal Legal Council to facilitate “coordination and communication 
                                                 
474 Jimmy Carter, Veto of the Sikes Act Amendments of 1978:  Message to the House of 
Representatives Returning H.R. 10882 Without Approval (July 10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1250, 
1250; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 192. 
475 Act of Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. § 108, 93 Stat. 395, 397. 
476 Jimmy Carter, Department of State, International Communication Agency, and Board of 
International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill:  Statement on Singing H.R. 3363 into Law (Aug. 15, 1979), 
in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434.  Carter closed seven of the ten protected consulates by early the 
following year.  126 CONG. REC. 21515-16, 28513 (1980); see also May, supra note 289, at 967. 
477 See Devins, supra note 156, at 285 (citing inter alia GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. 
OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 29-32 (1982); FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 286). 
478 See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
437, 449 (1993) (citing BELL & OSTROW, supra note , at 24-28). 
479 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 233, 234 (1980).  It should be noted that Carter did permit the 
agencies to present their own views before the Supreme Court.  See Devins, supra note 156, at 289. 
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among Federal legal offices” in order to “avoid inconsistent or unnecessary litigation by 
agencies.”480  In addition, the Carter Administration shelved a proposal advanced during 
the campaign to turn the Justice Department into an independent agency.  Bell, who as 
Attorney General was assigned the task of preparing the necessary legislation, expressed 
“serious doubt as to the constitutionality of such legislation.”481  According to Bell, “[t]he 
first sentence of Article II vests the executive power of the Government in the President 
and charges him with the general administrative responsibility for executing the laws of 
the United States.482  When combined with the Appointments and Take Care Clauses, 
Bell concluded that “the President is given not only the power, but also the constitutional 
obligation to execute the laws.”483  Moreover, the Court made clear in Myers v. United 
States484 that “the President’s freedom to remove executive officials cannot be altered by 
legislation.”485  This was particularly true for the Attorney General:   
 The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the 
Untied States.  He acts for the President to ensure that the President’s 
constitutional responsibility to enforce the laws is fulfilled.  To limit a 
President in his choice of the officer to carry out this function or to restrict 
the President’s power to remove him would impair the President’s ability 
to execute the laws. 
 Indeed, the President must be held accountable for the actions of 
the executive branch; to accomplish this he must be free to establish policy 
and define priorities.  Because laws are not self-executing, their 
enforcement obliviously cannot be separated from policy considerations.  
The Constitution contemplates that the Attorney General should be subject 
to the policy direction of the President.  As stated by the Supreme Court:  
“The Attorney General is . . . the hand of the President in taking care that 
                                                 
480 Exec. Order 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1980 compilation); see also Devins, supra note 
156, at 266, 268-69; Harvey, supra note 156, at 1584; Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor General:  
Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (1994). 
481 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 75, 75 (1977). 
482 Id. 
483 Id. at 76. 
484 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
485 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 76. 
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the laws of the United States . . . be faithfully executed.”  Removing the 
Attorney General from the President’s control would make him 
unaccountable to the President, who is constitutionally responsible for his 
actions.486 
Any limitation on the president’s power to remove the Attorney General, even if self-
imposed by executive order, “would be restricting [the president’s] ability to fulfill his 
constitutional responsibility to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  That 
constitutional responsibility for the execution of the laws cannot be waived.”487  Thus, 
Bell concluded, “there is no method, short of a constitutional amendment, to separate the 
Attorney General from Presidential control.”488 
Furthermore, in the face of continuing congressional interest in the legislative 
veto,489 Carter also continued his predecessors’ practice of opposing the device as an 
unconstitutional infringement of the President’s exclusive authority to execute ongoing 
federal programs.490  Carter protested that the legislative veto had “the potential of 
involving Congress in the execution of the laws, a responsibility reserved for the 
President under the Constitution.”  Therefore, in signing the bill, Carter noted his 
“intention to preserve the constitutional authority of the President.”491  A month later, 
                                                 
486 Id. (alterations in original; citation omitted) (quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S .254, 
262 (1921)). 
487 Id. at 77. 
488 Id.  See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 43-44. 
489 During the late 1970s, Congress extended the legislative veto into a wide range of new 
areas, including the war power, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential papers, and federal 
salaries.  See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 284.  In 1977, the House considered a proposal 
similar to the one that passed the House during the Ford Administration that would have subjected all 
agency regulations to a legislative veto.  See Dixon, supra note 388, at 432 n.29. 
490 For a summary of President Carter’s positions on legislative vetoes, see Peter E. Quint, 
The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 829-31 (1984); Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, 
supra note 86, at 284-85; Dixon, supra note 388, at 431-32 nn.27-29.  For lists of President Carter’s signing 
statements opposing the legislative veto, see William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative 
History:  A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 701 n.7, 718-19 (1991); May, supra note 289, at 934-35. 
491 Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1977:  Statement on Signing H.R. 
6884 into Law (Aug. 5, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1431, 1432. 
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Carter even more explicitly based his objection on the unitariness of the executive branch 
by adding a key word to the language he used in his signing statement of August 5.  The 
execution of the laws was “a responsibility reserved exclusively to the President under the 
Constitution.”492 
Furthermore, in a general message to Congress issued on June 21, 1978, Carter 
issued a sweeping condemnation of all legislative vetoes.  In Carter’s eyes, legislative 
vetoes unconstitutionally “inject[ed] the Congress into the details of administering 
substantive programs and laws.”  Such congressional participation in the execution of the 
laws violated the Take Care Clause by “infring[ing] on the Executive’s constitutional 
duty to faithfully execute the laws.”493  Although Carter noted that “the Attorney General 
                                                 
492 Jimmy Carter, Presidential War Powers Bill:  Statement on Signing H.R. 7738 into Law 
(Dec. 28, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 2186, 2187 (emphasis added).  President Carter also repeated his 
objection based on Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution.  Id.  For other protests based on Article I, 
Section 7, see Jimmy Carter, International Navigational Rules Act of 1977:  Statement on Signing H.R. 186 
into Law (July 28, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1374, 1375:  Statement on Signing S. 791 into Law (Nov. 
10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1999, 2000; Jimmy Carter, Department of State, International 
Communication Agency, and Board for International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill:  Statement on 
Signing H.R. 3363 into Law (Aug. 15, 1979), in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434-35; Jimmy Carter, Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act:  Statement on Signing H.R. 10 into Law (May 23, 1980), in 1980-
81 PUB. PAPERS 965; Jimmy Carter, International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980:  
Statement on Signing H.R. 6942 into Law (Dec. 16, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2813; see also Jimmy 
Carter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978:  Statement on Signing H.R. 8638 into Law (Mar. 10, 1978), 
in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 500, 502 (challenging whether Congress could “overturn authorized executive actions 
through procedures not provided in the Constitution”). 
493 Jimmy Carter, Legislative Vetoes:  Message to the Congress (June 21, 1978), in 1978 
PUB. PAPERS 1146, 1147.  Furthermore, legislative vetoes unconstitutionally “authorize[d] Congressional 
action that has the effect of legislation while denying the President the opportunity to exercise his veto,” 
effectively “circumvent[ing] the President’s role in the legislative process established by Article I, Section 
7 of the Constitution.”  Carter also objected to legislative vetoes on policy grounds, pointing out that they 
contributed to administrative delays; tended to politicize the administrative process; and gave agencies 
incentive to rely on case-by-case adjudication rather than issuing clear, uniform rules.  Id. at 1147-48.  
Carter did acknowledge one major exception to his position:  legislative vetoes contained in reorganization 
acts did “not involve Congressional intrusion into the administration of on-going substantive programs, and 
it preserves the President’s authority because he decides which proposals to submit to Congress.  The 
Reorganization Act jeopardizes neither the President’s responsibilities nor the prerogatives of Congress.”  
Id. at 1147; see also 43 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 10 (1977); Dixon, supra note 388, at 431-32 & n.27 (citing 
Letter from Griffin Bell to President Carter (Jan. 31, 1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 105, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 10-11 (1977); Letter from John Harmon to Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (Feb. 14, 1977); Letter from John 
Harmon to Rep. Joshua Eilberg (Apr. 1, 1977)).  Therefore, Carter entered no objection when signing the 
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[was] seeking a definitive judgment” on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes, Carter 
noted that “no immediate resolution is in prospect.”494  Therefore, Carter urged Congress 
not to include legislative vetoes in future legislation and informed Congress that he 
would treat all extant legislative vetoes as “report and wait” provisions.  Furthermore, “if 
Congress subsequently adopts a resolution to veto an Executive action, we will give it 
serious consideration, but we will not, under our reading of the Constitution, consider it 
legally binding.”495  
As promised, Carter thereafter determinedly opposed the legislative vetoes, 
refusing to sign at least two bills because they contained legislative vetoes496 and 
announcing in numerous signing statements thereafter his intention to treat legislative 
vetoes as “report and wait” requirements.497  Moreover, the Carter Administration, like 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reorganization Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 95-17, § 2, 91 Stat. 29, 29.  See generally FISHER & DEVINS, 
supra note 427, at 126-27, 136-37; Quint, supra note 490, at 830 n.233. 
494 Carter, Legislative Vetoes:  Message to the Congress, supra note 493, at 1147. 
495 Id. at 1149.  To say that the legislative veto is unconstitutional is not to give the President 
license to ignore the wishes of Congress.  The day after Carter’s Message to Congress was issued, Attorney 
General Griffin Bell and White House Adviser Stuart Eizenstat each emphasized that, although the 
President could not be bound by a legislative veto as a constitutional matter, as a matter of comity the 
President nonetheless had every reason to accommodate the interests of Congress whenever possible.  
Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 86, at 285; see also 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55, 56, 58 (1980); 
May, supra note 289, at 981.  As Carter discovered throughout his tenure, the President disregards 
congressional politics at his own risk. 
496 E.g., Jimmy Carter, Veto of the Navajo and Hopi Relocation Bill:  Memorandum of 
Disapproval of H.R. 11092 (Nov. 2, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1925; Jimmy Carter, Veto of Legislation 
Requiring a Study of Health Effects of Dioxin Exposure:  Message to the Senate Returning S. 2096 
Without Approval (Jan. 2, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 4. 
497 Jimmy Carter, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978:  Statement on 
Signing S. 9 into Law (Sept. 18, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1530, 1531; Amtrak Improvement Act of 
1978:  Statement on Signing S. 3040 into Law (Oct. 5, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1718; Jimmy Carter, 
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978:  Statement on Signing H.R. 12222 into Law 
(Oct. 6, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1721; Jimmy Carter, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Appropriations Bill:  Statement on Signing S. 1140 into Law (Aug. 29, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 
1592; Jimmy Carter, Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980:  Statement on Signing S. 2622 
into Law (Oct. 18, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2335; Jimmy Carter, National Historic Preservation Act 
Amendments of 1980:  Statement on Signing H.R. 5496 into Law (Dec. 12, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 
2802, 2803; Jimmy Carter, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Extension:  Statement on 
Signing H.R. 7018 into Law (Dec. 17, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2814, 2815; see also Jimmy Carter, 
National Parks and Recreation Act Amendments:  Statement on Signing H.R. 3757 into Law (Mar. 5, 
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the Ford Administration, challenged the constitutionality of the legislative veto in 
court.498  These challenges were of more than passing interest to the President.  In two 
separate signing statements, he mentioned his intent to bring a judicial challenge to the 
legislative veto.499  Moreover, after the Ninth Circuit struck down the legislative veto,500 
                                                                                                                                                 
1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 432, 433 (instructing Secretary of the Interior to regard committee veto “as 
advisory only”); Carter, Presidential War Powers Bill, supra note 492, at 2187 (issued prior to June 21, 
1978, Message) (indicating that legislative would be treated as a “notify and wait” provision).  In three 
statements, President Carter specifically stated that congressional attempts to exercise a legislative veto 
would be given serious consideration, but not regarded as legally binding.  Carter, Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Appropriations Bill, supra, at 1592; Jimmy Carter, Coastal Zone Management 
Improvement Act of 1980, supra, at 2335; Carter, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
Extension, supra, at 2815. 
Four other signing statements effectively took the same position without referring directly to the 
June 21, 1978, Message.  Carter, National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, supra note 498, at 2000 
(directing the Secretary of Agriculture to report actions to Congress and “listen to any concerns which may 
be expressed by the specified congressional committees” with the understanding that the Secretary may 
consummate any actions without committee approval); Carter, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
Act, supra note 492, at 965 (directing Attorney General to “carefully consider any congressional views that 
are expressed” without “treat[ing] any resolution of ‘disapproval’ as binding”). 
498 Although the Carter Administration challenged the constitutionality of the legislative veto 
before the Supreme Court, Brief of the United States at _, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 
(1977) (No. 75-1606), the Court declined to reach the question, noting only that “[w]hatever are the future 
possibilities for constitutional conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public access to 
particular documents, nothing in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and, 
therefore, unconstitutional on its face.”  433 U.S. at 444-45.  The Carter Administration also backed 
challenges to the legislative veto in several courts of appeals with mixed results.  Compare Chadha v. INS, 
634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto), and McCorkle v. 
United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); with Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 
1977) (upholding legislative veto).  See also Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 82; 
Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 86, at 284. 
The Carter Administration did face some problems framing the legislative veto as an issue in a 
justiciable controversy.  Even though President Carter instructed the Secretary of Agriculture in 1978 that 
he should proceed without following a certain legislative veto provision, Carter, National Parks and 
Recreation Act of 1978, supra, at 2000, the Justice Department concluded that “in spite of the President’s 
direction, the Department [of Agriculture] and the Forest Service should cooperate with . . . the Congress” 
and advised the Department of Agriculture that it could voluntarily comply with the legislative veto 
provision as a matter of policy.  The Department of Agriculture ordered the Forest Service “to proceed as if 
[the legislative veto provision] were applicable,” the President’s instructions notwithstanding.  The Forest 
Service complied with the Departments orders.  May, supra note 289, at 944-45 (quoting Additions to the 
National Wilderness Preservation System:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 244-45 (1979)). 
499 Carter, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 493, at 1147; Jimmy Carter, Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Acts of 1980:  Statement on Signing H.R. 2313 into Law (May 28, 1980), in 
1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 982, 983. 
500 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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Carter issued a statement applauding the decision and urging the Attorney General to 
“seek[] Supreme Court review of the decision as soon as possible.”501 
In fact, the Carter Administration even went so far as to ignore Congress’s 
attempt to exercise a legislative veto over a series of education regulations.502  Attorney 
General Benjamin Civiletti advised the Secretary of Education that the legislative veto 
provision violated the Constitution and that the Secretary of Education was “entitled to 
implement the regulations in question in spite of Congress’ disapproval.”503  Civiletti 
concluded, “only the executive branch can execute the statutes of the United States.”504  
To recognize the legislative veto “as legally binding would constitute an abdication of the 
responsibility of the executive branch, as an equal and coordinate branch of government 
with the legislative branch, to preserve the integrity of its functions.”505  As a result, 
“once a function had been delegated to the executive branch, it must be performed there, 
and cannot be subjected to continuing congressional control except through the 
constitutional process of enacting new legislation.”506 
                                                 
501 Jimmy Carter, Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service:  Statement on the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision (Dec. 24, 1980), in 1980 PUB. PAPERS 2836. 
502 Like Nixon and Ford, Carter refused to follow the legislative veto procedures required by 
the War Powers Resolution.  However, Carter opposed the provisions as an infringement of his powers as 
Commander in Chief, rather than his exclusive power to execute the laws.  War Powers Resolution, 1977:  
Hearings on the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution Before the Senate Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see also CHECK Ely, 88 Colum. 1381 & n.8;  May, supra 
note 289, at 974-75. 
503 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21, 22 (1980).   
504 Id. at 29.  The Executive had a duty to execute the law faithfully.  However, the Attorney 
General pointed out, the “duty to enforce the fundamental law set forth in the Constitution” at times 
overrides its “duty to enforce the law founded in the Acts of Congress.”  Because the legislative veto 
“intrude[d] upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive,” the present case was such a case.  Id. at 
29. 
505 Id.  
506 Id. at 27.   
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Despite Congress’s insistence that the Attorney General abide by the legislative 
veto provision,507 the Secretary followed Civiletti’s advice and implemented the 
regulations.508  Therefore, although the Carter Administration did tolerate the enactment 
of a few legislative vetoes without comment,509 it is clear that Carter did defend the 
unitariness of the executive branch by firmly opposing the legislative veto. 
Carter did not merely react to congressional attempts to control the execution of 
the laws:  he also proactively asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing 
the Nixon-Ford program of OMB review of proposed regulations.510  Upon assuming 
office, Carter ordered agencies to continue to analyze the inflationary impact of 
regulations and directed them to give more detailed consideration to their economic cost.  
Carter supplemented these directives the following year with an executive order entitled 
“Improving Government Regulations”511 that far exceeded previous regulatory review 
efforts.  This program required that executive agencies include a “Regulatory Analysis” 
                                                 
507 May, supra note 289, at 978 n.541 (citing Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Sen. Max 
Baucus (July 30, 1980), reprinted in Constitutionality of GAO’s Bid Protest Function:  Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 745 (1985)). 
508 45 Fed. Reg. 22634, 22742, 23602, 27880 (1980) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 100d, 134, 
161c, 161g (1980)); see also May, supra note 289, at 975-76.  Congress did not give up without a fight.  
The House attempted to enforce its legislative veto by adding an amendment to two key appropriations bills 
providing that “none of the funds appropriated . . . by this Act shall be available to implement, administer, 
or enforce any regulation” which had been vetoed by Congress.  126 CONG. REC. 19313 (1980) (House 
enactment of the Levitas amendment to H.R. 7584, _ Cong., _ Sess. (1980)); Id. at 20507 (House 
enactment of Levitas amendment to H.R. 7591, _ Cong., _ Sess. (1980)).  The Office of Legal Counsel 
responded with an opinion condemning the amendments as an attempt by Congress to place indirect 
restrictions on the President which, if placed directly, would violate the Constitution.  4B Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 731, 733-34 (1980). 
509 See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 143 (noting acceptance of 
legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC and the Federal Election Commission); LOUIS FISHER, 
THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 94-95, 106 (1981) (noting acceptance of legislative veto provisions 
relating to arms sales, war powers, and gasoline rationing); Strauss, supra note 5, at 580 n.20 (noting 
acceptance of legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC); Quint, supra note 490, at 829-30 n.232 
(noting OMB support for legislative veto in Impoundment Control Act (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON 
RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 2 (Comm. Print 1980))). 
510 For a general description of the Carter Administration’s regulatory review program, see 
Percival, supra note 357, at 142-47; Bruff, supra note 425, at 547-49; DeWitt, supra note 357, at 771-72. 
511 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979 compilation). 
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in all proposals of major rules outlining the major alternatives considered by the agency 
and explaining why the agency chose the particular alternative it did.512  The order also 
required that “agencies . . . publish at least semiannually an agenda of significant 
regulations under development or review.”513  The order cited no specific authority as its 
basis, relying simply on his authority as President of the United States.514  Although the 
initial draft of the order clearly contemplated that it would apply to the independent 
agencies as well as the executive departments,515 Carter decided in the end to avoid a 
“confrontation with Congress over the applicability of the order to the independent 
regulatory agencies”516 and opted instead to simply ask the chairmen of the commissions 
to comply with the Order’s procedures voluntarily.517 
Carter supplemented that order by creating the Regulatory Analysis Review 
Group (RARG) to conduct an intensive review of ten to twenty major regulations a year 
and to submit its findings during those regulations’ public comment periods.  Carter also 
created a Regulatory Council charged with keeping a calendar of forthcoming significant 
regulatory proposals and to use it to identify and mediate interagency conflicts.518  The 
                                                 
512 Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 154 . 
513 Id. § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at _. 
514 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979 compilation); see also Bruff, supra note 
358, at 465 & n.69. 
515 The initial draft of Executive Order No. 12,044 was ambiguous as to whether it applied to 
independent agencies, and the notice accompanying it sought public comment about whether it should be 
so applied.  42 Fed. Reg. 59,740 (_).  Carter was apparently advised that it had the authority to do so.  
Strauss, supra note 5, at 592-93 n.20; see also Bruff, supra note 358, at 499; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION:  ROADS TO REFORM 108 (1979).  See 
generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 494-95. 
516 43 Fed. Reg. 12,670 (1978). 
517 Jimmy Carter, Improving Government Regulations:  Letter to the Heads of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (Mar. 23, 1978), 1978 PUB. PAPERS 563, 564; see also Frank B. Cross, The Surviving 
Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 599, 706 (1990). 
518 Jimmy Carter, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
Subject:  Strengthening Regulatory Management (Oct. 31, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1905; see also 
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, REFORMING REGULATION:  PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS 21-22 (1981). 
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Carter Administration also issued a circular laying out procedures for coordinating and 
clearing agencies’ legislative recommendations.519  Finally, in 1980 Congress enacted 
two statutes that further strengthened OMB’s control over agency regulations.  The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act required agencies to analyze the impact of their regulations on 
small businesses;520 the Paperwork Reduction Act required that OMB review and clear all 
information collection requests and created the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) to conduct regulatory reviews.521  In addition, the Executive Office of the 
President reviewed a large number of the proposed regulations and intervened directly in 
numerous regulatory decisions.522  
Like the Quality of Life Review of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, President 
Carter’s program stopped short of centralized supervision of the rulemaking process.  
Although the President and OMB gave some guidance as to which rules should be 
subjected to regulatory analyses and how regulatory analyses should be conducted,523 the 
final decisions on those issues were left to the individual agencies.524  Furthermore, 
RARG had no authority to block agencies from issuing proposed or final regulations and 
did not begin its review until after the proposed regulation had been published in the 
                                                 
519 OMB Circular A-19 (July 31, 1972).  This circular on its face applied to the independent 
regulatory commissions, although it should be noted that several of the commissions’ organic statutes 
provided that they were not subject to OMB circulars.  Moreno, supra note 94, at 490. 
520 Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980). 
521 Paperwork Reduction Act , Pub. L. No. 96-51, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980). 
522 WHITE, supra note 518, at 221; Percival, supra note 357, at 146-47 & n.112; Cross, supra 
note 423, at 495; Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 849, 951 
(1982). 
523 Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3(a) & (b); Memorandum from Wayne G. Grandquist, 
Associate OMB Director for Management and Regulatory Policy, to the Heads of Departments and 
Agencies, Regulatory Analysis (Nov. 21, 1978), cited in Bruff, supra note 425, at 548; see also Cross, 
supra note 423, at 495 n.62 (citing authorities). 
524 Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking:  An Analysis of 
Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.8 
(1981); Cross, supra note 423, at 495 & n.63. 
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Federal Register.525  Nonetheless, commentators have generally acknowledged that 
Carter’s regulatory review program did enable the President to increase his control over 
regulatory policy.526 
Thus, despite Carter’s acceptance of certain pieces of post-Watergate legislation 
that impinged on his authority to execute the laws, on balance Carter emerges as a 
steadfast defender of the unitary executive.  The fact that short-term political pressures 
effectively precluded him from asserting the President’s prerogatives on those few 
occasions does not rise to the level of acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate 
construction. 
VIII. RONALD REAGAN 
Ronald Reagan was, along with Franklin D. Roosevelt, one of the two most 
important presidents of the Twentieth Century.  Just as FDR won World War II and 
pulled us out of the Great Depression, so too did Reagan win the Cold War and pull us 
out of the malaise into which the nation had fallen during the Carter years. 
                                                 
525 Percival, supra note 357, at 144-45; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 1200 n.8; DeWitt, 
supra note 357, at 772.  The fact that RARG review occurred after a rule had already been proposed 
marked a significant change from Quality of Life Review, since it prevented reviewers from attempting to 
influence regulations before they were proposed.  Percival, supra note 357, at 144-45. 
526 WHITE, supra note 618, at 221; Cross, supra note 423, at 495; Richard M. Neustadt, The 
Administration’s Regulatory Reform Program:  An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 129, 141-42 (1980); Paul 
R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies:  Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 943, 949 (1980).  Carter also exerted his authority by denying procurement contracts to companies 
that failed to follow “voluntary” wage and price guidelines.  Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979 
compilation), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,288, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1982 compilation).  Other similar steps 
followed.  The D.C. Circuit eventually upheld Carter’s actions as an exercise of his powers under the 
general procurement statutes.  AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 
U.S. 915 (1979).  Although this conclusion was quite a stretch, in the end it demonstrates that Carter’s 
imposition of wage and price controls was an exercise of statutory authority and not an exercise of the 
President’s power to control the execution of the laws.  See generally Quint, supra note 490, at 791-98. 
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Although the Reagan presidency’s political importance is unquestioned, its 
position with regards to the unitary executive remains something of an enigma.  While 
the Reagan Administration was in power, many of its supporters and critics regarded the 
unitary executive as one of the centerpieces of the Administration’s policy.527  As Charles 
Fried, who served as Solicitor General under Reagan, has noted, “The Reagan 
administration had a vision about the arrangement of government power: the authority 
and responsibility of the President should be clear and unitary.  The Reagan years were 
distinguished by the fact that that vision was made the subject of legal, rather than simply 
political, dispute.”528  Others have been more equivocal.  As Reagan’s first Attorney 
General, William French Smith, later observed: 
If there was one area in which the White House was deficient during my 
years in office, it was in the protection of presidential power.  Decisions 
there were made on the basis of the substance of individual issues.  There 
was no effective concern or review of the impact that issue or the position 
taken with respect to it would have on presidential power.  Nor was there 
any effort to identify governmental activities elsewhere that, if developed, 
would adversely affect the province of the executive.  Nor to be candid, 
was the bully pulpit used to provide leadership or defense of that vital 
institution.529 
In support of Smith’s criticism, other scholars have pointed out that President Reagan 
never vetoed a bill on the grounds that it infringed upon the President’s authority.530   
                                                 
527 See Miller, supra note 333, at 410-12; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 628-34; Shane, 
supra note 5, at 596-97. 
528 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION -- A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 133 (1991). 
529 WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 222 
(1991), quoted in Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17, 38. 
530 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1245-46 (1994); Lund, supra note 529, at 42.  But see supra notes 543-551 and accompanying text (arguing 
that Reagan pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 in part to protect the unitariness of the 
executive). 
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As with many things, the truth may well lie somewhere in between.531  However, 
regardless of how the debate whether the Reagan Administration defended the 
President’s authority to execute the laws too strongly or not strongly enough is resolved, 
it remains clear that it did protect the unitariness of the executive branch to a sufficient 
degree as to overcome any inference of acquiescence to any deviations from the unitary 
executive for purposes of coordinate construction. 
The Reagan Administration began with “the most conscientious transition in 
White House history,” headed up by longtime Reagan confidant, Edwin Meese III.532  
That said, Reagan “could be ruthless when necessary” on personnel actions,533 as 
evidenced by his decision not to give Meese the job he wanted most:  White House Chief 
of Staff, the job he coveted.  Instead, that position went to James Baker, formerly of 
George Bush’s presidential campaign, with Meese receiving a free floating White House 
position as Counselor to the President.  Reagan then made Michael Deaver the third 
member of his White House troika for the first term, giving him the title of Deputy Chief 
of Staff.534  Meese, Baker, and Deaver struggled for preeminence on the White House 
staff during Reagan’s first term.  This struggle for preeminence left Reagan able to pick 
and choose from the policy options his three subordinates presented him with.  The net 
result was the augmenting of Reagan’s power and control. 
                                                 
531 Miller, supra note 333, at 401-02 (“In the Reagan years, the picture was mixed, with a 
resurgent and aggressive presidency but with Congress not relinquishing the gains it had made.”); see also 
id. at 410-12. 
532 EDMUND MORRIS, DUTCH:  A MEMOIR OF RONALD REAGAN 419 (1999). 
533 Id. at 420. 
534 Id. at 421. 
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Reagan set aside regular time for cabinet meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 
2 p.m., but the time was not always used.535  Reagan was not hesitant in using the 
removal power vigorously to further his administration’s goals.  Early in the first term, 
Reagan had his first major cabinet removal crisis when it became clear that Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig was not working out very well.  Just as he had been ruthless in 
picking Baker over Meese as White House Chief of Staff, so too was Reagan ruthless in 
forcing Haig to resign.536  In his first year in office, Reagan dramatically settled an air-
traffic controllers strike by firing the striking air-traffic controllers to resounding popular 
applause.537  During the second term, Reagan subtly forced the resignation of his White 
House Chief of Staff Donald Regan because of his failure to detect the Iran-Contra 
affair.538  Reagan also demonstrated his support for the unitary executive by the manner 
in which he wielded his removal power to displace three members of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights in 1983539 and numerous other officials thought to be 
insulated from presidential control.540  Although the courts did not always approve of 
Reagan’s removals,541 the fact that Reagan did maintain his power to remove was 
sufficient to uphold his power to remove for the purpose of coordinate construction. 
                                                 
535 Id. at 426. 
536 Id. at 462-63. 
537 Id. at 659. 
538 Id. at 620-22. 
539 The statute creating the Commission was silent about removals and established the 
Commission “in the executive branch of the Government.”  Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 
§ 101(a), 71 Stat. 634, 634.  For a full discussion of the debate over the Commission’s supposed 
“independence,” see Entin, supra note 203, at 770-76. 
540 For other examples of removals instigated by Reagan, see FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78-79; Miller, supra note 333, at 411 & n.63, 414n.82; 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 1 (1982); 5 Op. Legal Counsel 337 (1981). 
541 A district court enjoined Reagan from removing the Civil Rights Commissioners.  On 
appeal, the D.C. Circuit subsequently vacated the injunction as moot, since the statutory authorization for 
the Commission had expired.  Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33,898 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 
1983), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  Congress later reconstituted the 
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Reagan also supported the unitary theory of the executive by opposing all three 
post-Watergate ethics statutes reluctantly accepted by the Carter Administration.  First, in 
1981, Reagan removed a dozen Inspectors General without complying with the statutory 
requirement that he inform Congress of the reasons for his removals.  Instead, Reagan 
simply explained that he wanted Inspectors General in whom he had total confidence.542 
Second, Reagan pocket vetoed the proposed Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1988, which would have amended the Civil Service Reform Act in ways that would have 
derogated from the unitary executive.543  It would have moved the Office of Special 
Counsel outside the MSPB and turned it into a freestanding independent agency.544  
Other provisions would have given the Office of Special Counsel independent litigating 
authority that was not subject to coordination by the Justice Department.545  It would also 
authorize the Office of Special Counsel to transmit information to Congress “without 
review, clearance, or approval by any other administrative authority.”546   
Recalling the concerns first raised by John Harmon,547 Reagan objected that the 
Act “creates an Office of Special Counsel and purports to insulate the Office from 
presidential supervision and to limit the power of the President to remove his 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission, this time requiring specific cause for the removal of its members.  United States Commission 
on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, § 2(d), 97 Stat. 1301, 1301; see also Borders v. Reagan. 
518 F. Supp. 250, 268 (D.D.C. 1981) (blocking Reagan’s attempted removal of a member of the D.C. 
Judicial Nomination Commission).  But see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir 1983.) (upholding 
removals); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). 
542 Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate on the Inspector general Appointees of Certain Executive Agencies (Jan. 20, 1981), in 1981 PUB. 
PAPERS 24, 25; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78. 
543 For overviews of the history of this legislation from two very different perspectives, see 
Kmiec, supra note 466, at 340-44; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 662-88. 
544 S. 508, 100th Cong., § 1211, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S15,330 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 
1988).   
545 Id. § 1212. 
546 Id. § 1217. 
547 See supra notes 466 and accompanying text. 
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subordinates from office.”548  Reagan was also concerned about a second provision that 
“purport[ed] to prohibit review within the Executive branch of views of the Office of 
Special Counsel proposed to be transmitted in response to congressional committee 
requests.”549  These provisions clearly raised “serious constitutional concerns.”550  But 
Reagan reserved his sharpest criticism for the section of the bill that would have 
authorized the Special Counsel to challenge the decisions of the MSPB in court.  
Permitting two executive agencies to resolve a dispute in court “conflict[ed] with the 
constitutional grant of the Executive power to the President which includes the authority 
to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates.”551  Such a provision was 
antithetical to the unitary theory of the executive branch.   
Third, the Reagan Administration in due time came to oppose the Ethics in 
Government Act as an impermissible infringement on the unitariness of the executive 
branch.  Although the Reagan Administration did not enter any objections when the 
Ethics in Government Act was first reauthorized in 1983,552 by the time Congress 
revisited the issue again in 1987, the administration began to voice more serious 
concerns.  Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton challenged the constitutionality of 
the Act during hearings, arguing that all prosecutors were properly considered executive 
                                                 
548 Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower 
Protection (Oct. 26, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1391, 1392. 
549 Id. 
550 Id. 
551 Id.  For a complete description of the Act and particularly sharp criticism of Reagan’s 
pocket veto, see Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 662-88;  see also Devins, supra note 156, at 267-68.  For a 
more sympathetic assessment of Reagan’s actions, see Kmiec, supra note 466, at 342-43. 
552 Ethics in Government Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).   
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officers who thus had to be subject to the direction and control of the President.553  
Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper sounded similar themes..554     
Reagan concurred, declaring that “[a]n officer of the United States exercising 
executive authority in the core area of law enforcement necessarily, under our 
constitutional scheme, must be subject to executive branch appointment, review, and 
removal.  There is no other constitutionally permissible alternative.”555  However, in light 
of the fact that the matter was being litigated before the D.C. Circuit and “[i]n order to 
ensure that public confidence in government not be eroded while the courts are in the 
process of deciding these questions,” Reagan decided to “tak[e] the extraordinary step of 
signing this bill despite [his] very strong doubts about its constitutionality”556 while at the 
same time pressing its opposition the independent counsel statute in its briefs before the 
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court in the litigation leading up to Morrison v. Olson.557  
In his brief in the Morrison case, Solicitor General Charles Fried argued that the Vesting 
and Take Care Clauses of Article II demanded that the President be able to control the 
actions of, and remove, independent counsels.  The argument section of Fried’s brief 
began by saying: 
                                                 
553 FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 147, 156-57 (citing Independent Counsel 
Amendments Act of 1987:  Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 429-
33 (1987), and quoting Oversight of the Independent Counsel Statute:  Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1987)). 
554 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper to Leon Silverman (_), reprinted 
in Independent Counsel Amendments of 1987:  Hearings on H.R. 1520 & H.R. 2939 Before the Subcomm. 
on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 100 (_). 
555 Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 
1987 (Dec. 15, 1987), in 1987 PUB. PAPERS 1524, 1524. 
556 Id. 
557 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  For the Reagan Administration’s support for the unitary executive, 
see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-16, 29-41, Morrison v. Olson 
(No. 87-1279); Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264 and 87-5265), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), 
reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 101-02, 104, 112-16, 126-30 (1987). 
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Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution declares: “The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  Section 3 
of the same Article then charges the President with the corresponding 
duty: “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  The 
independent counsel statute violates the plain meaning of those words by 
taking an important part of the executive power, and of the concomitant 
duty to see the faithful execution of the laws, away from the President and 
assigning it to a person unaccountable to the President in her selection and 
her performance and her tenure.  The statute vests executive power other 
than in the President, in direct contravention of Article II, Section 1’s 
“grant of power.”558 
The brief goes on to assert, “Whatever limits Congress may constitutionally 
impose on the President’s various means of holding other officers to account, it may not 
deny his power to remove purely executive officers like an independent counsel.”559  The 
brief went on to distinguish Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener by saying that those cases 
concerned entities that were quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial and here the function of 
prosecuting high level wrongdoing was a core executive function.  All in all, the brief 
was a ringing defense of the unitary executive, which was unfortunately to lead to a 
disastrous Supreme Court decision. The Court in Morrison v. Olson divided seven to 
one, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court in upholding the constitutionality 
of the Ethics in Government Act.560  The worst part of Rehnquist’s decision was his 
apparent conclusion that even officers performing such core executive functions as 
prosecution could be insulated from presidential removal.561  Justice Scalia wrote a 
forceful dissent in which he berated the majority not only for what he believed was its 
erroneous interpretation of Article II, but for even failing to follow Humphrey’s Executor, 
                                                 
558 Morrison v. Olson, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 
5-6, Morrison v. Olson (No. 87-1279) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926)). 
559 Id. at 29. 
560 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
561 Id. at 688-91. 
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which itself did not purport to apply to core executive functions like prosecution.562  The 
Reagan Administration lost the battle in the Morrison case.563  Even though the 
Administration’s arguments failed to convince a majority of the Supreme Court, the fact 
that the Administration advanced them is sufficient to overcome any claims that the 
executive branch acquiesced to the institution of the independent counsel as a deviation 
from the unitary executive. 
Reagan also joined his predecessors in objecting to the legislative veto, which 
continued to command significant interest on Congress.564  Although Reagan primarily 
based his attacks on the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, section 
7,565 Reagan also condemned legislative vetoes “because of the potential for involving 
the Congress in the day-to-day implementation of the law, a responsibility allocated 
solely to the President under the Constitution.”566  As Reagan further noted: 
                                                 
562 Id. at 705-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, subsequent court decisions have 
indicated that holdover officials, such as Humphrey, do not fall within the scope of the “for cause” removal 
provision.  See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  It is thus now clear that under 
modern doctrine, Humphrey’s Executor would have been decided the other way. 
563  Interestingly, a number of leading scholars, including a number of leading critics of the 
unitary theory of the executive, have suggested that the issue is far from settled by acknowledging that 
nothing in Morrison precludes a president for removing a member of an independent agency for failure to 
follow a presidential policy directive.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 110-11; Strauss, supra note 
5, at 615; cf. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note -, at § 2.5, at 46 (pointing to criticism of Humphrey’s Executor in 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), as suggesting that the issue has not yet been resolved); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at 254 n.45 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the lack 
of clarity as to what may constitute proper cause for removal). 
564 Much as had occurred during the Ford and Carter Administrations, the Senate had passed 
legislation that would subject all agency rules to a legislative veto.  See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 142 & n.113. 
565 See Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance 
Legislation (Dec. 29, 1981), in 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1202, 1203; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill 
Concerning the Establishment of Alcohol Traffic Safety Programs (Oct. 25, 1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS 
1378; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981 (Dec. 29, 
1981), in 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1207; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Student Aid Bill (Oct. 14, 
1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS 1312; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill Amending the Indian 
Judgment Funds Act (Jan. 12, 1983), in 1983 PUB. PAPERS 44. 
566 Reagan, Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation, 
supra note 565, at 1203. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  
 
121
These provisions can be expected to inject an unnecessarily disruptive 
element by subjecting proposed programs to disapproval, congressional or 
even committee, even after they have been examined by the executive 
branch and found to be compatible with congressionally adopted standards 
and supportive of the national interests of the United States.567  
The Reagan Administration backed up its rhetoric by successfully challenging the 
legislative veto in the Courts of Appeals and by pressing the case before the Supreme 
Court, in which it argued that that the legislative veto impermissibly allows Congress to 
participate in the execution of the laws.568  These efforts culminated in the landmark 
ruling in INS v. Chadha569 holding that the legislative veto violates bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of Article I, section 7.  The fact that the Supreme Court 
resolved the case on alternate grounds does not change the import of the Reagan 
Administration’s assertion of the unitary executive for the purposes of coordinate 
construction.  Indeed, Reagan continued his opposition in the face of Congress’s refusal 
to recognize the import of Chadha by continuing to pass legislation containing legislative 
vetoes.  Reagan’s signing statements approving this legislation consistently indicated that 
the unconstitutional provisions would be ignored.570 
                                                 
567 Id.; see also Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill Concerning the Establishment of 
Alcohol Traffic Safety Programs, supra note 565, at 1378 (objecting that the legislative veto 
“unconstitutionally involves the Congress in the executive functions of promulgating regulations under 
authority previously conferred, in violation of the principle of separation of powers”); 5 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 294, 297, 301-03 (1981).  The Reagan Administration did occasionally allow a legislative veto to 
be enacted without registering any protest.  _, Pub. L. No. _, § _, 96 Stat. _, 1870 (1982); see also FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 143. 
568 Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 44-56, Chadha (No. 80-1832). 
569 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
570 See Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization 
Act of 1984 (July 17, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1052, 1053; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985 (July 
18, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1056, 1057; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Appropriations Bill (Oct. 30, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1686; Ronald Reagan, Statement on 
Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, 
1986 (Nov. 25, 1985), in 1985 PUB. PAPERS 1419, 1420; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Nov. 14, 1986), in 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1557, 
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The Reagan Administration even revived the objections raised by Wilson and 
Franklin Roosevelt571 to permitting the Comptroller General to have any role in the 
execution of the laws.  For example, when signing the Gramm-Rudman Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, which gave the Comptroller General the authority to 
issue the sequestration order that would initiate a series of mandatory budget cuts, 
Reagan noted that “under the system of separated powers established by the Constitution, 
. . . executive functions may only be performed by officers in the executive branch.”  
Thus, Reagan concluded, the “significant role” the bill assigned to the Comptroller 
General raised “serious constitutional questions,” because the Comptroller General was 
an agent of Congress who could not properly wield such executive power.572  Although 
Reagan signed the legislation, he emphasized that he was “in no sense dismissing the 
constitutional problems or acquiescing in a violation of the system of separated powers 
carefully crafted by the framers of the Constitution.”573  Therefore, notwithstanding his 
                                                                                                                                                 
1558; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Federal Triangle Development Act (Aug. 22, 1987), in 
1987 PUB. PAPERS 973, 973-74; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Sept. 27, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1228; 
Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
Amendments of 1988 (Oct. 5, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1284, 1285-86; Ronald Reagan, Statement 
on Signing a Bill Providing for the Leasing of Property to the District of Columbia Chapter of the 
American National Red Cross (Nov. 8, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1485. 
After Chadha, the Reagan Administration did enter into some informal agreements with Congress 
which served much of the same purpose as legislative vetoes.  See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, 
at 286-90; Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 84-91.  The fact that the executive 
branch at times may voluntarily choose to keep Congress informed, however, is not in any way inconsistent 
with the unitary executive or any other provision of the Constitution.  See City of Alexandria v. United 
States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984);  Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 
86.   
571 See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
572 Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public Debt Limit and 
Enacting the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Dec. 12, 1985), in 1985 PUB. 
PAPERS 1471, 1471.  Reagan also harbored constitutional concerns about a provision in the Act requiring 
Comptroller General approval of all presidential terminations and modifications of defense contracts.  
Reagan noted, “Under our constitutional system, an agent of congress may not exercise such supervisory 
authority over the President.”  Id. 
573 Id. at 1472.  See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 143-45, 148-53. 
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approval of the Act, the Reagan Administration challenged Gramm-Rudman in court, 
arguing among other things that it improperly encroached upon the President’s Article II 
power to execute the laws.574 
For the same reasons, the Reagan Administration also challenged the provisions 
of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that permitted the Comptroller General to 
resolve protests entered by unsuccessful bidders for government contracts.575  Reagan 
“vigorously object[ed] to certain provisions that would unconstitutionally attempt to 
delegate to the Comptroller General of the United States, an officer of Congress, the 
power to perform duties and responsibilities that in our constitutional system may be 
performed only be officials of the executive branch.”576  Accordingly, Attorney General 
Smith and OMB Director David Stockman issued orders to the executive agencies not to 
comply with CICA, and the Administration subsequently refused to comply with a 
district court order upholding CICA’s constitutionality.577  Although the courts did not 
ultimately accept Reagan’s objections to CICA,578 the fact remains that the Reagan 
Administration protested Congress’s efforts to assign the Comptroller General a role in 
executing the law as being inconsistent with the unitary executive. 
                                                 
574 Brief for the United States at _, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 85-1377, 
85-1378, 85-1379).  These arguments, of course, ultimately prevailed.  Bowsher, 478 U.S. at _. 
575 CICA was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit. 
VII, 98 Stat. 494, 1199. 
576 Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (July 18, 1984), 
in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1053; see also Kmiec, supra note 466, at 349 (nothing the Justice Department’s 
objections to CICA). 
577 May, supra note 289, at 979, 984 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 
(1985)); see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 130; Rosenberg, supra note 278, 
at 691.   
578 See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988); Parola 
v. City of Monterey [Weinberger?], 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988); Universal Shipping Co. v. United States, 
652 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated as moot, No. 87-5120 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 1989). 
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The Reagan Administration also asserted the President’s authority to control the 
execution the laws directly.  For instance, Reagan also took firm control of the federal 
government’s legal affairs, expanding the Federal Legal Council, using opinions issued 
by the Office of Legal Counsel to centralize control of governmental litigation in the 
Attorney General,579 and even assuming a role in the positions that his Administration 
would take before the Supreme Court.580  The Reagan Administration also repudiated 
several informal, nonstatutory understandings regarding the division of responsibility 
between the executive departments and the independent agencies581 and even challenged 
one such agency’s efforts to file amicus brief in federal appellate court.582  In fact, the 
Reagan Administration went so far as to question the very constitutionality of these 
agencies supposed “independence.”583  
The Reagan Administration also asserted the President’s authority to control the 
execution the laws directly by continuing and expanding upon the regulatory review 
program initiated by his predecessors.584  Executive Order 12,291 directed all executive 
agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis in implementing their regulations.  The order 
                                                 
579 Devins, supra note 156, at 266 (citing 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47, 61-62 (1982); 6 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 180, 187-88 (1982)). 
580 Id. at 284; Harvey, supra note 156, at 1585. 
581 Devins, supra note 156, at 268. 
582 Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive:  What Makes an Independent 
Agency Independent?, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 273, 285-98 (1993) (describing the Reagan Administration’s 
efforts to prevent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from filing an amicus brief in Williams 
v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
583 As Attorney General Meese noted, “Federal agencies performing executive functions are 
themselves properly agents of the executive.  They are not ‘quasi’ this or ‘independent’ that.  In the 
tripartite scheme of government, a body with enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of 
government.”  See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 789 (quoting Stuart Taylor, A Question of Power, a Powerful 
Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1985, at B6); see also id. at 779 n.4 (noting that Meese suggested that “the 
entire system of independent agencies may be unconstitutional”); Miller, supra note 333, at 411 & n.66 
(noting that Meese questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies). 
584 For a complete description of the Reagan regulatory review program, see Percival, supra 
note 357, at 147-54; see also Bruff, supra note 425, at 549-51; Cross, supra note 423, at 496-98; DeWitt, 
supra note 357, at 773-76. 
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further required them to submit all rules to OMB for prepublication review and to prepare 
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of all major rules explicitly laying out the anticipated 
costs and benefits of the rule, the alternatives considered, and an explanation, if 
appropriate, of the reasons why the most cost-effective means of achieving the 
anticipated benefits was not adopted.  OMB would review the proposed rules and the 
RIAs to maximize the “aggregate net benefits to society.”585   
Reagan supplemented Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,498, 
which empowered OMB to take formal control of the regulatory planning process by 
requiring agencies to submit to OMB a “draft regulatory program” describing “all 
significant regulatory actions” to be undertaken that year.586  OMB would then resolve 
any inconsistencies between the draft regulatory program and the Administration’s 
policies and would consolidate them into the Administration’s overall regulatory plan.  
These two orders extended the White House’s control over the agencies to a greater 
degree than ever before by dictating substantive criteria that agencies had to employ in 
issuing regulations and by permitting OMB to postpone indefinitely the publication of 
regulations of which it disapproved.587  Reagan did not invoke any particular statutory 
authority for issuing these orders, instead relying solely on “the authority vested in [him] 
as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America”588 as had so 
                                                 
585 Exec. Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981 compilation). 
586 Exec. Order 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985 compilation). 
587 See Percival, supra note 357, at 149-50.  The Reagan Administration, like the Carter 
Administration, considered including the independent regulatory commissions within its program of 
regulatory review, but declined to do so.   See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF 
POWERS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS _ (1996). 
588 Exec. Order 12,291, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at _; Exec. Order 12,498, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at _.  
Courts reviewing these orders apparently agreed.  See Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier 
Safety, 706 F.2d 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming application of cost/benefit requirement of Executive 
Order 12,291); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986) (“A certain degree of 
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many of his predecessors.589  Reagan specifically disclaimed any intent to direct agency 
decisionmaking, noting that nothing in the order “shall be construed as displacing the 
agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”590  Even opponents of the unitary executive 
theory recognized that the regulatory review program did in fact have a direct impact on 
regulatory outcomes and represented one of the most sweeping invocations of the unitary 
executive yet seen.591   
During his second term, Reagan designated Meese to lead the Justice Department 
by appointing him Attorney General.  Meese became very firmly committed to the theory 
of the unitary executive as well as to the authority and duty of all three branches to 
interpret the Constitution.  Meese explicitly questioned the constitutionality of 
independent agencies in a major speech, which was widely noticed at the time.592  He 
also made a speech defending departmentalism—the notion that all three branches of the 
federal government are co-equal interpreters of the Constitution—that was worthy of 
Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln.593  Meese’s so-called Tulane speech defending 
                                                                                                                                                 
deference must be given to the authority of the President to control and supervise executive policy 
making.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1622 v. Brown, 645 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (“Within the range of choice allowed by statute, the President may direct his subordinates’ 
choices.”). 
589 See supra notes 112, 261, 311 and accompanying text; Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _. 
590 Exec. Order 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982 compilation); see also 
Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Feb. 13, 1981), reprinted in Role 
of OMB in Regulation:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 486 (1981) (indicating that the OMB’s then-proposed 
oversight role was “advisory and consultative” and did not authorize it to reject an agency’s judgment as to 
matters delegated to it). 
591 See Percival, supra note 359, at 990-93; Rosenberg, supra note 524, at 1200-01. 
592 Howard Kurtz, Agencies’ Authority Challenged:  Justice Department Seems to Side with 
Conservatives on Regulatory Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1986, at A17; Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Question of 
Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8. 
593 Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). 
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departmentalism is every bit as ringing as Abraham Lincoln’s similar speech responding 
to Dred Scott.594 
Reagan was decisive when it came to matters of foreign policy.  When the 
question arose whether to invade and liberate the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada, 
Reagan tersely ordered “Do it.”595  In the key arms control negotiation of his presidency 
with Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland, Reagan took personal charge of the negotiations, 
and when Gorbachev tried to force him to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
Reagan dramatically walked out of the Reykjavik talks.596  Jimmy Carter’s National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski was later to mention Reagan’s walkout at 
Reykjavik as the key moment when the Cold War was won.597  Even after the disastrous 
Iran-Contra scandal broke Reagan took the decisive action of appointing a three member 
board of inquiry headed up by former Senator John Tower to thoroughly investigate the 
scandal and get to the bottom of what happened.  Reagan was in short a very decisive 
leader who always knew what direction he wanted policy to go in. 
Another strong point of the Reagan presidency was ability to use the bully pulpit 
of the presidency in a series of striking speeches to call attention to his policy views.  In 
one striking speech, Reagan called the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire” which he predicted 
would be buried on the ash heap of history.598  In another important foreign policy 
address, Reagan stood in front of the Berlin Wall and called on Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
                                                 
594 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 21, at 719-20. 
595 MORRIS, supra note 532, at 501. 
596 Id. at 599. 
597 Id. at 658. 
598 Id. at 474. 
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leader of the Soviet Union to “tear down this wall.”599  These speeches clearly 
accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union and gave hope to the long oppressed peoples 
of Eastern Europe and of the Baltic states.  Together with Reagan’s support for anti-
communist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua and together with his 
Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan’s speeches helped to bring about the fall of 
communism. 
Our review of the historical record thus reveals that Reagan represented a 
steadfast proponent and supporter of the unitariness of the executive branch.  Thus even 
if one agrees with Attorney General Smith that the Reagan Administration could have 
gone to greater lengths to protect the prerogatives of the Presidency, it is clear that 
Reagan’s efforts on behalf of the unitary executive were at least sufficient to override any 
suggestions that the Reagan Administration followed a sustained and systematic pattern 
of acquiescence to congressionally-imposed deviations from the unitariness of the 
executive branch. 
IX. GEORGE H.W. BUSH 
More than almost any other President except for William Howard Taft, George 
Herbert Walker Bush staunchly defended the unitariness of the executive branch.600  
Thanks in large measure to his exceptionally able White House Counsel, C. Boyden 
Gray, and his superb staff, Bush defended the unitariness of the executive branch with 
almost academic rigor. 
                                                 
599 Id. at 624. 
600 See Devins, supra note 600, at 1043 (“Bush, more than any other president, embraced the 
‘unitary executive’ theory of White House control over government operations.”); Lund, supra note 529 
(detailing the Bush Administration’s efforts to defend presidential prerogatives). 
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The Bush administration began with the somewhat astonishing decision that after 
eight years of Ronald Reagan, it was time to clean house.  John Robert Greene, Bush’s 
biographer, reports that “[f]ar from the ‘friendly takeover’ that many members of the 
press, and later, one influential scholarly book viewed it to be, Bush sounded as if he 
were taking the office away from a president of the other party.”601  Greene notes that 
superficially the cabinet seemed to belie this since seven Reagan cabinet members 
continued in the Bush administration, but since “Bush had absolutely no intention of 
dispersing power back to the departments,”602 what really mattered was his complete 
overhaul of the White House staff.  Greene notes that “As the administration carried on, 
cabinet meetings became more infrequent.  Though he made it clear to his staff that any 
member of his cabinet could see him at any time, Bush reserved the policy-making role 
for his White House staff.”603  Key staff appointments went to the smart but overly-clever 
Richard Darman and to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.  Scowcroft made it 
clear at the press conference announcing his appointment that “I want to have a new look.  
We’re going to formulate our policies.”604 
Early on in his administration Bush encountered a major battle with the 
Democratically controlled Senate over the nomination of former Senator John Tower to 
be the new Secretary of Defense.  Tower had been very supportive of Bush’s career in 
Texas politics, and Bush stuck with him loyally and doggedly to the very end.  When 
Tower’s nomination was finally rejected on a 53 to 47 vote, it became the first cabinet 
                                                 
601 JOHN ROBERT GREENE, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE BUSH 48 (2000). 
602 Id. at 49. 
603 Id. at 50. 
604 Id. 
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nomination to fail since the last years of the Eisenhower administration in 1959.605  Bush 
immediately recovered by appointing the exceptionally capable Dick Cheney to be 
Secretary of Defense in place of Tower, and Cheney was easily confirmed.  Bush’s 
willingness to support Tower against all the odds sent an important signal to subordinates 
in the executive branch that loyalty would be a two-way street in the first Bush 
Administration. 
Bush was a vigorous, hands-on leader, and his attention to detail was appreciated 
by the public after concerns in Ronald Reagan’s later years over his inattention to detail.  
As Greene reports: 
Despite Americans’ latent affection for Ronald Reagan, long before 1988 
they had become troubled with his hands-off, detached approach to 
presidential leadership.  In George Bush they found Reagan’s polar 
opposite.  Bush’s style of executive leadership was characterized by 
indefatigable energy.  Indeed the words “energetic” and “hyperactive” 
damn Bush with faint praise; by any definition he was a workaholic. . . .  
Bush’s staff continually complained (or boasted, depending on whom they 
were talking to) about the long hours and the phone calls in the middle of 
the night from a boss who just wanted to talk.606 
George Bush was clearly in charge of his administration and was very attentive to details. 
Almost immediately after his inauguration, Bush expressed his concerns about 
“the erosion of federal power.”607  In response to these concerns, Bush embarked upon 
the most aggressive defense of the President’s prerogatives the republic had ever seen, as 
Bush used a plethora of vetoes and signing statements to protect against any invasions of 
the constitutional authority of the Presidency that he perceived.608  For example, Bush 
                                                 
605 Id. at 57 
606 Id. at 141. 
607 See Lund, supra note 529, at 36. 
608 Id. at 41-42, 44.  Professor Lund has suggested that Bush’s signing statements were so 
scrupulous about the separation of powers that at times they became “almost comical.”  Id. at 44. 
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charged that permitting executive agencies to present to Congress views differing from 
those of the administration infringed upon his “constitutional responsibility to supervise 
my subordinates and to ensure that the executive branch speaks with one voice.”609   
Therefore, Bush indicated that he would “interpret these provisions in a manner 
consistent with my constitutional authority, as head of a unitary executive branch, to 
resolve disputes among my subordinates before their views are presented to the 
Congress.”610  Bush also protested that statutes purporting to prohibit the President from 
changing any decisions made by executive officials “must be interpreted in light of my 
constitutional responsibility, as head of the unitary executive branch, to supervise my 
subordinates.”611  Bush raised similar objections to statutes that attempted to guide the 
manner in which he controlled the executive branch.612  As Bush noted, “When a member 
                                                 
609 George Bush, Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (Dec. 19, 1991), in 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1649, 1650. 
610 Id.; see also George Bush, Statement on Signing the President John F. Kennedy 
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Oct. 26, 1992), in 1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 2004, 2005 
(objecting that a provision requiring an agency to report simultaneously to both the President and Congress 
“would intrude upon the President’s authority to supervise subordinate officials in the executive branch”); 
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (Oct. 28, 
1992), in 1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 2060, 2061 (noting that section authorizing executive official to submit 
“‘reports, recommendations, testimony, or comments’ to the Congress without prior approval by ‘any 
officer or agency of the Untied States’ raised “constitutional difficulties”). 
611 George Bush, Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Act, 1991 (Nov. 5, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1561, 1562; see also George Bush, Statement on Signing 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Dec. 19, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1718, 1719 
(objecting that insulating subordinate officials of the Department of Health and Human Services from 
presidential review deprives the President “of his constitutional authority to supervise their actions”); 
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National 
Wildlife Refuge (Nov. 21, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1664, 1664 (noting that use of “‘independent’ 
appraisers, who would not be subject to supervision by the President” was “contrary to Article II of the 
Constitution”). 
612 When faced with a provision purporting to determine how the President would resolve a 
dispute between the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of AID, Bush concluded that the provision 
must be interpreted “consistent with my inherent constitutional authority as head of the executive branch to 
supervise my subordinates in the exercise of their duties, including my authority to settle disputes that 
occur between those officials through means other than those specified in the statute.”  George Bush, 
Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Oct. 24, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1962, 1963; see 
also George Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1993 (Oct. 6, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1766, 1767 (objecting that provisions 
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of the executive branch acts in an official capacity, the Constitution requires that I have 
the ultimate authority to supervise that officer in the exercise of his or her duties.”613  
Clearly, if any President aspired to a “zero tolerance” policy with regards to 
infringements on the unitary executive, it was Bush. 
The Bush Administration also backed up these words with action.  It ignored the 
failure of the Reagan Administration’s challenges to the Comptroller General’s role in 
executing the Competition in Contracting Act614 and ignored the fee-recovery provision 
of the Act for similar reasons.615  Furthermore, the Bush Administration pressured 
Congress into enacting a version of the Whistleblower Protection Act that omitted the 
constitutionally objectionable features that led Reagan to pocket veto the initial 
version.616  Specifically, the revised Whistleblower Protection Act dropped the previous 
attempt to give the Office of Special Counsel independent litigating authority.  As Bush 
noted in his signing statement, this change  
addresse[d] the chief constitutional concerns raised by earlier versions of 
this legislation.  The most substantial improvement in the bill is the 
deletion of provisions that would have enabled the Special Counsel, an 
executive branch official, to oppose other executive branch agencies in 
court.  Under our constitutional system, the executive branch cannot sue 
itself.617   
                                                                                                                                                 
concerning regulatory review by OMB could be interpreted to interfere with my authority under the 
Constitution to supervise the decision-making process within and management of the executive branch). 
613 Bush, Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 , 
supra note 610, at 2061. 
614 See supra notes 575-578 and accompanying text. 
615 A federal court did not reach the merits of the issue, dismissing the case on ripeness 
grounds.  United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1992); see also May, supra 
note 289, at 979 n.549. 
616 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16.  See generally 
Kmiec, supra note 466, at 343-44. 
617 George Bush, Statement on the Signing of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 
(Apr. 10, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 391, 392 [hereinafter Bush, Whistleblower Protection Act Signing 
Statement]. 
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The amendment also resolved one of the other problems with the original legislation by 
providing that any materials submitted by the Office of Special Counsel to Congress 
would be submitted “concurrently” to the President, dropping the clause providing that 
such materials would be submitted without the President’s review.618  Bush’s signing 
statement construed these provisions in a manner consistent with the unitary executive by 
stating, “I do not interpret these provisions to interfere with my ability to provide for 
appropriate prior review of transmittals by the Special Counsel to the Congress.”619  
Bush also asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing the 
regulatory review program established by Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 during the 
Reagan Administration.  Bush supplemented these Executive Orders by creating an 
interagency task force known as the Council on Competitiveness. which was charged 
with coordinating regulatory policy and mediating disputes arising between OIRA and 
the agencies during the regulatory review process.620  Through this mechanism, the Bush 
White House was able to exert its control over the entire executive branch in an 
extremely effective manner.  For example, in one incident Bush partially overruled both 
OMB and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approving a modification to food 
labeling requirements proposed by the FDA over OMB’s objections, but changing its 
substantive scope of the FDA’s proposed rule by exempting restaurants in partial 
                                                 
618 § 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. at 28. 
619 Bush, Whistleblower Protection Act Signing Statement, supra note 617, at 392. 
620 See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:  The 
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 165-73 (1995); see also Herz, supra note 
357, at 223-26; Percival, supra note 357, at 154-55; DeWitt, supra note 357, at 776-78.  Bush also issued 
executive orders requiring agencies to consider the effect proposed regulations would have on the family 
and on federalism. See Exec. Order 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1993 compilation); Exec. Order 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 
252 (1987 compilation).  See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 492-93. 
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accommodation of OMB’s concerns.621  It would be a mistake to construe Bush’s 
willingness to compromise as suggesting that the decision was anyone’s but the 
president’s to make.  As FDA Commissioner Daniel Kessler acknowledged, “If the 
decision went against, I could no disobey an order from the President.  For me as 
apolitical appointee, the only response to defeat was to leave.”622  Indeed, when Deputy 
Chief of Staff Bob Zoellick informed Kessler of the final outcome, he flatly stated, “This 
is the President’s decision.”623  It is true that Bush found himself unable to mandate 
OMB’s preferred solution.  Bush noted somewhat surprisedly, “I can’t just make a 
decision and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just salute smartly and 
go execute whatever decision I make.”624  Some critics of the unitary executive have 
mistakenly taken this statement as a reflection of limitations on the president’s sole 
authority to execute the law.625  Closer inspection reveals any such conclusions to be 
erroneous.  Bush’s inability to impose OMB’s proposal did not reflect any substantive 
restrictions on the president’s authority to execute the law, but rather on the procedural 
requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act:  changes of the magnitude 
proposed by OMB would have to be subjected to the notice and comment requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which would delay the decision by at least six to eight 
weeks and leave the final decision to the Clinton Administration.626 
                                                 
621 Id. at 71. 
622 DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT:  A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY 
INDUSTRY 67 (2001). 
623 Id. at 70. 
624 Id. at 68. 
625 See Percival, supra note 359, at 994-95.   
626 KESSLER, supra note 622, at 68. 
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Bush also attempted to assert his control over the independent agencies when he 
directed the U.S. Postal Service to withdraw its suit against the Postal Rate Commission 
“pursuant to the President’s authority as Chief Executive and his obligation to take care 
that the laws are faithfully executed.”627  Bush backed up his order by threatening to 
remove members of the Postal Service’s Board of Governors who refused to go along 
with his order.628  That the courts eventually refused to back up Bush’s order629 does not 
blunt the fact that the Bush Administration’s position did represent a strong assertion of 
the unitariness of the executive branch. 
Confronting from day one a Democratic majority in both the House and the 
Senate, Bush realized from the start that he was going to have to wield his veto power to 
great effect, if he wanted to play a role in policy-making.  Bush was to achieve 
astonishing success in using the veto.  In “four years Bush vetoed forty-four bills, and his 
veto was upheld forty-three times.”630  The only Bush veto ever to be overridden was on 
the Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992.631  Greene reports, “As a 
result of his successes with the veto, Bush was able to use the threat of it to affect how 
legislation was constructed.  As of 25 July 1991, the White House Press Office had 
recorded thirty-eight threats of a presidential veto of legislation; the vast majority of the 
legislation on the list did not ever become law.”632  In this way, Bush was able “to put a 
                                                 
627 Memorandum of President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec. 11, 
1992), quoted in Devins, supra note 600, at 1045. 
628 See Devins, supra note 600, at 1043-46; Lund, supra note 529, at 79-82. 
629 The D.C. Circuit ruled against the Bush Administration’s arguments on all counts, 
enjoining the removal of the members of the Board of Governors and holding that the Postal Service had 
the authority to bring suit against the Postal Rate Commission despite the President’s contrary wishes.  
Mail Order Ass’n v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 527 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
630 Id. at 62. 
631 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
632 GREENE, supra note 601, at 62. 
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conservative cast on legislation that was, in its original form at least, marked by the 
liberal slant of the Democratic Congress.”633  Perhaps the most important example for our 
purposes is the Ethics in Government Act, which was scheduled to expire in 1992.  In an 
April 3 speech, Bush indicated that he would veto any extension of the independent 
counsel statute unless significant changes were made.634  At a luncheon with reporters, 
Attorney General William Barr reiterated the Bush Administration’s dissatisfaction with 
the Ethics in Government Act and confirmed the likelihood of a veto of the proposal then 
pending before Congress.635  This veto threat, when combined with a filibuster organized 
by Senate Republicans, doomed the reauthorization legislation and caused the Ethics in 
Government Act to lapse.636 
There was one major removal of the Bush years, and it involved Governor John 
Sununu, Bush’s first White House Chief of Staff.  Sununu was brilliant, hard-working, 
and a real street fighter, but he ultimately became a big liability to Bush.  George W. 
Bush and Andrew Card, Sununu’s Deputy, ultimately persuaded Sununu that Bush 
wanted him to resign, and he finally did so on December 3, 1991.  There is no question 
the resignation was a forced one for the angry Sununu did not want to leave.   
In addition, Bush continued to oppose the legislative veto as an impermissible 
violation of the separation of powers.637  Accordingly, Bush announced that he would 
                                                 
633 Id. 
634 George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the Federalist Society of Philadelphia in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania (Apr. 3, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 532, 535. 
635 See Sharon LaFraniere, Barr Urges “Fundamental Changes” in Independent Counsel 
Statute, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at A5. 
636 See Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors:  Legal Accountability and the 
Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 390 (1993). 
637 See George Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 1990 (Nov. 3, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1448, 1449; George Bush, 
Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990 (Nov. 30, 1989), in 1989 PUB. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  
 
137
“treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other legislation in which they 
appear.”638  Although the Bush Administration did enter into at least one informal 
agreement with Congress that would have much the same effect as a legislative veto,639 
as noted earlier such informal arrangements did not raise the same constitutional concerns 
as true legislative vetoes.640 
But even an Administration as conscientious about protecting presidential power 
as Bush’s did on occasion disregards its duty to protect the unitariness of the executive 
branch.  When Congress enacted a statute permitting members of Congress to exercise 
control over the management of Washington National and Dulles Airports, the Bush 
Administration failed to challenge its constitutionality before the Supreme Court when 
given the opportunity to do so.641  The Bush Administration did not suffer for its mistake, 
                                                                                                                                                 
PAPERS 1609, 1611; George Bush, Statement on Signing the International Narcotics Act of 1989 (Dec. 13, 
1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1698, 1699; George Bush, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Nov. 5, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1553, 1555; George Bush, Statement on 
Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991 (Nov. 5, 1990), in 
1990 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559; George Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and 
General Government Appropriations Act, 1992 (Oct. 28, 1991), in 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1349, 1350; George 
Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993 
(Oct. 5, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1756, 1757; Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service 
and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, supra note 612, at 1767; see also 16 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 18 (1992) (preliminary print); 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 38 (1990) (preliminary print).  Despite 
Bush’s attempt to object to every legislative veto, Reagan and Bush reportedly singed more than two 
hundred new legislative vetoes into law after Chadha and often complied with them.  See Fisher, 
Legislative Vetoes, supra note 86, at 288; Lund, supra note 529, at 65. 
638 See Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1990, supra note 637, at 1449; see also Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of 
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, supra note 637, at 1559; Bush, Statement on 
Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1992, supra note 637, at 
1350; Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Act, 1993, supra 
note 637, at 1757; Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1993, supra note 612, at 1767. 
639 In 1989, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, agreed to give four congressional 
committees the right to approve the release of $50 million in humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.  
FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 130, 141-42; Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 291; Lund, 
supra note 529, at 64-65. 
640 See Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 86; Lund, supra note 529, 
at 65. 
641 See Lund, supra note 529, at 70-79. 
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as the Supreme Court nonetheless struck down the legislation in part because it 
represented an impermissible exercise of executive power by members of the legislative 
branch.642  The Bush Administration’s failure to defend the unitary executive in this one 
regard simply underscores the propriety of requiring that a presidential practice be 
systematic, unbroken, and long standing before it can form the basis for inferring 
acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate construction.  It should not undermine the 
other, ample evidence that President Bush determinedly defended the President’s 
authority to execute the laws throughout his Administration and that he almost invariably 
acted to protect the unitariness of the executive branch against any and all congressional 
attempts to encroach upon it. 
X. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 
Although Bill Clinton has emerged as one of the most controversial presidents of 
the Twentieth Century,643 all agree that Clinton’s intelligence and knowledge of policy-
making details was very impressive.  Joe Klein, Clinton’s biographer, notes that the 
president’s abilities awed his staff: 
The awe was inspired by Clinton’s intelligence—particularly, his 
encyclopedic knowledge of policy questions—his perseverance and his 
ability to charm almost anyone under any circumstances; he was, without 
question, the most talented politician of his generation.  At close range, his 
skills could be breathtaking: He was always the center of attention; he 
filled any room he entered. . . . [Clinton’s] staff was intensely loyal, with a 
deep sense of political mission.  There had not been a truly successful 
                                                 
642 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 
252, 275-76 (1991). 
643 See Lindgren & Calabresi, supra note 294, at 591-92 (rating Clinton the most 
controversial president in history on the grounds that the ratings of Clinton in a survey of historians, legal 
scholars, and political scientists exhibited the greatest variability). 
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Democratic administration in a very long time; Clinton was the first 
Democrat to win reelection to a second term since Franklin Roosevelt.644 
Klein adds that Clinton “seemed to know everything there was to know about domestic 
social policy.”645  Others echo these conclusions with regard to Clinton’s knowledge of 
policy making details.  Klein quotes one observer as saying that Clinton was “[j]ust 
remarkable.  You call him up and ask, ‘Who’s doing interesting things in housing?’  And 
he can tell you what everyone is doing—every last housing experiment in every state.”646  
Harold Varmus, Clinton’s Director of the National Institutes of Health, remembered 
Clinton grilling “AIDS researchers for several hours, asking questions so detailed and 
sophisticated that most of the participants were shocked by his mastery of the issue.”647  
Clinton seemed to promise so much with “his intelligence and remarkable political skills, 
. . . his detailed knowledge of almost every government activity, . . . his very 
presence.”648  In sum, there can be no doubt about the force of Clinton’s intelligence or 
about his mastery of the details of policy-making. 
In addition, Clinton was an unusually hard-working president who was deeply 
immersed in the policy-making details of his Administration.  Clinton demanded total 
control over the workings of the executive branch—and this attitude filtered into his 
decisions in appointing and dismissing as well as controlling subordinates: 
Clinton’s problems stem not from his oft-reported love of detail, but also 
from his desire to reach down into his administration to make minor 
decisions best left to others.  Consider the delays in filling important jobs 
in the administration.  Clinton demanded that he be involved in “signing 
off on the appointment of every assistant secretary, and sometimes deputy 
                                                 
644 JOE KLEIN, THE NATURAL 3-4 (2002). 
645 Id. at 26. 
646 Id. 
647 Id. at 188-89. 
648 Id. at 216. 
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assistant secretaries.”  The desire to be involved in every level of 
administration and in the many detailed debates of his policies reflects 
more than a quest for excellence; it suggests a need for control.  The 
element of control has been little noticed in Clinton’s psychology but is 
evident in his presidency.  By setting up a freewheeling staff system 
without clear lines of authority, by allowing lines of authority to be 
blurred, and by attempting to act as his own chief of staff, Clinton not only 
retains a large measure of control but remains the focus and the center.  By 
appointing a cabinet that reflects both strong left-of-center leanings 
(Donna Shalala, Henry Cisneros, Robert Reich) and strong moderate 
leanings (Lloyd Bentsen, Janet Reno), Clinton has done more than ensure 
he will get conflicting views; he has set himself as the center, as the 
person to be convinced, the person toward whom all debate is 
addressed.649   
Much like Lyndon Johnson, Clinton wanted no disagreement, indeed, no 
independent forces within his executive department.   
Both Bill and Hillary “have a greater need than is good for them to have 
people around them whose loyalty—and lack of independence—wasn’t in 
question.”  When it came to selecting his first chief of staff, “Friend after 
friend of Clinton said Clinton didn’t want a Jim Baker (Reagan’s strong, 
and cunning Chief of Staff).  He wanted someone with whom he was 
utterly comfortable, whom he could completely trust, who had not agenda 
of his own, and who wouldn’t get in his way” because “to his own great 
detriment, Clinton wanted to be his own Chief of Staff.”650 
Clinton even violated his own policies in order to achieve a staff that deferred to 
his executive authority.  “After his election, Clinton began his administration’s transition 
by announcing it would be guided by a stringent set of conflict-of-interest guidelines.  
Yet almost immediately they were relaxed to allow the president’s close friend Vernon 
Jordan to join the transition team as an adviser.”651  In addition, Clinton did not hesitate 
to exercise his authority to remove executive officials.  In October 1993, following a 
major battle in Somalia and a major blunder in Haiti, National Security Advisor Anthony 
                                                 
649 Id. at 260 (citations omitted) (quoting ELIZABETH DREW, ON THE EDGE:  THE CLINTON 
PRESIDENCY 99 (1994)). 
650 Id. at 264 (quoting DREW, supra note 649, at 130, 235). 
651 Id. at 278. 
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Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher both offered to resign.  As it turned out, 
Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who was “less prompt with his tender, was the one who 
was asked to leave.”652  The effective dismissal of Les Aspin was probably the most 
visible removal of the Clinton Administration. 
In addition to determining the composition of his administration, Clinton 
employed a wide array of institutional arrangements to ensure that he retained control 
over the execution of the law, which have been capably documented in a recent article by 
Dean Elena Kagan.653  For example, Clinton preserved the system of OMB regulatory 
oversight instituted during the Reagan and Bush Administrations largely intact.  
Specifically, Clinton continued to require agencies to participate in a regulatory planning 
process and to submit major regulations for OMB review.654 
After the criticism leveled by Democrats at OMB involvement in the regulatory 
process,655 that Clinton would continue this program might be regarded as something of a 
surprise.  Clinton did institute some changes in the program to mitigate the more 
deregulatory bent of the Reagan-Bush program of regulatory review.  Although Clinton’s 
scheme continued to evaluate rules through the lens of cost-benefit analysis,656 it 
broadened the inquiry to allow consideration of other factors, such as “equity,” 
“distributive impacts,” and “qualitative measures.”657  In addition, the Clinton program 
regularized many of the procedures surrounding regulatory review, requiring disclosure 
                                                 
652 Id. at 73. 
653 See Kagan, supra note 25. 
654 Executive Order 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993 compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601. 
655 See Devins, supra note 156, at, 256; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing 
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17, 27 (1995); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a 
System of Checks and Balances:  The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 
174 (1995). 
656 §§ 1(b)(5)-(6), 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 639, 645. 
657 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 639. 
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of all ex parte contacts and written communications between OIRA and the agency658 and 
placing limits on the time available for OMB review.659  In addition, the executive order 
implementing the scheme listed as one of its goals the “reaffirm[ation of] the primacy of 
Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making process” and averred that “the 
regulatory process shall be conducted with due regard to the discretion that has been 
entrusted to the federal Agencies.”660 
What did not change was the commitment to the unitariness of the executive 
branch underlying the institution of OMB review.  Clinton’s executive order clearly put 
the president in the position of resolving any interagency disputes that emerge from OMB 
review.661  “At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice President acting 
at the request of the President, shall notify the affected agency . . . of the President’s 
decision with respect to the matter.”662  Centralized regulatory planning and oversight 
continued to give the president a powerful tool for exercising control over his 
administration, and casing the president as the person to resolve any conflicts 
“constituted a striking assertion of executive authority.”663  Indeed, although centralized 
regulatory review was criticized as a largely deregulatory-oriented institution during the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations, the experience under the Clinton Administration 
revealed that its importance transcended mere partisan politics.  Instead, it is driven by 
the more fundamental and enduring issue of the proper balance of power within the 
federal government and the most effective way to ensure effective execution of the law. 
                                                 
658 § 6(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. at 647-48. 
659 § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 646-47. 
660 Pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 638. 
661 § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648. 
662 Id. 
663 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2289. 
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In some ways, Clinton expanded the regulatory review process far beyond that 
employed by Reagan and Bush.  For example, unlike Reagan, who asserted that he had 
the authority to include the independent agencies within OMB review, but declined to do 
so as a matter of discretion,664 Clinton required the independent agencies to participate in 
the regulatory planning process.665  Policies proposed by the independent agencies that 
were in conflict with other agency action or “the President’s priorities” would be required 
to participate in “further consideration.”666  Clinton’s belief in the president’s authority 
over the independent agencies was also evident in his response to legislation turning the 
Social Security Administration into an independent agency headed by an Administrator 
who was removable only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”667  When signing 
the bill into law, Clinton noted that the removal provisions raised significant 
constitutional questions.668  Clinton also sent letters to independent agencies requesting 
that take action on particular issues, although it has been suggested that these 
communications more resembled requests than orders from the head of the administrative 
state.669  As Kagan notes, the inclusion of the independent agencies within the regulatory 
planning process “signified a strong commitment to presidential oversight of 
administration” that exceeded even that asserted under Reagan.670 
                                                 
664 See supra note 587. 
665 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642. 
666 § 4(c)(4)-(6), 3 C.F.R. at 643. 
667  42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3). 
668  William J. Clinton, President’s Statement on Signing the Social Security Independence 
and Program Improvements Act of 1994 (Aug. 15, 1994), in 1994 PUB. PAPERS 1471, 1472. 
669 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2308-09. 
670 Id. at 2288; see also Pildes & Sunstein 29 (arguing that the inclusion of the independent 
agencies within the Clinton regulatory review scheme was driven in part by “an especially strong 
commitment to centralized presidential oversight of the large policy judgments made by independent 
agencies”). 
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Clinton also demonstrated his support for the president’s authority to implement 
the laws by issuing directives to other federal officials about how they should exercise 
their discretionary authority across a wide range of areas.671  In short, “[g]he President 
. . . asserted his right as head of the executive branch to determine how its internal 
processes and constituent units were to function.”672  Although both Reagan and Bush 
had employed this device in the past, Clinton took it to a completely different level.  Not 
only did Clinton issue far more such directives than his predecessors;673 Clinton’s 
interventions went far beyond the more managerial issues that had previously been the 
subject of such directives, such as the administration of the national park system, the 
armed forces, and federal contracting.  Instead, Clinton’s orders had a broad impact on 
nongovernmental actors and rights customarily viewed as private.674  Such authority was 
extremely helpful with respect to issues that transcended the classic departmental 
boundaries or required significant coordination.675  Presidential authority became all the 
more important after the Democrats lost control of Congress.676  Clinton’s domination of 
the lower agencies “sa[id] something significant about the nature of the relationship 
between the agencies and the President—to say that they were his and so too were their 
decision.”677 
                                                 
671 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2282-84, 2292, 2303-06 (detailing instances of presidential 
direction of federal policy in a wide range of areas, including health care; firearms regulation; 
nondiscrimination with respect to sexual orientation, parental status, or genetics; labor policy; energy and 
environmental policy; child support; youth smoking; and family leave). 
672 Id. at 2292. 
673 Kagan identifies only nine instances in which Reagan directed heads of domestic policy 
agencies on a matter of substantive regulatory policy.  Bush issued four such directives.  Clinton, in 
contrast, issued 107 such orders.  Id. at 2294-95. 
674 Id. at 2291-92. 
675 Id. at 2306. 
676 Id. at 2312. 
677 Id. at 2290. 
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Clinton’s close association with regulatory policy was apparent not only in his 
willingness to assert control over the agencies, but also in the manner in which he 
communicated about those policies with the American people.  As Kagan notes: 
In this administration, . . . nothing as too bureaucratic for the President.  
IN event after event, speech after speech, Clinton claimed ownership of 
administrative actions, presenting them to the public as his own—as the 
product of his values and decisions.  He merged in public, and to the 
public, as the wielder of ‘executive authority’ and, in that capacity, the 
source of regulatory action.678   
The manner in which Clinton used the bully pulpit to control the direction of his 
administration and to mobilize public support for his regulatory program “sent a loud and 
lingering message:  these were his agencies; he was responsible for their actions; and he 
was due credit for their successes”679  Indeed, so great was Clinton’s domination of his 
administration that one Senator accused Clinton of “debasing the constitutional 
structure.”680  Using language reminiscent of similar criticisms leveled at Andrew 
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Andrew Johnson,681 Congressman J.C. Watts criticized 
Clinton for “pretty much . . . acting as the king of the world.”682 
Another major initiative launched by Clinton was the attempt to reinvent 
government to be smaller and more efficient.  Vice President Albert Gore was charged 
                                                 
678 Id. at 2301. 
679 Id. at 2302. 
680 John J. Fialka, Clinton is Likely to Leave the Presidency with Record of Having Protected 
Lands, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2000, at A18 (quoting Senator Larry Craig), quoted in Kagan, supra note 25, 
at 2314. 
681 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1529, 1543; Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 21, at 
733, 744 
682 News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 22, 2001), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june01/abortion_1-22.html, quoted in Kagan, supra note 25, 
at 2314. 
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with being the point man on the “Reinventing Government” reform portfolio.683  Klein 
describes Gore’s involvement in the project as follows: 
The Reinventing Government project was perfect for [Gore], very worthy 
if eminently vice presidential: Presidents usually have more important 
things to worry about than how the government actually works.  But 
Reinventing Government was a particular favorite of New Democrats, 
who loved the idea of a direct assault upon the ancient paradigm of federal 
bureaucracy. . . .684 
Many aspects of this program would prove quite successful.  The federal 
workforce would be reduced by about 350,000 and an estimated $157 billion saved.  
Equally important, 16,000 pages of bureaucratic regulations would be tossed—including 
some of the more famous government snafus, like the purchasing regulations at the 
Pentagon that resulted in $700 toilet seats and $150 hammers.685  Ultimately, however, 
the plan to “reinvent government” became sidetracked by political exigency.  Clinton’s 
efforts to reinvent government would eventually be undone by his desire for new 
programs in health care and housing.  That Clinton was unable to marshal the resources 
to carry through on this initiative should not be taken as any belief that he lacked the 
authority to do so. 
The Clinton Administration ended in January of 2001 with quite a bang.  
President Clinton chose to depart office after “granting 177 presidential pardons and 
commutations of sentences on his last night in office.”  As Klein reports  
There was a libidinous crudeness to all of this.  It was a final act of self-
indulgence, a total loss of control.  Other presidents had granted last 
minute pardons, had signed last-minute executive orders, had staged 
bathetic farewell tours—but the rapacious enormity of these conceits and 
absolutions seemed to recapitulate Clinton’s most loathsome qualities.  
                                                 
683 KLEIN, supra note 644, at 65 
684 Id. at 66. 
685 Id. at 67. 
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And the Marc Rich pardon, at once incomprehensible and instructive, was 
the worst of all.686 
The only bright spot about the pardons was that they illustrated the extent to which, that 
for better or worse, the Constitution puts the President squarely in charge of the law 
enforcement process. 
Although there is always room for disagreement as to the substance of Clinton’s 
policies, in retrospect his commitment to the unitariness of the executive branch cannot 
be gainsaid.  As Clinton himself noted towards the end of his presidency, “I think if you 
go back over the whole reach of our tenure here, I have always tried to use the executive 
authority.”687 
XI. THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE DEATH OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 
ACT 
The Clinton years also witnessed one of the most climactic moments in the 
history of the unitary theory of the executive:  the demise of the Ethics in Government 
Act and the institution of impendent counsels.  The events began when Clinton directed 
Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate the mounting allegations of improprieties 
regarding the Arkansas Whitewater Development Corporation.  On January 20, 1994, 
Reno appointed Robert Fiske, a moderate Republican and prominent member of the New 
York Bar who had served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York during 
the Carter Administration, as special counsel to investigate Whitewater. 
                                                 
686 Id. at 204, 196. 
687 President’s News Conference (Dec. 8, 1999). 
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While the investigation was underway, Congress repassed the Ethics in 
Government Act, which had lapsed during the Bush Administration.688  The three-judge 
court designated under the statute to oversee the independent counsels immediately 
dismissed Fiske on the grounds that because he had been picked by the Administration to 
investigate Whitewater, he was insufficiently independent.  In a fateful move, the three-
judge court instead tapped Kenneth Starr, a former federal circuit judge and Solicitor 
General during the Bush Administration.  Starr’s inquiry kept expanding as more and 
more new subjects opened up for him to investigate, including firings in the White House 
Travel Office and even the suicide of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster.   
Eventually, the Starr investigation collided with a sexual harassment suit brought 
against Clinton by Paula Jones, who alleged that Clinton had exposed himself to her and 
had demanded oral sex after seeing her managing the registration desk at a conference.  
Jones sued Clinton, who claimed an executive privilege to the effect that a sitting 
president is not subject to civil suit for events that took place before he took office.  This 
issue went before the Supreme Court, and the Clinton Solicitor General’s office argued 
that the Court should find a privilege such that Jones’s suit would be postponed until after 
Clinton left office.  The Administration’s brief began with the claim that: 
To require that the President defend against private civil lawsuits in state 
and federal courts during his term of office would intrude impermissibly 
upon the President’s performance of his constitutional duties, in violation 
of separation of powers principles.  In both constitutional and practical 
terms, the demands placed upon the President under Article II are 
unceasing.  A sitting President cannot defend himself against litigation 
seeking to impose personal financial liability without diverting his energy 
and attention from the exercise of the “executive Power” of the United 
States.  A judicial order requiring the President to participate in the 
                                                 
688 See supra notes 636 and accompanying text. 
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defense of a private civil suit would therefore place the court in the 
position of impairing a coordinate Branch of the government in the 
performance of its constitutional functions.689 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously against Clinton,690 although Justice 
Stephen Breyer wrote what can best be described as a Clinton-friendly concurrence.691  
One great point of amusement about the Court’s opinion in Clinton v. Jones was Justice 
Stevens’s statement, hilarious in retrospect, that the case was “highly unlikely to occupy 
any substantial amount of [Clinton’s] time.”692 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. Jones, Jones’s attorneys 
deposed the President, asking him about his not-so-secret affair with Monica Lewinsky.  
When confronted with the Lewinsky allegations, Clinton denied under oath having a 
sexual relationship with Lewinsky, which in turn led Starr to investigate the perjury and 
obstruction of justice charges that formed the basis of Clinton’s impeachment by the 
House of Representatives on December 19, 1998 and subsequent acquittal by the Senate 
on February 12, 1999.   
Although some scholars have predicted that the Clinton impeachment would a 
weaken the presidency in the same manner as the failed impeachment of Andrew 
Johnson,693 other scholars have pointed out that such arguments overlook a fundamental 
difference between the two impeachments.694  Although there was certainly a partisan 
                                                 
689 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853). 
690 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
691 Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
692 Id. at 702. 
693 See R.W. Apple Jr., The Fallout of the Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1 (quoting 
Schlesinger). 
694 The most extended statement of this position is Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was 
No Andrew Johnson:  Comparing Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422 (2000).  See also Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:  Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 
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element to both impeachments, as Keith Whittington has eloquently demonstrated, “The 
Johnson impeachment was centrally about presidential power,”695 particularly with 
respect to which branch would control Reconstruction696 and Johnson’s conception of the 
president as the direct spokesperson for the people and the sole head of a unitary 
executive branch.697  The impeachment was thus in no small part a battle between 
Congress and Johnson over the proper role of the presidency in the constitutional order.  
Indeed, it is no accident that the “high crime” that provided basis for the impeachment—
the removal of Secretary of War Edward Stanton in contravention of the Tenure of Office 
Act of 1867—was unique to the presidency and could not have been committed by any 
other individual.698  Nothing less than the very structure of the federal government hung 
in the balance. 
In stark contrast to the Johnson impeachment, the Clinton impeachment focused 
on the particular individual holding the office of president and not the presidency itself.  
Indeed, as Whittington notes, “The Clinton impeachment was so unsatisfying in part 
because it seemed so constitutionally unimportant.”699  Neither the president nor 
Congress used the impeachment process as a platform for advancing a vision of the 
president’s place within the constitutional order.700  As a result, it is unlikely to have 
                                                                                                                                                 
GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (“[U]nlike the other instance—the impeachment of Bill Clinton—at the center of the 
Johnson impeachment was a fundamental power struggle between the two branches on the most critical 
issues of the day.”); Laura Kalman, The (Un?)Bearable Liteness of E-Mail:  Historians, Impeachment and 
Bush v. Gore, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 579, 602 (2003) (“In fact, Clinton’s impeachment bore few parallels 
to Johnson’s.”). 
695 Whittington, supra note 694, at 426. 
696 Id. at 427-31. 
697 Id. at 438-39. 
698 Id. at 443. 
699 Id. at 459. 
700 Id. at 455. 
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significant implications for the distribution of power between the legislative and 
executive branches.701 
In the end, the most important consequence of these events for the theory of the 
unitary executive was that it led to the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of its prior 
defense of the Ethics in Government Act.  Clinton was not the only person dogged by an 
independent counsel investigation.  Fully five members of Clinton’s Cabinet were 
investigated by special prosecutors.702  When the Act came up for renewal, the Clinton 
Administration dropped its support for the Act.  The first indication of this change in 
position appeared in Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder’s testimony during House 
subcommittee hearings on reauthorization.703  Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno, 
offered similar testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs about 
the Act: 
 After much reflection and inquiry, we [at the Justice Department] 
have decided—reluctantly—to oppose reauthorization of the Independent 
Counsel Act. . . .  In 1993, as many of you know, I testified in support of 
the statute. . . .  However, after working with the Act, I have come to 
believe—after much reflection and with great reluctance—that the 
Independent Counsel Act is structurally flawed and that those flaws cannot 
be corrected within our constitutional framework . . .. 
 Our Founders set up three branches of government:  a Congress 
that would make the laws, an Executive that would enforce them, and a 
judiciary that would decide when they had been broken.  The Attorney 
General, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, 
is publicly accountable for her decisions. . . . 
 In contrast, the independent counsel is vested with the full gamut 
of prosecutorial powers, but with little of its accountability.  He has not 
been confirmed by the Senate, and he is not typically subject to the same 
sorts of oversight or budgetary constraints that the Department faces day 
                                                 
701 Id. at 450-59. 
702 Id. at 88. 
703 Reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Statute, Part I:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 61 (1999) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearings]. 
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in and day out.  Accountability is no small matter.  It goes to the very heart 
of our constitutional scheme.  Our Founders believed that the enormity of 
the prosecutorial power—and all the decisions about who, what, and 
whether to prosecute—should be vested in one who is responsible to the 
people.  That way—and here I am paraphrasing Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Morrison v. Olsen—whether we’re talking about over-prosecuting or 
under-prosecuting, “The blame can be assigned to someone who can be 
punished.”  It was for this reason that the American republic survived for 
over 200 years without an Independent Counsel Act.704 
Both the first (Archibald Cox) and the last (Kenneth Starr) of the modern 
independent counsels asked Congress to let the statute die.705  Senators Howard Baker, 
Robert Dole, and George Mitchell706 as well as a bipartisan array of former Attorneys 
General707 and independent counsels708 also called for restoring control over prosecution 
of senior government officials to the control of the executive branch. 
The Clinton Administration’s opposition to reauthorization dealt a final death 
blow to the Ethics in Government Act.  Republicans still upset about Lawrence Walsh’s 
investigation of Iran-Contra joined with Democrats outraged by the Starr investigation of 
Clinton to bring an end to the independent counsel statute.  The statute was allowed to 
                                                 
704 The Future of the Independent Counsel Act:  Hearings Before the Comm. on Sen. 
Governmental Affairs Comm., 106th Cong. 242, 245-46 (1999) (testimony of Attorney General Janet 
Reno), reprinted in PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 675-76 (2000) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearings]. 
705 See id. at 719, 725 (testimony of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr); Cox & 
Heymann, supra note 9. 
706 See id. at 26 (testimony of former Senate Majority Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr.); 
ROBERT DOLE & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, PROJECT ON THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1999) 
707 See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 704. at 28 (testimony of former Attorney 
General Griffin B. Bell); House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 703, at 139 (testimony of former 
Attorney General William P. Barr), 146 (testimony of former Attorney General Benjamin R. Civletti). 
708 See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 704, at 56 (testimony of former Independent 
Counsel Joseph E. diGenova); 204 (testimony of former Independent Counsel Robert Fiske), 330 
(testimony of former Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh), 364 (testimony of former Assistant 
Prosecutor, Whitewater Investigation Julie Rose O’Sullivan).  Former independent counsels were not 
unanimous in their opposition.  See id. at 64 (testimony of former Special Prosecutor Arthur H. Christy), 76 
(testimony of former Independent Counsel Curtis Emery Von Kann), 283 (testimony of former Associate 
Independent Counsel John Q. Barrett). 
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lapse, and subsequent regulations gave the attorney general the authority to appoint and 
supervise special counsels charged with investigating top government officials. 
The abruptness with which support for the Act collapsed was somewhat shocking.  
At the end of 1997, the statute still enjoyed broad support, although many commentators 
and legislators believed some adjustments might be necessary.  By the end of 1998, 
political support had almost completely evaporated.709 
Thus, as we predicted,710 the rise and fall of the Ethics in Government Act 
ultimately paralleled the rise and fall of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 chronicled in 
our prior work.711.  Both statutes were enacted by imperial Congresses at a time of great 
presidential weakness:  the Andrew Johnson Administration in one case and the post-
Watergate Carter Administration in the other.  Both statutes lasted roughly twenty years, 
during which time they worked very badly.  Both statutes were then finally repealed in a 
show of bipartisan determination to return to the system of presidential removal power 
which the Framers so wisely bequeathed us. 
CONCLUSION 
We thus come to the end of our four-part survey of the presidents from George 
Washington to Bill Clinton to determine the constitutional practices with respect to 
presidential control over the execution of the law.  Just as we found in each of the 
preceding periods, we conclude that every president between 1945 and 2001 defended the 
unitariness of the executive branch with sufficient ardor to rebuff any claims that 
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institutions such as independent counsels and independent agencies have been foreclosed 
as a matter of history.  From Harry Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur to 
Bill Clinton’s removal of Les Aspin, each president during in this period has proved to be 
a vigorous defender of the unitary executive.  The consistency with which presidents 
have asserted their sole authority to execute the law is made all the more important by the 
Supreme Court’s recognition in INS v. Chadha712 that the fact that every president since 
Woodrow Wilson had objected to the legislative veto was sufficient to prevent the issue 
from becoming an established aspect of our constitutional order.  Clearly, the same 
reasoning dictates that the issue remains open as a historical matter and must be resolved 
on the basis of legal and normative arguments. 
The main controversy during this fourth quarter of American history that bore on 
the unitary executive was over the constitutionality of the special prosecutor regime set 
up by the ethics in government act.  The important point to note about that controversy is 
that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s approval of the institution of independent 
counsels in Morrison v. Olson,713 the Ethics in Government Act was allowed to lapse in 
June of 1999 after both Democrats and Republicans had grown to appreciate its flaws.  
This rejection of the Ethics in Government Act some twenty years after it was first 
enacted is quite reminiscent of the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act under Grover 
Cleveland, which also occurred some twenty years after that statute was enacted.  In both 
case, Congress was tempted to experiment with unconstitutional limits on the president’s 
removal power, and in both cases the unconstitutional regime did not work out and was 
                                                 
712 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983). 
713  487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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eliminated.  The story of the rise and fall of both the Tenure of Office Act and the Ethics 
in Government Act are eerily similar and stand as stark reminders of the dangers that can 
occur when the power to execute the law is placed outside of presidential control. 
That the unitary executive would emerge from this era as an open constitutional 
question is rendered all the more remarkable in light of the radical expansion of 
presidential power during this era.  This serves a stark refutation of those who have 
argued that the increase in executive authority justified sanctioning greater legislative 
intervention in the execution of the law.714 
We do not expect, however, that the demise of the independent counsel law will 
forestall further controversy surrounding the unitariness of the executive branch.  Indeed, 
many of these issues have begun to play themselves out once again during the 
Administration of George W. Bush.  The question about the proper scope of presidential 
control over the execution of the law arose when creating the new Cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Security.  Given the sensitive nature of the antiterrorism work 
to be conducted by the Department, Bush was adamant that the president have the 
unilateral power to remove Department officials at will.  Disagreement by Senate 
Democrats led to an impasse that would ultimately be settled by the 2002 midterm 
elections, in which the Republicans successfully gained control of the Senate.  It is thus 
likely that we have not yet seen the last of the debates surrounding the unitary executive.  
It is our hope that in reviewing the history of presidential practices with respect to the 
execution of the law, this project will help provide the historical context in front of which 
the relevant legal and normative issues can be discussed. 
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